Engagement Quality Reviews: A Comparison of Audit Firm Practices

2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn K. Epps ◽  
William F. Messier
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Quality Review ◽  
Audit Review ◽  
Audit Planning ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Quality Control Mechanism

Engagement quality (concurring partner) review is an important part of the audit review process. It is one quality control mechanism used by public accounting firms to monitor the quality of audit engagements. The engagement quality reviewer serves as an evaluator of the performance of the engagement partner and engagement team. Concerns about the effectiveness of existing firm concurring partner review practices have led to increased partner sanctions imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In addition, Section 103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 directs the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to develop an auditing standard on engagement quality review. This practice note reports on an analysis of six major firms' written guidance and practice aids for engagement quality review. Our comparison of the firms' guidance shows some differences in the assignment of engagement quality reviewer, the participation of the engagement quality reviewer in audit planning, the extensiveness of practice aids, and the involvement of engagement quality reviewer during the course of audit engagements. Lastly, we identify a number of research questions and practice implications.

An Analysis of SEC and PCAOB Enforcement Actions against Engagement Quality Reviewers

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
William F. Messier ◽  
Thomas M. Kozloski ◽  
Natalia Kochetova-Kozloski
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Audit Process ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
Quality Review ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Quality Control Mechanism

SUMMARY: Engagement quality review is an integral part of the audit process. It is designed to be a quality control mechanism for assessing the quality of an audit engagement. Since the 1990s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increased sanctions against partners serving as engagement quality reviewers. Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued an auditing standard on engagement quality review as required by Section 103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This practice note reports on an analysis of SEC and PCAOB enforcement actions against engagement quality reviewers (EQRs). Our results show the following: We identified 28 cases since 1993 that involve some type of sanction against an EQR. Only eight cases involved the Big 4/5 public accounting firms. All of the 28 cases involved sanctions due to violations of GAAS and 75 percent contained GAAP violations. Twenty-three cases identified GAAS violations related to a lack of due professional care. Further analysis of those cases showed that the EQR demonstrated a lack of professional skepticism in 22 cases, over-relied on management representations in 20 cases, and ignored materiality concerns in five cases. About half of the 28 cases resulted in the EQR being denied the privilege of practicing before the SEC or PCAOB for three or more years. Our findings provide important implications for practitioners and regulators, and areas for future research for those interested in engagement quality review.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

scholarly journals Increasing Transparency: A Prototype of the Nonpublic Portions of PCAOB Large-Firm Inspection Reports

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. A1-A21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachael J. Evans ◽  
Ronald S. Boster ◽  
Bill Gradison
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Large Firm ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Audit Reports

SUMMARY:The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and requires it to conduct annual inspections of accounting firms that regularly provide audit reports for more than 100 public companies (issuers). Certain information in these reports is, by law, nonpublic—in particular, findings of “quality control” (QC) deficiencies. Having access to nonpublic portions of PCAOB inspection reports, the authors create an illustrative example of a nonpublic portion of a large-firm inspection report, albeit with specific firms and issuers de-identified.

scholarly journals An Updated Analysis of Enforcement Actions against Engagement Quality Reviewers

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. A1-A12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kraussman ◽  
William F. Messier
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Control Mechanism ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Quality Review ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Quality Control Mechanism

SUMMARY Engagement quality review (EQR) is designed to be a quality control mechanism for improving the quality of audit engagements. This paper updates the findings of Messier, Kozloski, and Kochetova-Kozloski (2010) on enforcement actions against engagement quality (EQ) reviewers, especially in light of the December 2009 implementation of the new standard on engagement quality review, Auditing Standard No. 7 (AS7). We identified 16 enforcement actions since 2009 that involve some type of sanction against an EQ reviewer. Only two cases involved a Big 4 firm. Thus, the vast majority of cases involved EQRs from smaller public accounting firms. Six cases occurred prior to the implementation of AS7, nine cases occurred after AS7 took effect, and one case involved violations both prior to and after AS7 implementation. All of the pre-AS7 cases involved sanctions resulting from an inadequate EQR. In contrast, all of the post-AS7 cases involved sanctions resulting from a failure to perform an EQR. Our review of these post-AS7 cases suggests that some small firms were either unable or unwilling to bring in qualified outside reviewers. Our findings provide important implications for practitioners, regulators, and researchers interested in engagement quality review and in improving the overall quality of audit engagements. Data Availability: The cases included in this study are available from public sources.

