Luck, Love, and Extreme Skiing: Distributive Injustice without Unfairness

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerah Gordon-Solmon

AbstractIn the classic article, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” G.A. Cohen states that “a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the effects of brute luck on distribution.” This canonical formulation pinpoints what is distinctive of the luck-egalitarian mandate. But it also indicates that that mandate, so stated, is incomplete. The primary task of the paper is to extend what is explicit within that mandate, and in doing so, to bring it closer to completion. To that end, I defend – in the spirit of Cohen, and by arguments he pioneered – a new, expanded conception of luck-egalitarian compensation. I propose, accordingly, an amendment, seemingly friendly, to Cohen’s statement. But, in fact, my proposed amendment, and its rationale, reveal a major lacuna in the normative underpinnings of Cohen-style egalitarianism. I thereby show that, contrary to what is widely assumed, important foundational work remains to be done for the luck-egalitarian project.

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 954-972
Author(s):  
Nicola Mulkeen

Social egalitarians have charged distributive egalitarianism with abandoning the victims of option luck, disrespecting victims of brute luck and misunderstanding the aim of egalitarian justice. Social egalitarians have tended to favour a conception of equality that is concerned with ending oppression and expressing equal respect for everyone. In this article, I argue that what has so far been missing from this debate is the fundamental connection that exists between distributive egalitarianism and a conception of exploitation. Once this connection is understood, we can see that social egalitarians are unfair in their criticisms. Importantly, the connection to exploitation reveals that social egalitarianism and distributive egalitarianism are not rival positions. When it comes to exploitation, the two positions are able to coordinate and identify two core wrong-making features that form part of an exploitative interaction.


Author(s):  
Shlomi Segall

The chapter discusses the evolution of theories of justice in health and healthcare. It traces Norman Daniels’s Rawlsian account, as well as the criticism it received. It then goes on to discuss two rival theories that sprang in opposition to Daniels’s, namely a sufficientarian family of theories and luck egalitarian justice in health. Special attention is devoted to three focal questions: the pattern of justice in health, its currency, and its scope, that is, the what, how, and who. Under the latter, the chapter discusses the requirements of global justice in health, and investigates what temporal unit is appropriate in thinking of just healthcare.


Author(s):  
Alex Voorhoeve

The author outlines and defends two egalitarian theories, which yield distinctive and complementary answers to why health-related inequalities matter. The first is a brute luck egalitarian view, according to which inequalities due to unchosen, differential luck are bad because unfair. The second is a social egalitarian view, according to which inequalities are bad when and because they undermine people’s status as equal citizens. These views identify different objects of egalitarian concern: the brute luck egalitarian view directs attention to health-related well-being, while social egalitarianism focuses on health-related capabilities that are central to a person’s status as a citizen. The author argues that both views are correct and should jointly guide priority-setting in health.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

This chapter defends Cohen's claim, in “Currency,” that “a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the effect of brute luck on distribution,” where brute luck consists of differences in fortune that are not a reflection of choice. “Brute luck” is to be contrasted with “option luck,” where the latter consists of differences in fortune that are the upshot of chosen gambles. Whereas Cohen had previously endorsed Dworkin's view that egalitarian justice does not call for the compensation of those whose misfortune is purely down to bad option luck.


Author(s):  
Raj M. Ratwani ◽  
Alyssa E. Andrews ◽  
Jenny D. Sousk ◽  
Gregory Trafton
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