scholarly journals Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic Logic Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 3076-3083 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlo Souza ◽  
Álvaro Moreira ◽  
Renata Vieira
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Revision Operation ◽  
Belief Bases ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Base Revision ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision

AGM’s belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been largely used to specify the agent’s belief state - whether representing the agent’s ‘explicit beliefs’ or as a computational model for her belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in dynamic epistemic logic. This work investigates how priority graphs, a syntactic representation of preference relations deeply connected to prioritised bases, can be used to characterise belief change operators, focusing on well-known postulates of Iterated Belief Change. We provide syntactic representations of belief change operators in a dynamic context, as well as new negative results regarding the possibility of representing an iterated belief revision operation using transformations on priority graphs.

scholarly journals A Semantics for Hyperintensional Belief Revision Based on Information Bases

Studia Logica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sena Bozdag
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Doxastic Logic ◽  
Dynamic Operation ◽  
Belief Dynamics ◽  
Dynamic Doxastic Logic ◽  
New Framework

AbstractI propose a novel hyperintensional semantics for belief revision and a corresponding system of dynamic doxastic logic. The main goal of the framework is to reduce some of the idealisations that are common in the belief revision literature and in dynamic epistemic logic. The models of the new framework are primarily based on potentially incomplete or inconsistent collections of information, represented by situations in a situation space. I propose that by shifting the representational focus of doxastic models from belief sets to collections of information, and by defining changes of beliefs as artifacts of changes of information, we can achieve a more realistic account of belief representation and belief change. The proposed dynamic operation suggests a non-classical way of changing beliefs: belief revision occurs in non-explosive environments which allow for a non-monotonic and hyperintensional belief dynamics. A logic that is sound with respect to the semantics is also provided.

(DIS)BELIEF CHANGE AND ARGUED FEED-BACK DIALOG

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (05) ◽  
pp. 511-538
Author(s):  
LAURENT PERRUSSEL ◽  
JEAN-MARC THÉVENIN
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Preference Relation ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Temporal Aspects ◽  
Incoming Information ◽  
Multi Agent

This paper focuses on the features of belief change in a multi-agent context where agents consider beliefs and disbeliefs. Disbeliefs represent explicit ignorance and are useful to prevent agents to entail conclusions due to their ignorance. Agents receive messages holding information from other agents and change their belief state accordingly. An agent may refuse to adopt incoming information if it prefers its own (dis)beliefs. For this, each agent maintains a preference relation over its own beliefs and disbeliefs in order to decide if it accepts or rejects incoming information whenever inconsistencies occur. This preference relation may be built by considering several criteria such as the reliability of the sender of statements or temporal aspects. This process leads to non-prioritized belief revision. In this context we first present the * and − operators which allow an agent to revise, respectively contract, its belief state in a non-prioritized way when it receives an incoming belief, respectively disbelief. We show that these operators behave properly. Based on this we then illustrate how the receiver and the sender may argue when the incoming (dis)belief is refused. We describe pieces of dialog where (i) the sender tries to convince the receiver by sending arguments in favor of the original (dis)belief and (ii) the receiver justifies its refusal by sending arguments against the original (dis)belief. We show that the notion of acceptability of these arguments can be represented in a simple way by using the non-prioritized change operators * and −. The advantage of argumentation dialogs is twofold. First whenever arguments are acceptable the sender or the receiver reconsider its belief state; the main result is an improvement of the reconsidered belief state. Second the sender may not be aware of some sets of rules which act as constraints to reach a specific conclusion and discover them through argumentation dialogs.

scholarly journals Credibility-limited Base Revision: New Classes and Their Characterizations

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 1023-1075
Author(s):  
Marco Garapa ◽  
Eduardo Fermé ◽  
Maurício Reis
Keyword(s):  
Belief Change ◽  
The Other ◽  
Belief Bases ◽  
Axiomatic Characterizations ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Base Revision ◽  
New Information ◽  
Limited Base ◽  
The One ◽  
Agm Model

In this paper we study a kind of operator —known as credibility-limited base revisions— which addresses two of the main issues that have been pointed out to the AGM model of belief change. Indeed, on the one hand, these operators are defined on belief bases (rather than belief sets) and, on the other hand, they are constructed with the underlying idea that not all new information is accepted. We propose twenty different classes of credibility-limited base revision operators and obtain axiomatic characterizations for each of them. Additionally we thoroughly investigate the interrelations (in the sense of inclusion) among all those classes. More precisely, we analyse whether each one of those classes is or is not (strictly) contained in each of the remaining ones.

scholarly journals ARROW UPDATE LOGIC

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARTELD KOOI ◽  
BRYAN RENNE
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Logic Approach ◽  
Action Models ◽  
Information Change ◽  
Update Logic

