Should Audit Committee Directors Serve on Multiple Audit Committees? Evidence from Cost of Equity Capital

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Divesh S. Sharma ◽  
Vineeta D. Sharma ◽  
Paul N. Tanyi ◽  
Xiaoyan Cheng

SUMMARY We find a significant negative association between cost of equity and audit committee directors' simultaneous service on multiple audit committees (ACNUM). However, this association is not linear, as we find that cost of equity begins to increase when ACNUM is 1.50 for non-retired directors compared to 3.50 for retired directors. Further analyses reveal the negative association is more pronounced when a firm's information environment is strong and widely used firm-level measures of multiple directorships are not related to cost of equity. The evidence we present is consistent with the notion that investors positively perceive audit committee directors' service on multiple audit committees, but only to the extent such service does not undermine directors' ability to effectively discharge their governance responsibilities. Our study informs policymakers, boards, and nominating committees and advances the literature on multiple directorships, audit committees, and cost of equity. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; M40; M41. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Author(s):  
Jimmy Carmenate ◽  
Cori O. Crews ◽  
Vineeta D. Sharma ◽  
John R. Sparger

Recent research by Sharma, Sharma, Tanyi, and Cheng (2020) provides new insight into directors serving on multiple public company audit committees. Specifically, they investigate how an individual audit committee director serving on multiple audit committees is related to companies’ cost of equity capital. Their evidence suggests that serving on multiple audit committees is viewed positively by investors up to a certain point, but beyond that point investors become concerned. This turning point, on average, is 3.5 audit committees for retired directors and 1.5 audit committees for directors in full-time employment. These results have implications for numerous stakeholders including investors, proxy advisors, boards, nominating committees, stock exchanges, and policymakers. They also have implications for future research.


2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 84-93
Author(s):  
Yawar Miraj Khilji ◽  
Shehzad Khan ◽  
Muhammad Faizan Malik

This Research explores the effect of Chief executive Dominance and Shareholder rights on Cost of equity of listed companies in an emerging equity market, Pakistan. The research is for the period of 2012 to 2018 for which firm level data of top 100 non-financial listed firms from Pakistan Stock Exchange has been examined by using descriptive statistics, a correlation -matrix, Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Model approach. The impact of controlled variables which includes firm size, Financial Leverage, and Book to market ratio influence on the firms cost of equity has also been investigated. Research results indicate that when Chief executive officers align their interest with that of shareholders, the risk of agency problem is mitigated thus leading to lower cost of equity.


2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-112
Author(s):  
Jessica Dye ◽  
Aaron Gilbert ◽  
Gail Pacheco

Recent evidence has suggested that the benefits of equity market integration may not be shared equally by all firms. Making use of a firm-level measure of integration we investigate whether one of the documented benefits of equity market integration, lower cost of equity capital (COEC), holds for all Australian firms. Empirical evidence suggests that the degree of integration is reflected in firm COEC, albeit not in the expected way. Our results indicate that increased integration at the firm level leaves firms exposed to higher COEC when world market conditions are volatile.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amitava Mondal ◽  
Chiranjit Ghosh

PurposeThe impact of the intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) on the cost of equity capital (COEC) is not well established in the aspect of the Indian scenario. So the objective of this paper is to examine not only the overall effect of ICD but also the individual effect of human capital disclosure (HCD), relational capital disclosure (RCD) and structural capital disclosure (SCD) on COEC.Design/methodology/approachThis research work is conducted by regressing COEC, firm size, leverage, industry type and disclosure index. The disclosure index is prepared based on content analysis of disclosure made in the annual reports of a sample of 50 companies listed in the Nifty 50 index for the year 2018–2019. But in this paper 20 companies are eliminated due to their negative COEC and rest 30 companies are used as the sample companies for this study.FindingsThe outcome of this study indicates a negative association between the disclosure of intellectual capital (IC) as a whole and the COEC. But a negative association only for two components (human capital and structural capital) with the COEC is found only when the association of COEC with the categories of ICD is considered.Originality/valueThis is the first study that examines the nexus between the level of ICD and its impact on the COEC in India context.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahsan Habib ◽  
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan ◽  
Julia Y.H. Wu

