Do We Need Propositions?

Disputatio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (52) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Gordon Barnes
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Valid Argument ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Trenton Merricks ◽  
Abstract Entities

Abstract Trenton Merricks argues that we need propositions to serve as the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments (Merricks 2015). A modally valid argument is an argument in which, necessarily, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true. According to Mer- ricks, the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments have their truth conditions essentially, and they exist necessarily. Sentences do not satisfy these conditions. Thus, we need propositions. Merricks’ argument adds a new chapter to the longstanding debate over the exis- tence of propositions. However, I argue that Merricks’ argument does not quite succeed. Merricks has overlooked one viable alternative to pos- tulating propositions. However, this alternative employs the relation of being true-at-a-world, which is difficult to analyze. Thus, the soundness of Merricks’ argument ultimately depends on the comparative merits of accepting propositions as abstract entities, versus accepting truth-at-a- world as an unanalyzed relation between sentences and possible worlds.

Infinitive Perfect and Backward Causation

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Johan Sæbø
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Counterfactual Analysis ◽  
Present Perfect ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
Causative Constructions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
General Semantic ◽  
Backward Causation

The present paper represents an attempt to explain the semantically deviant nature of causative constructions with present perfect effect sentences. As far as I known, such constructions have not been commented upon in the literature on causativity. I show that any counterfactual analysis of the traditional sort will bring them out as synthetic sentences, provided they are syntactically well-formed. On the other hand, if the notion os counterfactural dependence is re-interpreted along the lines of branching possible worlds, they can be shown to be systematically contradictory. I discuss the various revisions of the truth conditions for tensed formulae and of the general semantic framework which are necessary to accomplish this.

Taking Possible Worlds Seriously

2019 ◽  
pp. 106-126
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Real World ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Abstract Entities

The discussion so far has been employing the notion of possible worlds, popularized via the semantics of modal logic. How seriously, however, should possible worlds be taken? David Lewis held them to be genuine, concrete worlds, no less real than ours, the actual world, whereas Robert Stalnaker and Saul Kripke take them to be, rather, abstract entities, properties of the actual world—the only real world—which it might possibly possess. I agree with Lewis that possible worlds are no less real than the actual world, but I also agree with Stalnaker that only our world actually exists. I affirm that merely possible worlds, though they lack existence, possess being. I develop the notion of possible worlds, in which possible individuals exist, but also point to unsolved problems, such as how to account for the contingency of the actuality of the actual world.

The Metaphysics of Meaning: Propositions and Possible Worlds

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Soames
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Cognitive States

This chapter examines two crucial aspects of the metaphysics of meaning—propositions and possible world-states. It reviews why propositions—needed as meanings of sentences and objects of the attitudes—can neither be extracted from theories of truth conditions, nor defined in terms of possible world-states, It then explains why they also cannot be the mysterious, inherently representational, abstract objects they have traditionally been taken to be. Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of their relations to the supposedly prior and independent representationality of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the cognitive states with which they are connected. A new account of is presented along these lines.

scholarly journals Set-Theoretic Dependence

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Wigglesworth
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Logical Framework ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
First Order ◽  
Dependence Relations ◽  
Asymmetric Dependence ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
First Order Modal Logic

In this paper, we explore the idea that sets depend on, or are grounded in, their members.  It is said that a set depends on each of its members, and not vice versa.  Members do not depend on the sets that they belong to.  We show that the intuitive modal truth conditions for dependence, given in terms of possible worlds, do not accurately capture asymmetric dependence relations between sets and their members.  We extend the modal truth conditions to include impossible worlds and give a more satisfactory account of  the dependence of a set on its members. Focusing on the case of singletons, we articulate a logical framework in which to evaluate set-theoretic dependence claims, using a normal first-order modal logic.  We show that on this framework the dependence of a singleton on its single members follows from logic alone. However, the converse does not hold.

From Possibility to Properties? Or from Properties to Possibility?

Philosophy ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-49
Author(s):  
Sophie R. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Causal Necessity

AbstractThis paper contrasts two metaphysical accounts of modality and properties: Modal Realism which treats possible entities as primitive; and Strong Dispositionalism in which metaphysical possibility and necessity are determined by actually existing dispositions or powers. I argue that Strong Dispositionalism loses its initial advantages of simplicity and parsimony over Modal Realism as it is extended and amended to account for metaphysical rather than just causal necessity. Furthermore, to avoid objections to its material and formal adequacy, Strong Dispositionalism requires a richer fundamental ontology which it cannot explicate without appealing either to possible worlds or to an account of counterfactual truth conditions, both of which Strong Dispositionalism was intended to replace.

