Luck and Equality

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Brute Luck ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Option Luck

This chapter defends Cohen's claim, in “Currency,” that “a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the effect of brute luck on distribution,” where brute luck consists of differences in fortune that are not a reflection of choice. “Brute luck” is to be contrasted with “option luck,” where the latter consists of differences in fortune that are the upshot of chosen gambles. Whereas Cohen had previously endorsed Dworkin's view that egalitarian justice does not call for the compensation of those whose misfortune is purely down to bad option luck.

Exploitation: Bridging Social and Distributive Egalitarianism

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 954-972
Author(s):  
Nicola Mulkeen
Keyword(s):  
Brute Luck ◽  
Form Part ◽  
Equal Respect ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Option Luck

Social egalitarians have charged distributive egalitarianism with abandoning the victims of option luck, disrespecting victims of brute luck and misunderstanding the aim of egalitarian justice. Social egalitarians have tended to favour a conception of equality that is concerned with ending oppression and expressing equal respect for everyone. In this article, I argue that what has so far been missing from this debate is the fundamental connection that exists between distributive egalitarianism and a conception of exploitation. Once this connection is understood, we can see that social egalitarians are unfair in their criticisms. Importantly, the connection to exploitation reveals that social egalitarianism and distributive egalitarianism are not rival positions. When it comes to exploitation, the two positions are able to coordinate and identify two core wrong-making features that form part of an exploitative interaction.

Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equalityof Initial Opportunities

Ethics ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vallentyne
Keyword(s):  
Brute Luck ◽  
Option Luck

scholarly journals Equality of resources, risk, and the ideal market

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Lars Lindblom
Keyword(s):  
Safety Net ◽  
Social Safety Net ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Option Luck ◽  
The Ideal

Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources makes extensive use of markets. I show that all these markets rely on one specific neoclassical conception of the ideal market in full equilibrium, as analyzed by Debreu. This market must be understood as operating under circumstances of certainty, and this is incompatible with several components of Dworkin's account. In particular, it does not allow one to hold people responsible for their option luck, and it implies a high social safety net rather than insurance schemes for addressing brute luck. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of equality of resources that takes the ideal market seriously.

Luck, Love, and Extreme Skiing: Distributive Injustice without Unfairness

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerah Gordon-Solmon
Keyword(s):  
Primary Task ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Classic Article ◽  
Canonical Formulation ◽  
Foundational Work ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Luck Egalitarian ◽  
Distributive Injustice

AbstractIn the classic article, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” G.A. Cohen states that “a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the effects of brute luck on distribution.” This canonical formulation pinpoints what is distinctive of the luck-egalitarian mandate. But it also indicates that that mandate, so stated, is incomplete. The primary task of the paper is to extend what is explicit within that mandate, and in doing so, to bring it closer to completion. To that end, I defend – in the spirit of Cohen, and by arguments he pioneered – a new, expanded conception of luck-egalitarian compensation. I propose, accordingly, an amendment, seemingly friendly, to Cohen’s statement. But, in fact, my proposed amendment, and its rationale, reveal a major lacuna in the normative underpinnings of Cohen-style egalitarianism. I thereby show that, contrary to what is widely assumed, important foundational work remains to be done for the luck-egalitarian project.

HOW GIFTS AND GAMBLES PRESERVE JUSTICE

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Williams
Keyword(s):  
Influential Paper ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Option Luck

This paper examines G. A. Cohen's final criticism of Ronald Dworkin's theory ofequality of resources, which targets its treatment of inequalities that arise when some individuals make luckier choices than others make. Rebutting Cohen's argument that suchoption luck inequalitiesfail to be just in an unqualified sense, the paper argues that choice does not merely render inequality legitimate but instead can sometimes make inequality just. It also examines the relationship between Cohen's criticism and the conception of equality developed in his earlier influential paper, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’.

CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 259-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Bognar
Keyword(s):  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Luck Egalitarians ◽  
Option Luck ◽  
As If

Abstract:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.

Treaties and re-setting the colonial relationship: Lessons for Australia from the Treaty of Waitangi

Ethnicities ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 146879682199986
Author(s):  
Dominic O'Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Indigenous Populations ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Treaty Negotiations ◽  
Indigenous Nations ◽  
Australian State ◽  
Treaty Of Waitangi ◽  
First Peoples ◽  
Egalitarian Justice

Colonial hegemony distinguishes relationships between the Australian state and Indigenous nations. British government was violently established and there was no accommodation with the Indigenous populations to allow settlement to proceed, as occurred through treaties in Canada and New Zealand. Indigenous arguments for treaties in Australia are, however, well established. Notwithstanding some Commonwealth and state and territory governments considering such agreements over the past 40 years, none have been concluded, and more modest forms of recognition have been alternatively proposed. In 2015, following extensive Indigenous advocacy, the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition appointed a Referendum Council to consult on an amendment to the Commonwealth Constitution to recognise Australia’s first peoples. The recommendation of a Voice to Parliament and a Makarrata Commission to oversee truth telling and agreements to allow ‘coming together after a struggle’ suggested a transformative ambition beyond the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition’s expectations. Makarrata does not stipulate treaties as an ideal form of agreement, but in raising the possibility, the Council added to the concept’s political momentum. This article discusses the place of treaties in contemporary Australian discourse, including treaty negotiations that are in progress in Victoria, Queensland and the Northern Territory. It uses examples from New Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi to discuss their possibilities and limits in Australia. From these examples, two overarching arguments are made. Firstly, that treaties are potentially transformative, not because they may settle historical grievances, but because their required mutual recognition of each party’s enduring political standing means that they define ongoing, just terms of association. Secondly, the substantively different political arrangements that they presume mean that they are not merely instruments of egalitarian justice and are instead concerned with the distribution of political authority – Indigenous authority over their affairs and through a distinctive and culturally contextualised state citizenship.

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