A Man´s Attitude Towards Animals in the Context of Gender, Age, Place of Living, Eating Habits, and World-view in Slovakia

The ecological values or environmental competency development is currently an important topic. Attitude, relationship, love or respect for nature can be identified within several theories by various diagnostic tools, though they might be so general covering a man´s true attitude towards animals. The study discusses the characteristics of the author's questionnaire of human-animal relationship AniRe-Que (15) based on the ecological theory of biocentric egalitarianism covering extraterrestrial beings´ respect and consideration. The Questionnaire of Ecocentric and Anthropocentric Attitudes Towards the Environment (Thompson and Barton 1994) adapted by Siegrist (1996) was used to determine the construct validity of the author's questionnaire. Both tools were used to search for respondents' attitudes towards animals (N=937) in the context of their gender, age, residence, eating habits and worldview. The research study is of correlation-differential study design. The most important findings were that the attitude towards nature expressed in general does not completely coincide with the attitude towards animals leading to the hypothesis not all natural being are treated with equal respect by a man. The self-reported respect for animals was significantly lower than the respect for nature assessed by the ecocentric environmental attitude. The diagnostic tools thematizing only nature in its general (complex, synthesizing) context seem to be not sufficient to determine a respondent's attitude towards animals. A man might protect nature, but s/he can care less about the animals.

Secularism at schools as a tool for social integration: the approach of the European Court of Human Rights

When examining the cases on freedom of religion in the field of education, the European Court of Human Rights increasingly adopts the conception of hard or republican secularism. This approach has far-reaching implications for the Court’s understanding of social integration as a legitimate ground for the restriction on individual’s freedom. The judgement in Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland and the cases on wearing of religious attire at school demonstrate that despite its claim to neutrality, the republican conception of secularism has its inherent presuppositions about what society should look like and which values such a society should embrace. In consequence, the application of this conception results in standardisation and homogenisation of the society according to secular and thus non-neutral ethos. This outcome is difficult to reconcile not only with equal respect for individual freedom of religion and moral autonomy, but also with general principles underlying its axiological structure, such as pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness.

Self-Respect, Arrogance, and Power

Robin S. Dillon reconsiders her influential previous position, that arrogance involves a failure to recognize the true source of one’s own value, as a rational being with the status to demand equal respect. On this view, arrogance and self-respect are antithetical. In this chapter, Dillon revises her position, taking into account differences in power in societies. For people who are oppressed, arrogance (claiming more than society thinks is appropriate) may be compatible with, or even necessary for, self-respect. Neither people within a society, nor we as observers, can claim an objective perspective in adjudicating the issue of whether these claims are warranted, or excessive. Furthermore, it may be objectively true that, in some circumstances, arrogance is a necessary tool for overcoming oppression.

Political Equality

This chapter argues that liberal relational egalitarianism requires, for reasons of both non-domination and equal respect for persons’ sense of justice, a demandingly egalitarian conception of rights to political participation, and that this requirement has to enjoy a qualified priority over other requirements of justice. However, it must, in principle, be open to some restriction, should this be strictly necessary to fulfil such other requirements. The chapter goes on to identify the conditions governing the justification of such restrictions and shows that these are likely to permit special institutional practices such as constitutional review, while ruling out ground-level political inequality between citizens, because egalitarian strategies for improving the quality of citizen input will almost always be available. It concludes by showing how Ronald Dworkin’s account of political rights fails to do justice to the expressive value of political equality. This result strengthens the case against distributive egalitarian theories made earlier.

Cultural Citizenship and Refugee Integration

This chapter sheds light on the cultural citizenship of refugee-background Black Africans in Australia. Specifically, it elaborates on cultural citizenship as an analytical framework, outlines recent multicultural policy provisions in Australia, and highlights how conservative politicians and media personalities racialize youth violence and stigmatize Black Africans as dangerous criminals. Then the chapter proceeds to explain why racialized moral panic undermines the integration of African refugees. It argues that public humiliation emasculates self-efficacy, leading to youth disengagement. Second, the deprivation of cultural citizenship diminishes refugee youth's sense of affiliation. Third, public racial disparagement reinforces interpersonal racial prejudice and discrimination. Fourth, racial stigmatization perpetuates socio-economic disadvantages of refugee communities, durably positioning them on the margin of society. In light of these points, it is argued that a claim for equal respect and dignifying representation is a demand for full citizenship.