A Refutation of the Lewis-Stalnaker Analysis of Counterfactuals

Metaphysica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Arvan
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals

AbstractThe standard philosophical analysis of counterfactual conditionals – the Lewis-Stalnaker analysis – analyzes the truth-conditions of counterfactuals in terms of nearby possible worlds. This paper demonstrates that this analysis is false.

scholarly journals "good" as a predicate of worlds

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 407-424
Author(s):  
Frank Sode
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Gradable Adjectives ◽  
Subjunctive Conditionals ◽  
Positive Form ◽  
Classical Notion

The paper proposes a new semantics for good-predications involving finite if -andthat-clauses. The proposal combines a standard semantics for conditionals with a standardsemantics for the positive form of gradable adjectives and a minimal semantics for modal good.The predicted truth-conditions and conditions of use solve the mood puzzle presented in thefirst part of the paper. The remainder of the paper defends the classical notion of comparativegoodness in terms of a comparison between possible worlds against Lassiter (2017)’s challenge.Keywords: gradable adjectives, subjunctive conditionals, preference predicates, factivity.

scholarly journals Nouwen's Puzzle and a Scalar Semantics for Obligations, Needs, and Desires

2015 ◽  
pp. 694
Author(s):  
Daniel Lassiter
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Universal Quantifiers

Nouwen (2010a,b) presents a puzzle involving the interaction of degree expressions and modals: a class of apparently unremarkable sentences expressing minimum and maximum requirements, obligations, desires, etc. are predicted to be trivially false or undefined, or receive otherwise incorrect truth-conditions. I suggest that the puzzle can be resolved if we treat the affected modals not as universal quantifiers over possible worlds but instead as scalar expressions which map propositions to points on a scale of expected utility. Independent arguments indicate that these modals are scalar, non-monotonic, and information-sensitive -- facts which are highly problematic for quantificational theories, but predicted immediately by the proposed scalar semantics. With no extra modification, this semantics also predicts the correct truth-conditions for Nouwen's examples, modulo some subtleties involving epistemic interpretations of minimum and maximum operators. These conclusions provide additional evidence in support of previous work arguing that the semantics of obligation and desire should be built around a non-monotonic scalar semantics rather than quantification over possible worlds.

scholarly journals Nouwen's Puzzle and a Scalar Semantics for Obligations, Needs, and Desires

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 694 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Lassiter
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Universal Quantifiers

Nouwen (2010a,b) presents a puzzle involving the interaction of degree expressions and modals: a class of apparently unremarkable sentences expressing minimum and maximum requirements, obligations, desires, etc. are predicted to be trivially false or undefined, or receive otherwise incorrect truth-conditions. I suggest that the puzzle can be resolved if we treat the affected modals not as universal quantifiers over possible worlds but instead as scalar expressions which map propositions to points on a scale of expected utility. Independent arguments indicate that these modals are scalar, non-monotonic, and information-sensitive -- facts which are highly problematic for quantificational theories, but predicted immediately by the proposed scalar semantics. With no extra modification, this semantics also predicts the correct truth-conditions for Nouwen's examples, modulo some subtleties involving epistemic interpretations of minimum and maximum operators. These conclusions provide additional evidence in support of previous work arguing that the semantics of obligation and desire should be built around a non-monotonic scalar semantics rather than quantification over possible worlds.

A Theory of Conditionals

2019 ◽  
pp. 151-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Conditional Logic ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Ramsey Test ◽  
The Way

This chapter was the first exposition and defense of an axiom system and model theory for a conditional logic in the possible worlds framework, a theory designed to model counterfactual propositions. It is argued, using a version of the Ramsey test, that the truth-conditions for conditionals that are provided can explain why we assess counterfactuals in the way we do. Counterexamples are given for various principles that are often taken to be valid for conditionals, but that are invalid on the semantics provided. It is argued that the theory helps to explain how propositions that are ostensibly about counterfactual possible situations can be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence about the actual world.

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