Choosing What to Believe - New Results in Selective Revision

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fillipe Resina ◽  
Marco Garapa ◽  
Renata Wassermann ◽  
Eduardo Fermé ◽  
Maurício Reis
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Revision Operation ◽  
Input Information ◽  
Belief Bases

Selective Revision was proposed by Fermé and Hansson as a belief revision operation in which it is possible to accept only a part of the input information. In this paper, we extend Selective Revision to belief bases and also to logics not closed under negation.

scholarly journals Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic Logic Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 3076-3083 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlo Souza ◽  
Álvaro Moreira ◽  
Renata Vieira
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Revision Operation ◽  
Belief Bases ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Base Revision ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision

AGM’s belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been largely used to specify the agent’s belief state - whether representing the agent’s ‘explicit beliefs’ or as a computational model for her belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in dynamic epistemic logic. This work investigates how priority graphs, a syntactic representation of preference relations deeply connected to prioritised bases, can be used to characterise belief change operators, focusing on well-known postulates of Iterated Belief Change. We provide syntactic representations of belief change operators in a dynamic context, as well as new negative results regarding the possibility of representing an iterated belief revision operation using transformations on priority graphs.

BELIEF REVISION IN NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOV GABBAY ◽  
ODINALDO RODRIGUES ◽  
ALESSANDRA RUSSO
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Revision Operation ◽  
First Order ◽  
General Methodology ◽  
Definition Of

In this article, we propose a belief revision approach for families of (non-classical) logics whose semantics are first-order axiomatisable. Given any such (non-classical) logic $L$, the approach enables the definition of belief revision operators for $L$, in terms of a belief revision operation satisfying the postulates for revision theory proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM revision, Alchourrón et al. (1985)). The approach is illustrated by considering the modal logic K, Belnap's four-valued logic, and Łukasiewicz's many-valued logic. In addition, we present a general methodology to translate algebraic logics into classical logic. For the examples provided, we analyse in what circumstances the properties of the AGM revision are preserved and discuss the advantages of the approach from both theoretical and practical viewpoints.

scholarly journals Multi-Agent Belief Base Revision

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emiliano Lorini ◽  
Francois Schwarzentruber
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Optimal Model ◽  
Belief Base ◽  
Belief Bases ◽  
The Core ◽  
Base Revision ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Core Part

We present a generalization of belief base revision to the multi-agent case. In our approach agents have belief bases containing both propositional beliefs and higher-order beliefs about their own beliefs and other agents’ beliefs. Moreover, their belief bases are split in two parts: the mutable part, whose elements may change under belief revision, and the core part, whose elements do not change. We study a belief revision operator inspired by the notion of screened revision. We provide complexity results of model checking for our approach as well as an optimal model checking algorithm. Moreover, we study complexity of epistemic planning formulated in the context of our framework.

Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one’s own knowledge and belief revision.

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (12) ◽  
pp. 2319-2332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Hagá ◽  
Kristina R. Olson
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Learning Perceptions

Children change their answers in response to neutral follow-up questions by a knowledgeable asker

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
New Information ◽  
Common Practices ◽  
Parent Child

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.

Positive versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision

Noûs ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision
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