Auditor Independence and Auditor-Provided Tax Service: Evidence from Going-Concern Audit Opinions Prior to Bankruptcy Filings

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dahlia Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
The Public ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Information Spillover

SUMMARY: This study examines whether auditors’ provision of tax services impairs auditor independence by focusing on auditors’ going-concern opinions among a sample of bankruptcy filing firms. The evidence from the bankruptcy setting is particularly salient given that the bankruptcy of corporations such as Enron motivated several provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. More recently, auditors’ provision of tax service to their audit clients has been the focus of new rules by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Consistent with improved audit quality from information spillover, the study documents a significant positive correlation between the level of tax services fees and the likelihood of correctly issuing a going-concern opinion prior to the bankruptcy filing. One implication of this result is that restricting tax services by auditors of poorly performing firms may diminish the quality of auditors’ reporting decisions without leading to an improvement in auditor independence.

A Reexamination of Audit Fees for Initial Audit Engagements in the Post-SOX Period

2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemond Desir ◽  
Jeffrey R. Casterella ◽  
Julia Kokina
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Sample Period ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Client Relationships

SUMMARY: On August 16, 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a concept release seeking comments on ways to enhance auditor independence. The Board notes that higher failure rates in new audit engagements might be linked to unrealistic pricing. The Board's concern is that a new auditor might be more susceptible to management pressure if initial-year audit fees are set artificially low. Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, empirical evidence shows that auditors discounted their initial-year audit fees. This practice, known as lowballing, was expected to decrease significantly after the enactment of SOX. Indeed, findings in Huang, Raghunandan, and Rama (2009) seem to confirm that Big 4 auditors charged a fee premium on new auditor-client relationships in 2006. However, it is not clear if more recent post-SOX initial-year audits are free of lowballing. We investigate whether lowballing exists in new auditor-client relationships in an “extended” post-SOX environment for the years 2007 to 2010. Our results suggest that both Big 4 and non-Big 4 accounting firms discounted their initial-year audit fees during our sample period (2007–2010). These findings should be of interest to the PCAOB as it searches for ways to bolster auditor independence. Data Availability: Available from public sources.

Auditing the Auditors: A Case on PCAOB Inspection Reports of Registered Public Accounting Firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. B1-B18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Daugherty ◽  
Marshall K. Pitman
Keyword(s):  
Public Accounting ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Public Accounting Firms ◽  
Audit Evidence ◽  
Inspection Process

SUMMARY: We present a timely practice-oriented case related to the inspection process of registered firms by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). This case allows auditing students an opportunity to explore the unique challenges that public accounting firms auditing U.S. public companies face with respect to the PCAOB inspection process. The case focuses on large and small registered firms (inspected annually and triennially, respectively) receiving an inspection report where the PCAOB identified certain matters considered to be audit deficiencies of such significance that the inspection team believed the audit firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support the auditor’s opinion. The case exposes students to the PCAOB inspection process, highlights many deficiencies noted to date by the PCAOB inspectors, and emphasizes the importance of sufficient and appropriately documented audit evidence to support audit opinions. By reviewing ‘deficient’ inspection reports, students gain an appreciation for common audit deficiencies as well as the subjective nature of portions of the authoritative literature and the inspection process itself. The case reinforces students’ understanding of the practical matters involved in appropriately obtaining, evaluating, and documenting audit evidence, as well as educates students on the PCAOB inspection process in order to address important competencies required of Sarbanes-Oxley era audit professionals.

scholarly journals Peer Review Process in Scholarly Communication and Scientific Publishing

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 15-19
Author(s):  
Bishnu Bahadur Khatri
Keyword(s):  
Peer Review ◽  
Review Process ◽  
Peer Review Process ◽  
Scholarly Communication ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Early Career ◽  
Scientific Publishing ◽  
The Public ◽  
Quality Control Mechanism

Peer review in scholarly communication and scientific publishing, in one form or another, has always been regarded as crucial to the reputation and reliability of scientific research. In the growing interest of scholarly research and publication, this paper tries to discuss about peer review process and its different types to communicate the early career researchers and academics.This paper has used the published and unpublished documents for information collection. It reveals that peer review places the reviewer, with the author, at the heart of scientific publishing. It is the system used to assess the quality of scientific research before it is published. Therefore, it concludes that peer review is used to advancing and testing scientific knowledgeas a quality control mechanism forscientists, publishers and the public.

scholarly journals Is The Pcaob a “Heavily Controlled Component” Of The Sec?: An Essential Question In The Constitutional Controversy

2009 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Donna M. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Free Enterprise ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Essential Question ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, described as “the most important separation-of-powers case regarding the President’s appointment and removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years.” Established by Congress as the cornerstone of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the “Act”), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “PCAOB” or the “Board”) was structured as “a strong, independent board to oversee the conduct of the auditors of public companies.” Its principal mission was to prevent the type of auditing failures that contributed to the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and numerous other public companies in the period leading up to the passage of the Act.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document