Purpose This paper aims to investigate whether audit committee ownership (consisting of both equity holdings and option holdings) is associated with the cost of equity capital. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses regression analysis to examine the association between audit committee ownership and the cost of equity capital. The data set consists of 2,825 firm-year observations for companies listed on the ASX between 2001 and 2015. This paper also conducts tests to explore the mediating effects of financial reporting quality, firm performance and the risk of reporting problems, on the relation between audit committee ownership and cost of equity capital. Findings The analyses reveal that audit committee ownership reduces the firm’s cost of equity and, thereby, support the incentive alignment view. However, the association is driven primarily by audit committee equity ownership, with option holdings having an insignificant effect. This paper also finds that firm performance mediates the association between audit committee ownership and the cost of equity capital. Practical implications Findings of the existing corporate governance research relating to the cost of equity capital and audit committee ownership remain sparse in the context of “comply-or-explain” types of regulatory environment, like that of Australia. The findings indicate that principle-based discretionary governance arrangements, e.g. compensating audit committee members with company equity, may bring benefits to firms in terms of cheaper financing. Regulators, scholars and practitioners are invited to consider further the comprehensive implications of the structure and transparency of audit committee incentives on the effective functioning of security markets. Originality/value The effects of audit committee ownership on the cost of equity capital are an issue of direct economic consequence for equity investors. The main finding of this study, namely, that a firm with higher audit committee share ownership is likely to benefit from a lower cost of equity capital, therefore adds value to the limited extant literature.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nasser Alsadoun ◽  
Vic Naiker ◽  
Farshid Navissi ◽  
Divesh S. Sharma

SUMMARY Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) banned most nonaudit services (NAS), it did not restrict auditors from providing tax NAS to their audit clients. In the post-SOX period, regulators and investors are highly concerned about the increase in tax NAS and consequently calling for restrictions. The profession contends that tax NAS are beneficial to the audit and opposes limitations. We contribute to this ongoing debate and fill a void in the literature by examining investors' perception of auditor-provided tax NAS, as reflected in the implied cost of equity capital. Our results suggest that investors require higher cost of equity capital for clients that generate more tax NAS revenue for their auditor's office. Further tests reveal that our main finding is driven by audit clients that report more uncertain tax reserves (higher tax risk), rather than clients that exhibit poor financial reporting quality. The effects we document are economically significant and robust to a large battery of sensitivity tests. Our findings suggest that investors seem to negatively perceive tax NAS because of punitive and cash flow risks associated with tax NAS. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ranjith Appuhami

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine whether audit committee characteristics influence the cost of equity capital. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on signalling theory, this study hypothesises that the presence of an AC with adequate characteristics serves as a market “signal” of the credibility of the effective monitoring process and hence affects the perception of capital providers on the cost of equity capital. The study uses a multiple regression analysis on data collected from a sample of top Australian listed firms. Findings The study finds that audit committee characteristics such as size, meeting frequency and independence are significantly and negatively associated with the cost of equity capital. However, there is no significant evidence that the financial qualifications of audit committee directors are associated with the cost of equity capital. Originality/value While there have been several studies examining the cost of equity capital, there is very limited research on the cost of capital in Australian firms. The study aims to fill this gap, in part, and contribute to the literature on corporate governance and signalling theory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1105-1134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn M. Callahan ◽  
Rodney E. Smith ◽  
Angela Wheeler Spencer

ABSTRACT This study examines whether the adoption in 2003 of FASB Interpretation No. 46/R (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities—An Interpretation of ARB No. 51, changed the cost of capital for affected firms. Using comparative analysis on a broad sample of 11,719 firm-quarter observations for 1,389 firms during the period 1998 through 2005, we find evidence that FIN 46 significantly increased the cost of equity capital for firms with affected variable interest entities (VIEs), an increase of approximately 50 basis points relative to firms reporting no material effect from the standard. Further, firms consolidating these formerly off-balance sheet structures experienced the largest increase. Taken together, these results suggest that FIN 46 reduced the opportunity for firms to use off-balance sheet structures to artificially reduce their cost of capital, a matter of regulatory concern. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.


2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masoud Azizkhani ◽  
Gary S. Monroe ◽  
Greg Shailer

SUMMARY We examine whether audit engagement partner tenure and rotation affect investors' perceptions, as proxied by the ex ante cost of equity capital. We find that partner tenure has a nonlinear relation with the ex ante cost of equity capital for non-Big 4 audit engagements prior to the introduction of partner rotation requirements, and that the imputed gains from partner tenure appear similar to the imputed gains of having a Big 4 auditor. Consistent with the tenure results, we also find that partner rotation is associated with increased ex ante cost of equity capital. Our results are very robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and raise important questions for future research. It is not known to what extent investors or analysts are aware of the audit partner's identity or pay attention to audit partner tenure; if investors or analysts do not consider partner tenure, future research may identify omitted variables that have the same nonlinear relationship with the ex ante cost of capital that we observe for non-Big 4 audit partner tenure. JEL Classifications: M42; M48. Data Availability: The data used are from public sources identified in the manuscript.


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