scholarly journals Freedom of speech issues in Peach v Toohey and a hypothetical variant of that case

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-152
Author(s):  
Patrick Keyzer

The purpose of this article is to consider the tensions within Australian free speech jurisprudence based on a hypothetical variant of the facts of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Northen Territory in Peach v Toohey. In particular, this article briefly explores the competing legal interests  that operate when journalists seek access to restricted areas, in this case aborginal land, in the course of an investigation. After considering the case and the issues it raises the author develops a hypothetical that draws out some of the deeper tensions in this area of the law. The article concludes with proposals for new apporoaches to the test developed by the High Court of Australia in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation for the balancing of freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs—including the public right to know — against other legitimate objectives such as the maintence of property rights and the privacy interests that can be associated with propety rights. 

Author(s):  
Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae

This article reflects on the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In particular, it assesses whether the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndaba v Ndaba had adequately clarified how this area of law should be understood. In light of the inconsistent approaches from various divisions of the High Court, it has not always been clear how the courts should interpret the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In this paper, aspects of this area of law which have been clarified by the Supreme Court of Appeal are highlighted. This paper further demonstrates aspects of this area of law which the Supreme Court of Appeal did not settle and would potentially be subject to future litigation. This paper is based on the premise that while Ndaba v Ndaba is welcomed, the Supreme Court of Appeal nonetheless, missed a golden opportunity to authoritatively provide a basis upon which the law relating to pension interest in South Africa should be understood. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 537-582
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter examines torts of trespass to land and nuisance. Trespass to land is concerned with direct harm, and the tort’s primary importance is the protection of property rights. Harm in this context does not necessarily mean actual damage to the land concerned. The harm lies in the fact that land owned by one party has been unjustifiably interfered with by another. Private nuisance deals with indirect and unreasonable interferences to land, including what might be called consequential interferences resulting from a direct action. Private nuisance regulates relationships and conflicts between neighbours, defining their mutual rights and obligations with respect to land use. Many aspects of the law of nuisance, including determining whether an injunction or damages is the appropriate remedy, were clarified by the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2014].


Tort Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 535-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter examines torts of trespass to land and nuisance. Trespass to land is concerned with direct harm, and the tort’s primary importance is the protection of property rights. Harm in this context does not necessarily mean actual damage to the land concerned. The harm lies in the fact that land owned by one party has been unjustifiably interfered with by another. Private nuisance deals with indirect and unreasonable interferences to land, including what might be called consequential interferences resulting from a direct action. Private nuisance regulates relationships and conflicts between neighbours, defining their mutual rights and obligations with respect to land use. Many aspects of the law of nuisance, including determining whether an injunction or damages is the appropriate remedy, have recently been clarified by the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2014].


2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sherwyn ◽  
Paul Wagner

While the years 2017 and 2018 will be remembered for numerous geo political and social movements, any retrospective of this time will include the issue of sexual harassment and the corresponding “Me Too” movement. In this time, sexual harassment has transformed from a workplace legal concept to an issue that is defining the fabric of the country. While no one could persuasively argue that sexual harassment has not expanded from its legal roots to a movement that transcends the law, the fact is that the concept is rooted and adjudicated in law. Sadly, the commentators and the popular press often ignore or misstate the law. This creates a dangerous culture where the public is misinformed of their rights and responsibilities. More troubling, is the fact that there are serious problems with the law that need to be understand and, we contend, changed, in order for the entire problem to be eliminated, or, at least, mitigated. This paper explains the law with regard to what constitutes sexual harassment and when the employer is liable, identifies the problems, and proposes a fix so that we can create a future workplace where the authors’ five daughters (between them) and the rest of their generation will be able to honestly not raise their hands and not have to say: “Me Too!”


