scholarly journals Compensation to the Acquitted Person in International Criminal Law

Author(s):  
A. B. Mezyaev

INTRODUCTION. The practice of modern international criminal courts and tribunals raises serious questions about the proper enforcement of the rights of the accused. Among these rights, the accused's right to compensation is highlighted. Compensation is given to the accused (regardless of the verdict) for violation of his procedural rights and fundamental human rights and compensation to the acquitted person.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The analysis of ensuring the human right to compensation in the event of an unjust sentence is carried out on the basis of international human rights treaties, treaties on the creation of international courts, including appeal to the travaux preparatoires of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the practice of international criminal courts and tribunals, especially the ICC, as well as the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The study was conducted using general scientific methods of cognition (in particular, analysis and synthesis), as well as comparative legal, historical legal and formal dogmatic methods. To achieve the corresponding conclusions, various methods of interpretation of the rule of law are used, in particular, grammatical, systematic, teleological, harmonic, etc.RESEARCH RESULTS. In the activities of international criminal courts and tribunals, a violation of the accused’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time is systemic, including due to the absence of any procedural deadlines on the one hand, and the absence of any rules (or their non-application) to restore the rights of the accused and punishment of the party who committed the violation of these rights. This situation poses serious problems of ensuring the rights of specific accused (including justified), but also the development of modern international criminal procedural law and international human rights law.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. National legislation and international human rights instruments provide for the right of an acquitted person to compensation. In international criminal courts, this issue, however, is addressed in different ways. The statutes of international criminal courts ad hoc created by the UN Security Council do not mention the right to compensation for an accused or acquitted person. At the same time, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda recognized that the absence of a reference to law in the Statute of the Tribunal does not mean that the persons concerned do not have the corresponding right. At the same time, this recognition did not have practical consequences. The Statute of the International Criminal Court recognizes the right to compensation, however, does so to a limited extent. Thus, in international criminal courts and tribunals, the provision of the human right to compensation (primarily compensation to an acquitted person) is performed at a lower level than that established in international human rights treaties.

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-368
Author(s):  
Joanna Nicholson

Abstract That an accused receives a fair trial is essential to the legitimacy of international criminal courts and tribunals. However, how best to interpret the right to a fair trial in order to maximize the legitimacy of international criminal courts and tribunals’ decision-making? Some argue that international criminal courts and tribunals should aspire to the highest standards of fairness and should aim to set an example for domestic courts in this regard. Others argue that the unique context within which international criminal courts and tribunals operate allows them, at times, to interpret the right to a fair trial in a way which falls below minimum international human rights standards. This article examines both of these positions and finds both to be problematic. Rather, the article argues that international criminal courts and tribunals should aim for a middle path, the ‘fair enough’ standard, when interpreting the right to a fair trial. In situations where a different standard than that found within international human rights law is applied, international criminal courts and tribunals should expend greater effort in being open and clear as to why this is so, and should take care in communicating this to their audience, including victims and the accused. By doing so, the legitimacy of their decision-making will be enhanced.


Author(s):  
d’Argent Pierre ◽  
de Ghellinck Isabelle

Principle 32 deals with the procedural aspect of the right to reparation, that is, the right for victims of human right violations to access remedial procedures. It addresses three issues: the right to access remedial procedures, procedural requirements of national reparation programmes, and regional and international procedures. While the obligation of states to provide effective remedies is enshrined in most of, if not all, the key international human rights treaties, Principle 32 provides for a right to all victims to access remedies. ‘Reparation’ and ‘remedies’ are both envisioned as victims’ rights, but the distinction between them is vague. After providing a contextual and historical background on Principle 32, this chapter discusses its theoretical framework and how the reparation procedure, judicial or administrative, dealing with gross violations of human rights at national or international level has been implemented.


Author(s):  
Juan-Pablo Pérez-León-Acevedo

This chapter argues that female judges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) have made significant meaningful contributions to the ICC jurisprudence on victim matters. They have interpreted and applied the ICC legal framework on victims, have fleshed out the contours and scope of normative provisions, and have faced substantive and procedural issues on victim-witness protection, victim participation and reparations at the ICC. This chapter uses international human rights as a standard to assess the legitimacy of ICC jurisprudence. The jurisprudence on defence rights has largely sought to strike a balance between defence and victim rights. However, some jurisprudence on victims (partially) construed by female judges prompts questions on whether respect for defence rights or other ICC goals may have been compromised. It is argued that all ICC judges, including female judges, should take distance from excessive pro-victim judicial activism to fully respect defence rights, and avoid victim frustration.


2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergey Golubok

AbstractThis article analyses nascent case law of the International Criminal Court on provisional detention at the investigation stage and in the course of trial (together referred to as “pre-conviction detention”) vis-à-vis the standards developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, being a reflection of “internationally recognized human rights” to which the ICC, according to its Statute, must adhere. At least several instances of presumed inconsistencies are detected. It is argued that international criminal tribunals should above all comply with standards set by international human rights law for domestic criminal proceedings, in particular when the most fundamental and basic human right ‐ the right to personal liberty ‐ is affected. Failure to comply entails a serious risk of hazardous fragmentation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Perry

AbstractIn another essay being published contemporaneously with this one, I have explained that as the concept “human right” is understood both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in all the various international human rights treaties that have followed in the Universal Declaration's wake, a right is a human right if the rationale for establishing and protecting the right—for example, as a treaty-based right—is, in part, that conduct that violates the right violates the imperative, articulated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.” Each of the human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration and/or in one or more international human rights treaties—for example, the right, articulated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration and elsewhere, not to be subjected to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”—is a specification of what, in conjunction with other considerations, the imperative—which functions in the morality of human rights as the normative ground of human rights—is thought to forbid (or to require). A particular specification is controversial if and to the extent the supporting claim—a claim to the effect that the “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative forbids (or requires)X—is controversial. My aim in this essay is to elaborate and defend a particular specification: the right, internationally recognized as a human right, to freedom of conscience—to freedom, that is, to live one's life in accord with the deliverances of one's conscience.


Author(s):  
Clooney Amal ◽  
Webb Philippa

This chapter focuses on the right to be presumed innocent, one of the most ancient and important principles of criminal justice, and a prerequisite for any system based on the rule of law. The right is absolute and non-derogable and, at its core, prohibits convictions that are predetermined or based on flimsy grounds. International human rights bodies have therefore found that where a conviction is based on non-existent, insufficient, or unreliable evidence, the presumption has been violated and a miscarriage of justice has occurred. More frequently, international human rights bodies have applied the presumption to require specific procedural protections during a trial. These include guarantees that the prosecution bears the burden of proving a defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that the defendant should not be presented or described as a criminal before he has been proved to be one. The chapter concludes that the presumption is protected in similar terms in international human rights treaties, but also highlights divergences in international jurisprudence relating to the standard for finding that a court’s assessment of evidence violates the presumption, the permissibility of reversing the burden of proof, and the extent to which the presumption applies after a trial has been completed.


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