We presentArrow Update Logic, a theory of epistemic access elimination that can be used to reason about multi-agent belief change. While the belief-changing “arrow updates” of Arrow Update Logic can be transformed into equivalent belief-changing “action models” from the popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic approach, we prove that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. Further, since many examples of belief change are naturally thought of from Arrow Update Logic’s perspective of eliminating access to epistemic possibilities, Arrow Update Logic is a valuable addition to the repertoire of logics of information change. In addition to proving basic results about Arrow Update Logic, we introduce a new notion of common knowledge that generalizes both ordinary common knowledge and the “relativized” common knowledge familiar from the Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature.

scholarly journals Observations on Darwiche and Pearl's Approach for Iterated Belief Revision

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theofanis Aravanis ◽  
Pavlos Peppas ◽  
Mary-Anne Williams
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Strong Sense ◽  
Preference Ordering ◽  
Satisfactory Solution ◽  
Entire Class ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
Belief States

Notwithstanding the extensive work on iterated belief revision, there is, still, no fully satisfactory solution within the classical AGM paradigm. The seminal work of Darwiche and Pearl (DP approach, for short) remains the most dominant, despite its well-documented shortcomings. In this article, we make further observations on the DP approach. Firstly, we prove that the DP postulates are, in a strong sense, inconsistent with Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom (P), extending previous initial conflicts. Immediate consequences of this result are that an entire class of intuitive revision operators, which includes Dalal's operator, violates the DP postulates, as well as that the Independence postulate and Spohn's conditionalization are inconsistent with (P). Lastly, we show that the DP postulates allow for more revision polices than the ones that can be captured by identifying belief states with total preorders over possible worlds, a fact implying that a preference ordering (over possible worlds) is an insufficient representation for a belief state.

Choosing What to Believe - New Results in Selective Revision

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fillipe Resina ◽  
Marco Garapa ◽  
Renata Wassermann ◽  
Eduardo Fermé ◽  
Maurício Reis
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Revision Operation ◽  
Input Information ◽  
Belief Bases

Selective Revision was proposed by Fermé and Hansson as a belief revision operation in which it is possible to accept only a part of the input information. In this paper, we extend Selective Revision to belief bases and also to logics not closed under negation.

scholarly journals Ranking kinematics for revising by contextual information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meliha Sezgin ◽  
Gabriele Kern-Isberner ◽  
Christoph Beierle
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Contextual Information ◽  
Proof Of Concept ◽  
Ranking Functions ◽  
Ramsey Test ◽  
Local Contexts ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
Probability Kinematics ◽  
Set Up

AbstractProbability kinematics is a leading paradigm in probabilistic belief change. It is based on the idea that conditional beliefs should be independent from changes of their antecedents’ probabilities. In this paper, we propose a re-interpretation of this paradigm for Spohn’s ranking functions which we call Generalized Ranking Kinematics as a new principle for iterated belief revision of ranking functions by sets of conditional beliefs with respect to their specific subcontext. By taking into account semantical independencies, we can reduce the complexity of the revision task to local contexts. We show that global belief revision can be set up from revisions on the local contexts via a merging operator. Furthermore, we formalize a variant of the Ramsey-Test based on the idea of local contexts which connects conditional and propositional revision in a straightforward way. We extend the belief change methodology of c-revisions to strategic c-revisions which will serve as a proof of concept.

scholarly journals A Note on the Epistemological Value of Pretense Imagination

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Tom Schoonen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
General Theory ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Pretend Play ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Rational Belief

Abstract Pretense imagination is imagination understood as the ability to recreate rational belief revision. This kind of imagination is used in pretend-play, risk-assessment, etc. Some even claim that this kind of hypothetical belief revision can be grounds to justify new beliefs in conditionals, in particular conditionals that play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. In this paper, I will argue that it cannot. I will first provide a very general theory of pretense imagination, which I formalise using tools from dynamic epistemic logic. As a result, we can clearly see that pretense imagination episodes are build up out of two kinds of imaginative stages, so I will present an argument by cases. This argument shows that pretense imagination might indeed provide us with justification for believing certain conditionals. Despite this, I will argue that these are not the kind of conditionals that allow pretense imagination to play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality.

scholarly journals Iterated contraction of propositions and conditionals under the principle of conditional preservation

10.29007/3q8l ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriele Kern-Isberner ◽  
Tanja Bock ◽  
Kai Sauerwald ◽  
Christoph Beierle
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Ranking Function ◽  
Ranking Functions ◽  
Belief Contraction ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
Iterated Contraction

Research on iterated belief change has focussed mostly on belief revision, only few papers have addressed iterated belief contraction. Most prominently, Darwiche and Pearl published seminal work on iterated belief revision the leading paradigm of which is the so-called principle of conditional preservation. In this paper, we use this principle in a thoroughly axiomatized form to develop iterated belief contraction operators for Spohn's ranking functions. We show that it allows for setting up constructive approaches to tackling the problem of how to contract a ranking function by a proposition or a conditional, respectively, and that semantic principles can also be derived from it for the purely qualitative case.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document