LAW OF EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION PROCEDURE: PROBLEMS AND FEATURES

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-58
Author(s):  
V.N. KOVAL
2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-396
Author(s):  
Fraser Davidson
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

1987 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinand Schoeman

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-120
Author(s):  
’Mampolokeng ’Mathuso Mary-Elizabet Monyakane

AbstractThe Prima facie view regarding the admissibility of admissions, as evidence, in criminal matters is that, to admit admissions as evidence, the court requires a single consideration as to whether the admission was made freely and voluntarily. Without too much ado, the simple view to this understanding presupposes that admission of an admission as evidence against its maker is of a lesser danger compared to the admission of a confession. The admissibility of confessions against their makers does not come as easily as that of admissions. There are many prescribed requirements to satisfy before confessions are admitted as evidence. This comparison has led to a questionable conclusion that requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity equated to the requirements for the admission of confessions. This paper answers the question whether an inference that the requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity compared to the requirements for the admission of confessions is rational? It equates this approach to the now done away with commonwealth states rigid differentiation perspective. In the 1800s the commonwealth states, especially those vowing on the Wigmorian perspective on the law of evidence, developed from a rigid interpretation of confessions and admissions and adopted a relaxed and wide definitions of the word, “confession.” To this extent there was a relaxed divide between confessions and admissions hence their common classification and application of similar cautionary rules. The article recounts admissibility requirement in section 219A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) (Hereinafter CPA). It then analyses Section 219A of the CPA requirement in the light of the rationale encompassing precautions for the admission of confessions in terms of 217(1) of the CPA. It exposes the similarities of potential prejudices where confessions and admissions are admitted as evidence. It reckons that by the adherence to this rigid differentiation perspectives of confessions and admissions which used to be the practice in the commonwealth prior the 1800s developments, South African law of evidence remains prejudicial to accused persons. To do away with these prejudices this article, recommends that section 219A be amended to include additional admissibility requirements in section 217(1). In effect it recommends the merging of sections 217(1) and 219A of the CPA.


Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Claire Hamilton

Abstract The changes to the Irish exclusionary rule introduced by the judgment in People (DPP) v JC mark an important watershed in the Irish law of evidence and Irish legal culture more generally. The case relaxed the exclusionary rule established in People (DPP) v Kenny, one of the strictest in the common law world, by creating an exception based on ‘inadvertence’. This paper examines the decision through the lens of legal culture, drawing in particular on Lawrence Friedman's distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ legal culture to help understand the factors contributing to the decision. The paper argues that Friedman's concept and, in particular, the dialectic between internal and external legal culture, holds much utility at a micro as well as macro level, in interrogating the cultural logics at work in judicial decision-making.


1955 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 365
Author(s):  
James H. Chadbourn ◽  
Charles T. McCormick
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

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