“Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions”: A Comment

2007 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 10-10
Author(s):  
Bruce Alan Ackermann
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Decisions

Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Graham ◽  
Campbell R. Harvey ◽  
Shivaram Rajgopal
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Decisions

Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions

2006 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
pp. 27-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Graham ◽  
Campbell R. Harvey ◽  
Shiva Rajgopal
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Decisions

Does Investment-Related Pressure Lead to Misreporting? An Analysis of Reporting Following M&A Transactions

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 839-865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Bens ◽  
Theodore H. Goodman ◽  
Monica Neamtiu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Probability Of Detection ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Announcement Returns ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
The Face ◽  
Near Term

ABSTRACT This study examines whether managers alter their financial reporting decisions in the face of investment-related pressure. We define investment-related pressure as the increased pressure managers feel to retain their job following an M&A poorly received by the market. We hypothesize that managers attempt to assuage pressure by delivering strong performance post-merger, creating incentives for misreporting. Our findings indicate that acquirers with more negative M&A announcement returns are more likely to misstate financial statements in the post-investment period and the issuance of misstated financials mitigates this pressure, at least in the near term. Our study contributes to the literature on the relation between corporate investing and financial reporting by showing how investment-related pressure leads to misreporting, even in a setting where the costs (e.g., greater probability of detection) are high. Our study also has implications for the large body of research that evaluates various consequences of M&As using post-merger performance. Specifically, researchers should be careful to distinguish real from misstated financial performance in the post-investment period. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources indicated in the text.

scholarly journals The Attenuating Effect of Intelligent Agents and Agent Autonomy on Managers' Ability to Diffuse Responsibility for and Engage in Earnings Management

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Peter C. Kipp ◽  
Mary B. Curtis ◽  
Ziyin Li
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Intelligent Agents ◽  
Autonomous Agents ◽  
Ethical Conduct ◽  
Human Agent ◽  
Perception Of Control ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Aggressive Financial Reporting

SYNOPSIS Advances in IT suggest that computerized intelligent agents (IAs) may soon occupy many roles that presently employ human agents. A significant concern is the ethical conduct of those who use IAs, including their possible utilization by managers to engage in earnings management. We investigate how financial reporting decisions are affected when they are supported by the work of an IA versus a human agent, with varying autonomy. In an experiment with experienced managers, we vary agent type (human versus IA) and autonomy (more versus less), finding that managers engage in less aggressive financial reporting decisions with IAs than with human agents, and engage in less aggressive reporting decisions with less autonomous agents than with more autonomous agents. Managers' perception of control over their agent and ability to diffuse their own responsibility for financial reporting decisions explain the effect of agent type and autonomy on managers' financial reporting decisions.

Baywatch International: A Case Linking Financial-Reporting, Business, and User Decisions

2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-633 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Phillips ◽  
Kevin Morris ◽  
Kristina Zvinakis
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Technical Knowledge ◽  
Capital Asset ◽  
Financial Statement Analysis ◽  
Accounting Courses ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Asset Depreciation

Baywatch International is a hypothetical company that manufactures figure-enhancement products—a rapidly growing industry that is featured frequently in Fortune and on CNNfn. The executives at Baywatch are making financial-reporting decisions pertaining to the company's receivables, inventories, loss contingencies, and capital asset depreciation. These decisions require technical knowledge of fundamental topics covered in introductory financial accounting courses, as well as an appreciation for relationships among financial-reporting, business, and user decisions. Consideration of the implications for financial statement analysis, earnings management, and financial-reporting ethics also is encouraged.

Auditors’ Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Decisions: Analysis, Synthesis, and Research Directions

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Kwaku Asare ◽  
Brian C. Fitzgerald ◽  
Lynford E. Graham ◽  
Jennifer Joe ◽  
Eric Michael Negangard ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Research Directions ◽  
Reporting Decisions

The Effect of Real Earnings Management on Auditor Scrutiny of Management's Other Financial Reporting Decisions

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (5) ◽  
pp. 145-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin P. Commerford ◽  
Richard C. Hatfield ◽  
Richard W. Houston
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Mediation Model ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Regulatory Scrutiny ◽  
Serial Mediation ◽  
Subjective Estimates ◽  
Inference Theory

ABSTRACT Recent research reveals that accruals-based earnings management (AEM) is decreasing while real earnings management (REM) is increasing, suggesting the correlation is due to regulatory scrutiny. However, based on Correspondent Inference Theory, we predict and find that when management uses REM, auditors are more restrictive of management's subjective estimates, making it more difficult for management to use income-increasing AEM. Our experiment manipulates the presence versus absence of REM, and whether the audit difference potentially impacts the client's ability to meet an earnings target. Using a serial mediation model, we find that when auditors observe REM, they perceive these operating decisions as aggressive, leading them to perceive management as aggressive, ultimately causing greater proposed adjustments on an unrelated audit difference. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that when auditors observe REM, their altered perceptions about management can cascade, affecting how they respond to management estimates in unrelated financial statement accounts.

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