2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-78
Author(s):  
Michael J Kirby CMG

In October 2003 in Melbourne, the High Court of Australia celebrated the centenary of its first sitting.  According to the Australian Constitution, it is the “Federal Supreme Court” of the Australian Commonwealth.1  Although the Constitution envisaged the establishment of the High Court, the first sitting of the new court did not take place until a statute had provided for the court and the appointment of its first Justices.  They took their seats in a ceremony held in the Banco Court in the Supreme Court of Victoria on 6 October 1903.  Exactly a century later, the present Justices assembled in the same courtroom for a sitting to mark the first century of the Court.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-223
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Roark

The First Amendment protects one of our most precious rights as citizens of the United States—the freedom of speech. Such protection has withstood the test of time, even safeguarding speech that much of the population would find distasteful. There is one form of speech which cannot be protected: the true threat. However, the definition of what constitutes a "true threat" has expanded since its inception. In the new era of communication—where most users post first and edit later—the First Amendment protection we once possessed has been eroded as more and more speech is considered proscribable as a "true threat." In order to adequately protect both the public at large and our individual right to free speech, courts should analyze a speaker’s subjective intent before labeling speech a "true threat." Though many courts have adopted an objective, reasonable listener test, the U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. By holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat conviction, the Court will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and repair years of erosion caused by an objective approach.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Asep Syarifuddin Hidayat

Abstract.Article 13 paragraph 1 of Act Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power states that all court hearings are open to the public, unless the Act says otherwise. Therefore, a judicial review trial must be open to the public. If the trial process of the judicial review is carried out in a closed manner, it can be considered a legal defect, because it is contrary to Article 13 paragraph (3) of the Law. The Law of the Supreme Court is not regulated that the judicial review is closed, because in the judicial review there is a need for openness or principle of audiences of parties or litigants must be given the opportunity to provide information and express their opinions, including the defendant as the maker of Legislation invitation under the law, so that the impact of the decision will need to be involved.Keywords: Judicial Review, Audi Alteram Et Partem Principle, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court Abstrak.Pasal 13 ayat 1 Undang-Undang Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman menyebutkan semua sidang pemeriksaan pengadilan terbuka untuk umum, kecuali Undang-Undang berkata lain. Oleh karena itu,  judicial review persidangan harus dilakukan terbuka untuk umum. Apabila proses persidangan judicial review ini dilakukan secara tertutup, maka dapat dinilai cacat hukum karena bertentangan dengan Pasal 13 ayat (3) Undang-Undang tersebut. Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung pun tidak diatur bahwa persidangan judicial review bersifat tertutup, karena dalam judicial review perlu adanya keterbukaan atau asas audi alteram et partem atau pihak-pihak yang berperkara harus diberi kesempatan untuk memberikan keterangan dan menyampaikan pendapatnya termasuk pihak termohon sebagai  pembuat Peraturan Perundang-Undangan di bawah Undang-Undang sehingga akan terkena dampak putusan perlu dilibatkan.Kata Kunci: Judicial Review, Asas Audi Alteram Et Partem, Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

Proprietary estoppel provides one of equity’s most powerful remedies. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which arises when one party acts on the reliance of the promise of another. The promise and corresponding reliance creates a quasi-contract with reliance acting as an alternative to the consideration usually required in contracts. Proprietary estoppel is distinct from other equitable estoppels in that a proprietary estoppel can act as a ‘sword’ and form the basis of a cause of action. If all of the parts of proprietary estoppel are made out, a court can modify or create property rights to satisfy the equity.With regard to the Canadian experience, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently noted that proprietary estoppel has received “somewhat uneven treatment in Canada.” It is within this context that the Court of Appeal for British Columbia split on the proper scope for the Supreme Court of Canada. In Cowper-Smith v Morgan, the Supreme Court of Canada has both clarified the test for — and arguably expanded the scope of — proprietary estoppel in the context of promises exchanged between children over their mother’s care during her lifetime. The fact that a party lacks an interest in the disputed property at the time of the promise does not negate the obligation of fulfilling the promise. Instead, when the party responsible for the expectation has or acquires sufficient interest in the property, proprietary estoppel will attach to that interest and protect the equity. This article will discuss the law of proprietary estoppel in other jurisdictions and how the Supreme Court of Canada has infused this remedy with greater flexibility to satisfy the equity.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document