scholarly journals tModeling and analyzing pricing and inventory problem in a closed loop supply chain with return policy and multiple manufacturers and multiple sales channels using game theory

2017 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0-0 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leila Nazari ◽  
Mehdi Seifbarghy ◽  
Mostafa Setak
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9681
Author(s):  
Xiaomin Zhao ◽  
Xueli Bai ◽  
Zhihui Fan ◽  
Ting Liu

This paper studies a closed-loop supply chain that covers three key members: Manufacturer, new components supplier, and recycled-components supplier. Considering the power of each member in the chain, we use game theory to analyze the optimal decision and coordination, particularly investigating the economic value of components reuse strategy. The results show that, in a decentralized setting, the value of components reuse highly depends on the attributes of the products. For the products with low price elasticity, reuse strategy is only beneficial to the recycled-components suppliers. Further investigation shows the manufacturer can use wholesale price contracts to coordinate and improve the supply chain’s performance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zongbao Zou ◽  
Fan Wang ◽  
Xiaofan Lai ◽  
Jingxian Hong

As sustainability issues are receiving increasing attention in society, in recent years many manufacturers have been adopting remanufacturing via technology licensing. This paper uses a game theory approach to investigate this strategy of a manufacturer under a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one third-party remanufacturer (TPR), with the consideration of customer environmental awareness. In particular, the supplier supplies the components to the manufacturer and the manufacturer adopts technology licensing remanufacturing via the TPR. We explicitly characterize the reactions between the supplier and the manufacturer as being in equilibrium after adopting the technology licensing. We find that only when remanufacturing is a potential threat to the supplier is the performance of the supply chain improved and the double marginalization effect effectively eliminated. Moreover, remanufacturing by technology licensing only increases the profit of the manufacturer, but decreases the profit of the supplier. Interestingly, contrary to traditional wisdom, the existence of remanufactured products does not reduce the quantity of new products. Furthermore, remanufacturing by technology licensing may not always improve the environment, but customers in the market have environmental awareness that facilitates remanufacturing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (11) ◽  
pp. 8165-8170
Author(s):  
Jariya Seksan ◽  
Kannapha Amaruchkul

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (22) ◽  
pp. 6899-6916 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Guo ◽  
Ying Zhang ◽  
Chunnan Zhang ◽  
Yidong Zhang ◽  
Zixin Han

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 1891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Guo ◽  
Congdong Li ◽  
Ying Zhang ◽  
Chunnan Zhang ◽  
Mengmeng Lu

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