Ethical research in global health emergencies: making the case for a broader understanding of ‘research ethics’

The ethical challenges of global health research become particularly acute in emergency contexts, and are exacerbated by historic inequities and imbalances in power and influence. Drawing on the findings of an international working group established by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, this article argues for the need to take a broader approach to ‘research ethics’ as traditionally understood, to include the role of ‘duty-bearers’ such as funders, governments, research institutions and journals. An ‘ethical compass’ of three core values (equal respect, fairness and helping reduce suffering) supports ethical reflection at the level of policy, as well as on the ground.

Equal Respect for Rational Agency

Individuals are owed equal respect. But on the basis of what property of individuals are they owed such respect? A popular Kantian answer—rational agency—appears less plausible in light of the growing psychological evidence that human choice is subject to a wide array of biases (framing, laziness, etc.); human beings are neither equal in rational agency nor especially robust rational agents. Defenders of this Kantian answer thus need a non-ideal theory of equal respect for rational agency, one that takes seriously our characteristic deficiencies of practical rationality without junking the niotion that rational agency entitles us to equal respect. This chapter defends an understanding of respect for rational agency wherein the object of such respect is individuals’ aspiration to rationally govern their lives. This understanding of respect for rational agency retains the core notion of respect as a kind of deference, directs respect at persons, has suitably egalitarian implications, and does not require us to deny the aforementioned psychological evidence regarding the infirmities of human rationality.

Introduction

Liberal political philosophers, including John Rawls, often ground their theories in a model of citizens as free and equal individuals engaging in cooperation with each other. In starting with that model of citizens, little attention is given to the reality of inevitable human dependence. We all begin our lives as infants in a state of complete dependence on others. Many of us will end our lives that way as well. For people with certain significant disabilities, this dependence may continue throughout life. In contemporary societies, the dependence experienced by some people with disabilities can result in substantial social disadvantages. Further, the disadvantages associated with dependency do not just impact the dependent, but also those who care for them. Caring for dependents involves personal and economic costs that can negatively affect caregivers’ ability to pursue their own opportunities or to exercise their rights. How ought our institutions be designed to ensure equal respect for those who are significantly dependent and for their caregivers?...

Human Dignity

A comprehensive jurisprudence of just punishment would thus incorporate four propositions: Justice as proportionality: Offenders should never be punished more severely than can be justified by their blameworthiness in relation to the severity of punishments justly imposed on others for the same and different offenses. Justice as fairness: Processes for responding to crimes should be publicly known, implemented in good faith, and applied even-handedly. Justice as equal treatment: Defendants and offenders should be treated as equals; their circumstance and interests should be accorded equal respect and concern when decisions affecting them are made. Justice as parsimony: Offenders should never be punished more severely than can be justified by appropriate, valid, normative purposes.

Patriotism & Moral Theology

This essay examines the question of the moral justification of patriotism, given a Kantian view of morality as requiring an equal respect for every human being. The essay considers the background in Kant's moral theology for his cosmopolitanism. It then considers an extreme version of cosmopolitanism that denies a proper place for love of one's country, and it engages with a contemporary atheist cosmopolitan, Seyla Benhabib, suggesting that there are resources in Kant's moral theology to ground the hope that she expresses but does not succeed in grounding. Finally, it considers patriotism as a perfection of cosmopolitanism, in the same way that love of an individual can be a perfection of love of humanity. The essay suggests that defensible versions of cosmopolitanism put constraints on what kind of love of one's own country is morally permissible. But these constraints require the background in a Kantian moral theology.