PAST TENSE FORMS OF THE VERB ’BE’ IN MODAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN UDMURT

In Udmurt the past tense forms of the verb ’be’ ( val and vylem ) appear in different modal constructions and in the non-declarative moods. The paper focuses on the use of val and vylem in four modal constructions: two deontic, a desiderative and a permissive one. It is established that in such constructions val and vylem can have non-modal and modal use as well. In their non-modal sense val and vylem primarily modify the clause temporally and form the past tense equivalent of the given modal construction. The difference between the non-modal use of val and vylem lies in the difference between the first and second past tense in general. In their modal use val and vylem decrease the degree of modal force (also called as modal attenuation) and should be analyzed as particles. In such cases modal constructions can be interpreted as counterfactual conditionals. Differences can be characterized between the modal use of val and vylem . The particle vylem is associated with greater mental distance between the speaker and factuality and expresses that the likelihood of realization is small or nonexistent. therefore, it can be considered epistemic. The particle val does not distance the events from factuality to such a high extent as vylem . Also, native speakers associated a higher probability of fulfilment with the utterances formed with val . In my opinion, the difference between the modal use of the particles originates from their verbal use and from the differences between the first and second past tense.

Bell inequalities, counterfactual definiteness and falsifiability

We formally prove the existence of an enduring incongruence pervading a widespread interpretation of the Bell inequality and explain how to rationally avoid it with a natural assumption justified by explicit reference to a mathematical property of Bell’s probabilistic model. Although the amendment does not alter the relevance of the theorem regarding local realism, it brings back Bell theorem from the realm of philosophical discussions about counterfactual conditionals to the concrete experimental arena.

Resurgent Powers and the Failure of Conceptual Analysis

Jennifer McKitrick examines the causes moving many philosophers to pull Aristotelian powers out of history’s dustbin, the failure to reduce or eliminate dispositional ascriptions from philosophical and scientific discourses. Although many see this failure as grounds for rejecting Humeanism and return to Aristotelianism, McKitrick argues that only a more moderate reaction is warranted. She argues that restricting analysis to fundamental dispositions and adding a condition requiring the power ascription be grounded in or made true by the fact that the object possesses that fundamental disposition is the better reaction. McKitrick canvasses the main twentieth-century attempts to reduce or eliminate dispositional talk. She begins with the logical positivists’ attempt to replace dispositional talk with material conditionals. Then, after briefly considering Ryle’s version, she turns to Goodman and the move to replace material conditional analyses with stronger-than-material conditionals, such as causal implication or counterfactual conditionals backed up by natural kinds and laws of nature. Next, she turns to Lewis’s possible worlds semantics and concludes with a presentation of the ‘Simple Counterfactual Analysis’. Despite these problems with providing analyses of dispositional ascriptions in terms of counterfactuals, McKitrick recognizes that there is still an important connection between dispositions and counterfactuals. A thing’s disposition is its property of having a certain kind of counterfactual hold of it. But she advocates restricting counterfactual analyses to fundamental dispositions and powers and requiring that they be made true, or grounded by, the fact that the object has that power.

Causal effects and counterfactual conditionals: contrasting Rubin, Lewis and Pearl

Rubin and Pearl offered approaches to causal effect estimation and Lewis and Pearl offered theories of counterfactual conditionals. Arguments offered by Pearl and his collaborators support a weak form of equivalence such that notation from the rival theory can be re-purposed to express Pearl’s theory in a way that is equivalent to Pearl’s theory expressed in its native notation. Nonetheless, the many fundamental differences between the theories rule out any stronger form of equivalence. A renewed emphasis on comparative research can help to guide applications, further develop each theory, and better understand their relative strengths and weaknesses.

Spatial diagrams and geometrical reasoning in the theater

This article offers an analysis of the cognitive role of diagrammatic movements in the theater. Based on the recognition of a theatrical work’s inherent ability to provide new insights concerning reality, the article concentrates on the way by which actors’ movements on stage create spatial diagrams that can provide new insights into the spectators’ world. The suggested model of theater’s epistemology results from a combination of Charles S. Peirce’s doctrine of diagrammatic reasoning and David Lewis’s theoretical account of the truth value of counterfactual conditionals. I argue that in several theatrical works – in particular those whose central image is dominated by movements – the relation of what Lewis names “comparative overall similarity” between the fictional and the actual world is based on diagrammatic homology. The cognitive process involved in deciphering them is, hence, based on diagrammatic reasoning. The main emphasis of the analysis is on the previously unnoticed but important cognitive role of observation in the theater: the idea that observation takes an active role in the reasoning process that enables the spectators to form new knowledge about their actual world. Samuel Beckett’s plays Quad and Come and Go serve here as case studies.

Edgington on Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth

The chapter responds to Dorothy Edgington’s article ‘Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth’, which defends her seminal diagnosis of the Church–Fitch refutation of verificationist knowability principles. Using counterfactual conditionals, she reformulates those principles to block that objection. The chapter argues that, to avoid trivialization, Edgington must supply a more general constraint on how the knower specifies a counterfactual situation for purposes of her reformulated principles; it is unclear how to do so. The philosophical motivation for her strategy is also questioned, with special reference to her treatment of Putnam’s epistemic account of truth. In passing, it is questioned how dangerous Church–Fitch arguments are for verificationist principles with non-factive evidential attitudes in place of knowledge. Finally, a doubt is raised about the compatibility of Edgington’s reformulation strategy with her view that counterfactual conditionals lack truth-conditions.

Counterfactuals and Probability

Dorothy Edgington has been a resolute defender of an NTV account of conditionals, according to which a conditional does not express a proposition that makes a categorical claim about the world, but instead make a qualified claim, or express a conditional belief, qualified by or conditional on the proposition expressed by the antecedent. Unlike some philosophers who defend an NTV view for indicative conditionals, but not for subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals, Edgington argues for the more radical thesis that both kinds of conditionals should be given a non-propositional analysis. This chapter considers Edgington’s NTV account of subjunctive conditionals, the role of objective probability in the account, and its relation to the possible-worlds propositional analysis of subjunctive conditionals.

Counterfactuals to the Rescue

A central question for any theory of the interpretation of conditionals is what can be held constant and what must bce given up on the face of a counterfactual supposition. This chapter brings grammatical evidence to bear on the question from polarity reversal, the phenomenon where positive polarity items can exceptionally, albeit systematically, appear in the scope of negation in the antecedent of counterfactual conditionals. Taking polarity sensitive expressions to be associated with alternatives and to give rise to scalar assertions, it shows that polarity reversal can result in scalar assertions because in making a counterfactual assumption any contextual entailments are given up once the information that gives rise to them is revised. The analysis reveals the role that contextual information tied to presuppositions plays in determining a particular type of dependency between facts.