scholarly journals The Abyss of Meaning or the Cauldron of Signs: Meaning and Tertium Quid. Shakespeare as a Translator?

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-38
Author(s):  
Jean-Claude Gémar
Keyword(s):  
Canonical Function ◽  
Richard Ii ◽  
Final Interpretation ◽  
The Law

AbstractSum of atoms or molecules that are the signs that the author of a text organizes in speech, the text contains meaning, in latency. To activate it, reveal it must be interpreted, whether or not the purpose is to translate it. When it comes to translating, the difficulties presented by the translation of normative texts are due in large part to the notional burden, the degree of “juridical status” of the message conveyed by the text and the cultural singularity revealed by its mode of writing. While the substance of a text is of paramount importance in its interpretation, the manner in which it is written and presented – its form – is far from negligible. Each way of saying carries its own, and participates in, the meaning. The approach defined for the translation, sourcing (least-cultural) or targeting (most-cultural), guides the meaning. That is when the final interpretation of the two versions of the instrumental text by the courts fulfils the canonical function of law and language: to say the law by determining the meaning of all or part of a text. Until then, the signs generating the speech and its meaning nested in this place of uncertainty that is the tertium quid, where rest, like the ingredients that the Sisters of Destiny (Macbeth) stir in their cauldron, the signs of where meaning will come out, an uncertain and precarious truth deduced by the original interpreter of the instrumental text, the translator, transcribed into the target text. Would Shakespeare provide an answer to the existential questions posed by the translator, when the spectre (Hamlet) and the witches (Macbeth), enigmatic oracles, answer the protagonists’ ontological questions about the meaning and direction of their lives? The bard indeed launches this injunction: keep law and form and due proportion in Richard II (3.4.43)! Will the translator follow him in each of these three directions?

Sovereign Outlaws: Shakespeare’s Second Tetralogy

2020 ◽  
pp. 55-79
Author(s):  
Conor McCarthy
Keyword(s):  
History Plays ◽  
Richard Ii ◽  
Henry V ◽  
Sovereign Immunity ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
The Law ◽  
Second Tetralogy

This chapter asks whether the sovereign can (and perhaps must) act outside the law in a reading of the second tetralogy of Shakespeare’s history plays. The discussion opens with an examination of the notion of sovereign immunity, contrasted with a competing line of discourse against tyranny. It then argues that questions around the king’s status relative to the law constitute an important set of issues within Shakespeare’s Richard II,where both individuals (Richard and Bolingbroke) and events (Richard’s deposition) may be read as existing outside of the law in various senses. The chapter proceeds to consider the remaining plays in the tetralogy, arguing that Henry V, a sort of quasi-outlaw before gaining the throne, finds as king that he must act outside the law to defend the interests of his state. The discussion surveys a range of legal questions in Henry V, from his claim to the throne of France to his threats before Harfleur and his killing of prisoners at Agincourt. The chapter concludes with a brief glance at espionage in Elizabethan England, and the Elizabethan state’s recourse to methods of invisible power.

scholarly journals Ley aplicable a las acciones concursales de reintegración (comentario a la STJUE de 8 de junio de 2017, Vinlys Italia) = Applicable law to reintegration actionsin insolvency proceedings (commentary to CJUE judgment 8 June 2017 Vinlys Italia)

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 739
Author(s):  
Ángel Espiniella Menéndez
Keyword(s):  
Applicable Law ◽  
European Insolvency Regulation ◽  
Insolvency Regulation ◽  
Final Interpretation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Insolvency Proceedings ◽  
Rome I

Resumen: en el Asunto Vinyls Italia, el TJUE recuerda que la ley rectora del concurso no es base suficiente para revocar un contrato perjudicial para el conjunto de los acreedores, si la contratante prueba que la ley rectora de tal contrato no permite su impugnación. Entre los aciertos de la Sentencia, des­taca que esta excepción no debe amparar prácticas fraudulentas, además de que su tramitación procesal debe hacerse conforme a la lex fori. No obstante, la Sentencia presenta serias dudas al obviar que la de­terminación de la ley rectora del contrato, y su carácter internacional, deben hacerse por el Reglamento Roma I y no por el Reglamento europeo de insolvencia. También es dudosa la remisión a la lex fori para la posible aplicación de oficio de esta excepción; más bien debería jugar a instancia de parte de acuerdo con una interpretación literal y finalista del Reglamento europeo de insolvencia.Palabras clave: acciones concursales de reintegración, ley aplicable, ley rectora del concurso, ley rectora del contrato, tramitación procesalAbstract: in Vinyls Italy Case, the CJEU reminds that the law governing the insolvency proce­eding is not a sufficient basis to revoke a contract detrimental to all creditors, if the contracting party provides proof that the law governing that contract does not allow its revocation. One of the hits of the Judgment is that this defense should not cover fraudulent practices, as well as procedural aspects shall be governed by lex fori. However, the Judgment presents serious doubts when it obviates that the determi­nation of the law governing the contract, and its international consideration, shall be made by the Rome I Regulation and not by the European Insolvency Regulation. The reference to the lex fori is also doubtful in relation with the possible ex officio application of this defense; rather, that defense should play at the request of a party according to a literal and final interpretation of the European Insolvency Regulation.Keywords: reintegration actions, applicable law, law governing insolvency proceedings, law go­verning the contract, procedure

scholarly journals The Treason Legislation of Henry VIII (1531–1534): Alexander Prize Essay, 1916

1917 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 87-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. D. Thornley
Keyword(s):  
Henry Viii ◽  
Richard Ii ◽  
Edward Iii ◽  
Henry Iv ◽  
Long Life ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
Emergency Measures ◽  
Prize Essay

