scholarly journals PARTISIPASI POLITIK DALAM KONSEPSI TEORI PILIHAN RASIONAL JAMES S COLEMAN

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Nila Sastrawati

Social action is an important aspect in analyzing behavior, including in analyzing the political participation of individuals and society. Diverse forms of political participation indicate that individuals make choices of political participation based on subjective considerations with reference to costs and rewards. In the conception of Rational Choice Theory from James S. Coleman, there are 2 main essences, namely actors and resources. Actors as actors of participation, have the power to use resources, including external resources or political modalities so that the actors' political objectives are achieved.

Humaniora ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 264
Author(s):  
Yustinus Suhardi Ruman

Electoral democracy generates the political elites. Because these political elites are born through a democratic process, they are expected to practice their power in accordance to the basic principles of democracy. One of them is to open the opportunity and acces of people to participatie in decision making proceses. Nevertheless, the problem is that the political elites who were elected through electoral democracy tend to close the participation of citizen in policy making process. To analyze how the political elites formulated the policy and what the rationality of the policy was, this article used rational choice theory. Article used secondary data to analyze the problem. Results of the analysis showed that democracy in local level after elections was determined by rationality, preferences, and interests of the political elites. The practices of power of the elites in local level in the context of rational choice theory made opportunity and access for the people obstructed. It then affects the existing development policies reflect only rationality, preferences, and interests of some elites. 


Res Publica ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-157
Author(s):  
Sam Depauw

According to rational choice theory casework is a rational form of political participation for both voter and Member of Parliament. It increases the voter's chance to a redress of grievance and it is an important means for MPs to maximize their votes, which parliamentary activities fail to contribute to. Though rational for individual actors, casework is far from optimal for society as a whole. Disregarding isolated cases, casework does not constitute an important source of inspiration for legislative and oversight activities. A written survey among 101 Flemish MPs tends to show that a collective solution for grievances in great demand is not pursued, as casework seems electorally and personally so much more rewarding. A cure for casework cannot befound, unless it ends this structural attractiveness of constituency service. Disregarding its rationality in isolated cases, casework, because it does not result in collective measures, seems to be a meager substitute for political participation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-22
Author(s):  
Rafael Galvão de Almeida

This article proposes to analyze the contributions of Albert Hirschman to political economy. Although he was explicitly affiliated to any school of thought, Hirschman worked with both economics and political science to understand questions such as ‘why do people vote and participate in politics?’. He was disappointed with what mainstream economics could provide and elaborated the Exit-Voice-Loyalty (EVL) framework, to understand mechanisms of action in politics and the economy. His EVL framework has been widely read, but it did not develop a paradigm around it and was ignored by economists due to its lack of formal models. Hirschman went on to work on the political economy of citizenship in his works (Hirschman, 1977, [1982] 2002, 1991), in order to provide answers to questions of political economy away from rational choice theory, which he considered harmful.


2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
HÉlÈne Landemore

AbstractThis article is another unapologetic contribution to ‘the gentle art of rational choice bashing’. The debate over rational choice theory (RCT) may appear to have tired out; yet RCT is as dominant in political sciences as ever. The reason is that critics typically take aim at the symptoms of RCT’s failings, rather than their root cause: RCT’s very ambition of being the ‘science of choice’. In this article I argue that RCT fails twice, first as a science ofchoiceand then as ascienceof choice. Both failures suggest that political sciences need an epistemologic (re)conversion away from the Platonic ideal of a deductive and universal science of choice toward a more inductive and pluralist paradigm. While advocates of RCT rightly insist that ‘you can’t beat something with nothing’, I take their advice, with a grain of salt: in order for alternatives to appear, the frame of references needs to be modified. I draw a few perspectives for the political sciences.


OUGHTOPIA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-282
Author(s):  
In-Kyun Kim ◽  
Myeong-Geon Koh

Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.


Author(s):  
Michael Moehler

This chapter discusses contractualist theories of justice that, although they rely explicitly on moral assumptions in the traditional understanding of morality, employ rational choice theory for the justification of principles of justice. In particular, the chapter focuses on the dispute between Rawls and Harsanyi about the correct choice of principles of justice in the original position. The chapter shows that there is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute and, ultimately, formal methods alone cannot justify moral principles. This finding is significant for the development of the rational decision situation that serves for the derivation of the weak principle of universalization for the domain of pure instrumental morality.


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