Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equalityof Initial Opportunities

Ethics ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vallentyne
Keyword(s):  
Brute Luck ◽  
Option Luck

scholarly journals Equality of resources, risk, and the ideal market

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Lars Lindblom
Keyword(s):  
Safety Net ◽  
Social Safety Net ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Option Luck ◽  
The Ideal

Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources makes extensive use of markets. I show that all these markets rely on one specific neoclassical conception of the ideal market in full equilibrium, as analyzed by Debreu. This market must be understood as operating under circumstances of certainty, and this is incompatible with several components of Dworkin's account. In particular, it does not allow one to hold people responsible for their option luck, and it implies a high social safety net rather than insurance schemes for addressing brute luck. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of equality of resources that takes the ideal market seriously.

Exploitation: Bridging Social and Distributive Egalitarianism

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 954-972
Author(s):  
Nicola Mulkeen
Keyword(s):  
Brute Luck ◽  
Form Part ◽  
Equal Respect ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Option Luck

Social egalitarians have charged distributive egalitarianism with abandoning the victims of option luck, disrespecting victims of brute luck and misunderstanding the aim of egalitarian justice. Social egalitarians have tended to favour a conception of equality that is concerned with ending oppression and expressing equal respect for everyone. In this article, I argue that what has so far been missing from this debate is the fundamental connection that exists between distributive egalitarianism and a conception of exploitation. Once this connection is understood, we can see that social egalitarians are unfair in their criticisms. Importantly, the connection to exploitation reveals that social egalitarianism and distributive egalitarianism are not rival positions. When it comes to exploitation, the two positions are able to coordinate and identify two core wrong-making features that form part of an exploitative interaction.

CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 259-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Bognar
Keyword(s):  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Luck Egalitarians ◽  
Option Luck ◽  
As If

Abstract:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.

Luck and Equality

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Brute Luck ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Option Luck

This chapter defends Cohen's claim, in “Currency,” that “a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the effect of brute luck on distribution,” where brute luck consists of differences in fortune that are not a reflection of choice. “Brute luck” is to be contrasted with “option luck,” where the latter consists of differences in fortune that are the upshot of chosen gambles. Whereas Cohen had previously endorsed Dworkin's view that egalitarian justice does not call for the compensation of those whose misfortune is purely down to bad option luck.

Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income

1997 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart White
Keyword(s):  
Basic Income ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Free Ride

This paper considers whether arguments presented in Philippe Van Parijs' Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? succeed in rebutting the objection that the introduction of a substantial unconditional basic income (UBI) would allow non-working citizens to free-ride on the efforts of, and so exploit, working citizens. It considers Van Parjis' ‘external assets argument’ for UBI, and finds that this argument does not succeed in reconciling payment of a substantial UBI with the reciprocity principle which underpins this ‘exploitation objection’. It considers and rejects Van Parijs' implicit claim that the exploitation objection must be grounded in a distributive principle which contradicts the egalitarian commitment to prevent brute luck inequality. It concludes that Van Parjis has failed, thus far, to articulate a convincing response to the exploitation objection.

Luck, Love, and Extreme Skiing: Distributive Injustice without Unfairness

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerah Gordon-Solmon
Keyword(s):  
Primary Task ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Classic Article ◽  
Canonical Formulation ◽  
Foundational Work ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Luck Egalitarian ◽  
Distributive Injustice

AbstractIn the classic article, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” G.A. Cohen states that “a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the effects of brute luck on distribution.” This canonical formulation pinpoints what is distinctive of the luck-egalitarian mandate. But it also indicates that that mandate, so stated, is incomplete. The primary task of the paper is to extend what is explicit within that mandate, and in doing so, to bring it closer to completion. To that end, I defend – in the spirit of Cohen, and by arguments he pioneered – a new, expanded conception of luck-egalitarian compensation. I propose, accordingly, an amendment, seemingly friendly, to Cohen’s statement. But, in fact, my proposed amendment, and its rationale, reveal a major lacuna in the normative underpinnings of Cohen-style egalitarianism. I thereby show that, contrary to what is widely assumed, important foundational work remains to be done for the luck-egalitarian project.

Justice, Luck, and Pairwise Comparisons

2021 ◽  
pp. 163-201
Author(s):  
Gerald Lang
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social System ◽  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Pairwise Comparisons ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Complex Theory ◽  
Income Gap ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Structural Aspects ◽  
Option Luck

This chapter extends the anti-anti-luckist programme to political philosophy, and to the doctrine of luck egalitarianism in particular. Luck egalitarianism affirms that unchosen relative inequalities between agents are unjust. It condemns inequalities that are due to ‘brute luck’, and upholds inequalities that are due to ‘option luck’. Though it can be easily enough stated, luck egalitarianism is actually a complex theory with two separate components: egalitarianism and anti-luckism. Standard luck egalitarianism’s commitment to pairwise comparisons makes it vulnerable to what Susan Hurley calls the ‘Boring Problem’. The Boring Problem points out that any two agents in a pairwise comparison are bound to lack control over the relevant income gap between them, because each of them controls, at best, only one side of that comparison. Though Hurley herself is relatively dismissive of the Boring Problem, it is contended here that, when it is properly appreciated, it inflicts huge damage on luck egalitarianism, which needs in turn to be re-organized as a ‘baseline-sensitive’ theory that dispenses with pairwise comparisons. Baseline-sensitive luck egalitarianism makes decent progress on a number of critical fronts, particularly Saul Smilansky’s ‘Paradox of the Baseline’. But even this form of luck egalitarianism is still open to a worry about how it understands the relationship between its egalitarian default and its case for permissible inequalities, and it has less to say than it should about the structural aspects of a social system that generate inequalities.

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