PENGARUH AUDIT TENURE, FEE AUDIT, DAN REPUTASI AUDITOR TERHADAP AUDIT REPORT LAG (SEBELUM DAN SESUDAH PENERAPAN UU NO. 5 TAHUN 2011 TENTANG AKUNTAN PUBLIK)

Penelitian ini mereplikasi penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Ettredge at al (2006). Dalam penelitian tersebut menguji audit delay yang terjadi karena persyaratanpengungkapanICOFR di bawah SOXSection404. Penelitian tersebut menghasilkan bukti bahwa adanya peningkatan audit delay terkait dengan pelaksanan persyaratan pelaporan pada SOX section 404.Indonesia menerapkan undang-undang No.5 tahun 2011 tentang akuntan publik yang merupakan bentuk adopsi dari SOX Section 404. Peneliti menguji audit report lag yang terjadi dikarenakan syarat kepatuhan pada undang-undang tersebut dengan menggunakan variabel Audit tenure, fee audit dan reputasi auditor. Penelitian ini menggunakan data skunder, dari perusahaan yang terdaftar pada bursa efek indonesia pada tahun 2009-2014. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan audit tenure dan fee audit tidak berpengaruh pada audit report lag. Namun, Reputasi auditor yang diukur dengan KAP big four berpengaruh pada pengurangan Audit Report Lag. Hal ini menunjukkan KAP dengan reputasi big four bekerja lebih cepat demi mempertahankan reputasi mereka.

Updating Accounting Systems: Longitudinal Evidence from the Healthcare Sector

This paper provides evidence on the determinants and economic outcomes of updates of accounting systems (AS) over a 24-year timespan in a large sample of U.S. hospitals. We provide evidence that hospitals update their AS in response to three types of pressures: economic pressures, such as increases in the quality of accounting information driven by vendor rollouts of improved AS; coercive pressures imposed by regulators mandating certain practices, such as internal control practices imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley Section 404; and mimetic pressures for hospitals to conform their AS to those of their peers, such as local county and prominent “celebrity” peers. We find that only economically driven updates lead to economic benefits in the form of lower operating expenses and higher revenues. In contrast, we find some evidence that AS updates prompted by coercive regulatory pressures actually impose economic costs in the form of higher operating expenses. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

Investor Perceptions of Government Deregulation: Evidence from Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

We investigate the stock market's reaction to events leading up to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) 2007 regulatory changes that reduced the scope of and documentation requirements for assessments of firms' internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The stated goal of these regulations was to reduce firms' and auditors' compliance costs with mandatory ICFR assessments, while maintaining the effectiveness of these assessments. We examine abnormal returns surrounding key dates leading to the passage of these regulations and offer two main findings. First, investors reacted negatively on key event dates, suggesting that investors viewed the regulations as likely to reduce financial reporting quality rather than to drive firm and audit efficiencies. Second, this negative market reaction is larger when ICFR effectiveness should matter most - when firms are more complex, have higher litigation risk, and greater fraud risk. In additional analysis, we find that restatements increase in the post-regulation time period, consistent with investors' concerns that the effect of the legislation would be a reduction in ICFR effectiveness. Overall, our results may imply that investors prefer stronger government regulation when it comes to the assessments of a firm's internal controls over financial reporting.

Borrowers' Accounting Information and the Quality of Banks' Loan Portfolios

I examine the relation between borrowers' financial reporting (FR) and the quality of banks' loan portfolios. This relation is theoretically ambiguous as better FR improves banks' monitoring of loans but also grants more creditworthy borrowers cheaper access to alternative public funding, increasing competition and creating adverse selection problems for banks. Using the adoption of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to identify improvements in borrowers' FR, I find an overall positive effect of FR on banks' lending: the quality of loans extended to borrowers subject to Section 404 improves relative to the quality of loans extended by the same bank to other borrowers exempted from Section 404. Additional tests examining borrowers' internal control over FR and loan contracts' characteristics confirm that improved monitoring and screening are both responsible for the higher loan portfolio quality. Overall, my study highlights unexplored consequences of companies' FR on the quality of banks' assets.

Unexpected Consequences: The Effects on Non-Accelerated Filers of an Accelerated Filing Deadline and SOX Section 404

SYNOPSIS Regulations implemented by the SEC in 2003 and 2004 simultaneously shortened the financial statement filing deadlines and increased the time required for both the preparation of financial statements and the related audit of accelerated filers (AFs). However, there were indirect, unintended negative consequences for companies not subject to the regulations, namely, non-accelerated filers (NAFs). The new regulations imposed strains on auditor resources requiring auditors to make resource allocation decisions that negatively affected NAFs. We find that NAFs with an auditor who had a high proportion of AF clients (high-AF) had longer audit delays after the regulations were implemented than NAFs of an auditor with a low proportion of AF clients (low-AF). Further, we document that NAFs with high-AF auditors were more likely to change auditors than NAFs with low-AF auditors. Finally, NAFs that switched to auditors with less AFs experienced shorter audit delays after the auditor change. JEL Classifications: M42; M48.

SOX Section 404 Twenty Years After: Reviewing Costs and Benefits

Some issues of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 are still discussed controversially in literature. Thereof, Section 404 concerning internal control over financial reporting is one of the most criticized parts. This article focuses on costs and benefits of the section and impacts on earnings management. Most authors agree that compliance costs of Section 404 far outweigh its benefits. However, long-term benefits are expected. Regarding earnings management, studies show that the section has positive effects such as increased earnings quality and improved internal control systems. Although the section is heavily debated in literature, there is consensus that SOX Section 404 greatly contributed to the improvement of quality of financial reporting and of corporate governance as a whole.