Client Risk Management: A Pecking Order Analysis of Auditor Response to Upward Earnings Management Risk

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Lili Sun ◽  
Qian Wang ◽  
Rong Yang
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Risk Management Strategy ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Pecking Order ◽  
Order Analysis ◽  
Auditor Resignation ◽  
Client Risk

SUMMARY: This study examines Big N auditors' client risk management strategy in response to the risk of upward (i.e., income-increasing) earnings management in the post-SOX era. Specifically, we empirically study the relation between clients' signed discretionary accruals and subsequent audit pricing and auditor resignation decisions. We find that audit fees and resignations are positively associated with the risk of upward earnings management. We document a pecking order of auditor responses and find that auditors are more likely to respond in the order of charging higher abnormal audit fees if the trade-off between upward earnings management risk and return is within an acceptable level, and then resign if the risk is more severe and exceeds the auditors' tolerance level. Our results are robust to alternative accruals measures, controlling for clients' internal control quality and corporate governance characteristics.

The relationship between managerial ability, earnings management and internal control quality on audit fees in Iran

2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahmoud Mousavi Shiri ◽  
Seyedeh Zahra Hossini
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Control Quality ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to emphasize the relationship between managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and audit fees to establish whether or not there is a significant relationship between the variables of managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and the audit fees. Design/methodology/approach The study sample includes 190 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2009–2016. Research hypotheses were tested using the statistical methods of multivariable linear regression and data envelopment analysis pattern. Findings The obtained results indicate that there is a significant and direct relationship between managerial ability and internal control quality as well as real earnings management and internal control quality. Based on the results obtained from the second hypothesis, the authors could claim that there is an inverse and significant relationship managerial ability and audit fees. The third hypothesis also revealed that in companies with lower audit fees, there is a stronger relationship between managerial ability and internal control quality. The results of related tests show no significant relationship between accrual-based earnings management and internal control quality. Originality/value This paper is the first study in Iran whose main focus is on the relationship between managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and audit fees.

Internal Control Quality and Audit Pricing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Section 302

This paper extends prior research on audit risk adjustment by examining the association of audit pricing with problems in internal control over financial reporting, disclosed under Sections 404 and 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX]. While studies of auditors' responses to internal control risk provide mixed evidence, it is important to re-examine this issue using data on specific client problems not available prior to SOX. As a baseline, we first establish a strong association of audit fees with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of implementation of Section 404, consistent with prior research (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006). We then address two issues on which prior results are contradictory. In a broadly based sample of accelerated filers, we find that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by problem severity, when severity is measured either as material weaknesses versus significant deficiencies, or by nature of the problem. Also, while audit fees increase during the 404 period, our tests show less relative risk adjustment under Section 404 than under Section 302 in the prior year. Further examining intertemporal effects, we find that companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. Overall, our findings provide detailed insight into audit risk adjustment during the initial period of SOX implementation.

Characteristics of Managerial Tone Priced by Auditors: Evidence Based on Annual Letters to Shareholders of Large U.S. Firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-161
Author(s):  
Adam Greiner ◽  
Lorenzo Patelli ◽  
Matteo Pedrini
Keyword(s):  
Source Credibility ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Change Analysis ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Client Risk ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Corporate Disclosures

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between audit pricing and managerial tone as a proxy of source credibility. Prior research shows that source credibility influences auditors' perceptions of client risk. Textually analyzing annual letters to shareholders, we find that characteristics of managerial tone that reflect impaired source credibility are associated with higher audit fees. Additional tests, including a change analysis and controls for other managerial characteristics, future client performance, and aggressive accounting choices, corroborate and build on our inferences that managerial tone proxies for source credibility. Our study extends literature that uses corporate disclosures to measure managerial characteristics by showing that auditors price source credibility reflected in managerial tone. These findings are important because they empirically confirm that source credibility affects auditors' assessments of engagement risk and that analysis of tone can inform researchers, auditors, and investors who seek to enhance effectiveness and objectivity in assessing source credibility based on managerial tone. JEL Classifications: G21; G34; M41. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.

Internal Control Weaknesses and Client Risk Management

2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randal Elder ◽  
Yan Zhang ◽  
Jian Zhou ◽  
Nan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Client Risk

Short-Term Accruals and the Pricing and Production of Audit Services

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 221-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caren Schelleman ◽  
W. Robert Knechel
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Profit Margin ◽  
Work Effort ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Unique Data

SUMMARY: This study investigates how risk associated with increased levels of accruals that might be indicative of earnings management affects the pricing and production of audit services. Francis and Krishnan (1999) suggest that auditors can deal with the risk of earnings management in five ways: (1) screen out high-risk clients; (2) charge a premium to riskier clients; (3) increase audit effort; (4) negotiate adjustments to the financial statements; and/or (5) report more conservatively (e.g., by issuing a modified report). Using a unique data set, the current study investigates two of these options: charging a fee premium and increasing audit effort. Based on previous research on audit pricing and production, we construct models for audit fees, total audit effort, labor mix (extent of experienced auditor effort), and engagement profit margin including an accruals measure that could indicate earnings management. We test these models on a sample of 119 audit engagements from one Big 6 audit firm in The Netherlands. We find that signed short-term accruals are associated with a significant increase in audit fees as well as total effort, but not with experience mix or profit margin. However, we find secondary evidence that auditors utilize more supervisors, assistants and support personnel and earn smaller profits (returns) when a client has higher levels of short-term accruals. Taken together, these results suggest that auditors are responsive to high levels of short-term accruals that may be indicative of earnings management, and will increase their work effort even if they are unable to recoup all of the related costs.

Different tenure phases of executives and audit fees

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachana Kalelkar ◽  
Qiao Xu
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Chief Financial Officers ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The authors investigate whether the different tenure phases of executives have a differential effect on audit pricing. Two alternate views – career concern and power – can explain the effect of executives’ tenure on audit pricing. This paper aims to determine, which viewpoint dominates in explaining the relationship between audit pricing and executive tenure phases. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 11,198 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2016, the authors adopt an ordinary least squares regression model to assess the impact of the middle and long phases of executives’ tenure on audit fees. Findings Audit fees are significantly lower when executives enter the middle and long phases of tenure. The reduction in audit fees is greatest as both chief executive officers and chief financial officers enter the long tenure phase. Although audit fees gradually decrease as executive tenure is extended, they start increasing two years before the end of executive tenure. Furthermore, the negative association between the executive tenure phase and audit fees is greater when the executive is appointed externally. Finally, the long phase of executive tenure also mitigates the positive relationship between audit fees and internal control weaknesses. Research limitations/implications This study is based on US data. Future research may extend this study to other countries. Practical implications The findings are important to firms, practitioners and academicians, particularly, as the length of tenure of top executives has increased in recent years. By documenting that executives’ middle and long tenure phases reduce audit fees, the findings highlight the importance of maintaining executives in the firm. Finally, the findings have implications for investors, policymakers and auditors to identify companies with high audit risk. Originality/value This study is the first to document the impact of executives’ middle and long tenure phases on audit fees.

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