The aim of this paper is to consider the role of air power in the future, within the wider security environment and across the full spectrum of conflict. The key is to make some reasonable assumptions about the future strategic environment for the next ten to fifteen years, extrapolating from our experience since the end of the cold war and our existing knowledge of potential state threats and substate threats and challenges. One of our failings since the end of the cold war has been to focus on the operational level of war at the expense of thinking hard about national strategy. The formulation of national strategy is supposed to be directed by government, but if that government fails to provide strategic direction, as it has done over recent years, the result is short-termist perspectives, and a ‘hand to mouth’ approach to crisis management. This has been reinforced further by financial constraint and the electoral cycle. Ideally, a strategic perspective helps us not only to set our current age in a much wider context, thus preventing or making us less inclined to ‘knee-jerk’ reactions to single events, but it also assists in the making of correct judgements about the nature of a conflict or scenario, thus enabling us to apply the appropriate type of tool (air power or otherwise). History is littered with instances of the inappropriate use of military force, and air power is no exception, and we cannot afford nugatory manpower and material expenditure. The challenge is, therefore, enormous: to meet current commitments, while preparing for future possibilities.