All legislation is to some extent the product of circumstance, and none more so than the numerous Acts which have from time to time augmented or reduced the law governing high treason. The basis of that law has been since 1352 the famous Act of 25 Edward III, stat. 5, c. 2, and this Act itself was moulded by the circumstances under which it was passed. Edward III was at the height of his power and popularity, so that in defining treason it was only necessary to include offences likely to be committed against a popular king reigning by an undisputed title. This accounts both for what the Act contains and what it omits, and is the reason for that sufficiency in quiet times which has preserved it for over five centuries. It accounts also for its inadequacy in crises and disturbances, and the need to supplement it under such kings as Richard II and Henry VIII. New treasons are thus emergency measures to enable the Government to cope with particular situations; when the troublous times are over, they and the offences with which they deal disappear naturally with the circumstances which provoked them, and the Act of 1352 once more reigns supreme. When considering the causes of its long life, it must be remembered that Treason Acts fall into two classes: those augmenting and those diminishing the scope of the offence. The Act of 1352 belongs to the latter class. It was passed to bridle the judges in the creation of constructive treasons—a process which had alarmed Parliament—and, unlike all other Acts of its class, it did not follow a revolution or period of crisis, as the Act of I Henry IV, c. 10, followed the reign of Richard II; 1 Edward VI, c. 12, that of Henry VIII; and 1 Mary, c. I, that of Edward VI.

I. Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453 To 1509

1961 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Lander
Keyword(s):  
Married Woman ◽  
Maternal Inheritance ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Richard Ii ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Late Fifteenth ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
First Time

Attainder was the most solemn penalty known to the common law. Attainder for treason was followed not only by the most savage and brutal corporal penalties and the forfeiture of all possessions, but in addition the corruption of blood passing to all direct descendants, in other words, by the legal death of the family. Before proceeding to an examination of the effects of parliamentary acts of attainder in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries it is necessary first of all to define the scope of forfeiture for treason as it affected landed property. Bracton's classic definition of forfeiture had involved for the traitor ‘the loss of all his goods and the perpetual disinheritance of his heirs, so that they may be admitted neither to the paternal nor to the maternal inheritance’. Feudal opinion had always been very much opposed to the stringency of this conception and the Edwardian statute De Donis Conditionalibus, confirmed implicitly by the treason statute of 1352, had protected entailed estates from the scope of forfeiture, thus leaving only the fee simple and the widow's dower within the scope of the law. The wife's own inheritance or any jointure which had been made for her, because they ante-dated her husband's treason, as distinct from her right to dower which did not, were not liable to ultimate forfeiture—though a married woman could claim them only when ‘her time came according to the common law’, that is after the death of her husband when she ceased to be ‘femme couvert’. This equitable principle was confirmed by a statute of the Merciless Parliament of 1388 which, however, included for the first time the rule that lands held to the use of a traitor were also included in the scope of forfeiture. Thus, by 1388, of the lands held by a traitor (as distinct from the wife's inheritance and jointure), only those held in fee tail fell outside the scope of the treason laws. This loophole was closed by Richard II in 1398 when Parliament declared forfeit entailed estates as well as lands held in fee simple and to the use of a traitor, thus reverting with one exception to Bracton's view of forfeiture.

scholarly journals ‘Wat jy ook op die aarde mag bind, sal in die hemel gebonde wees, en wat jy ook op die aarde mag ontbind, sal in die hemel ontbonde wees’ (Matt 16:19)

2011 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Theuns F.J. Dreyer
Keyword(s):  
New Teacher ◽  
Good News ◽  
Reformed Tradition ◽  
Original Meaning ◽  
History Of ◽  
Final Interpretation ◽  
The Law ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The Church

‘What you prohibit on earth will be prohibited in heaven, and what you permit on earth will be permitted in heaven’ (Mt 16:19) This article has been a homiletic reflection on the well-known words in Matthew 16:19. The explication and application of these words have been theologically contextualised with respect to current debates amongst theologians in the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk. The original meaning of this verse relates to the rabbinical tradition of interpretation of the Torah. Matthew pictures Jesus as the new teacher (like Moses), who gave a new interpretation of the law. In rabbinical language, his teachings are ‘binding’ and ‘loosening’, or, as translated in the Good News Bible (1933), they permit and prohibit. In the history of the reformed tradition, this verse was mostly interpreted from a judicial perspective as the authority to excommunicate or to include. To a great extent and especially in certain circles, the tradition of interpretation became static because of the authority of a ‘final’ interpretation attached to the creeds of the church. However, the original meaning of this verse is the authority, and commands us continuously to interpret the meaning of the gospel in the context of the present-day situation.

Ethical Challenges: Less About Moral Wrongdoing and More About Communication Breakdown

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Leslie ◽  
Mary Casper
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Challenges ◽  
Speech Language Pathology ◽  
Thickened Liquids ◽  
Communication Breakdown ◽  
Professional Duty ◽  
Language Pathology ◽  
The Law ◽  
Personal Case

“My patient refuses thickened liquids, should I discharge them from my caseload?” A version of this question appears at least weekly on the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association's Community pages. People talk of respecting the patient's right to be non-compliant with speech-language pathology recommendations. We challenge use of the word “respect” and calling a patient “non-compliant” in the same sentence: does use of the latter term preclude the former? In this article we will share our reflections on why we are interested in these so called “ethical challenges” from a personal case level to what our professional duty requires of us. Our proposal is that the problems that we encounter are less to do with ethical or moral puzzles and usually due to inadequate communication. We will outline resources that clinicians may use to support their work from what seems to be a straightforward case to those that are mired in complexity. And we will tackle fears and facts regarding litigation and the law.

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