The Bomber Always Gets Through

In this chapter, to support the assertion that air power is inherently offensive, Kenneth Walker, in “Driving Home the Bombardment Attack,” argues that in the air, offense dominates defense, and a well-armed and well-flown massed bomber formation can defend against any air-to-air attack. In “Tactical Offense and Tactical Defense,” Frederick Hopkins takes an inductive approach to the question of whether the bomber will always get through. In World War I, only when German defenders concentrated their fighters to British bombers at a ratio of 1.5 to 1 did British attrition rates become too great for sustained operations. Hopkins considers it unlikely such ratios would be achieved in the future given the defender’s dilemma of having to defend everywhere yet also mass forces against an offensive force that could choose the time and location of attack.

2020 ◽  
pp. 168-175
Author(s):  
Jonathan R. Eller

Bradbury advanced his visionary role through his keynote address for NASA’s 1987 Goddard Memorial Dinner. Chapter 24 documents how he established a balance between criticism and motivation in spite of his mistrust of the military industrial establishment represented at the event. The chapter also discusses The Toynbee Convector and the importance of the title story, which offers Toynbee’s “challenge and response” insight as the best illustration of Bradbury’s self-perceived purpose as a writer: to show how humanity can shape the future by believing in it to the point of certainty. The chapter concludes with his summer trip to France and his journey to the grave of his uncle Samuel Bradbury, felled by influenza in the final days of World War I.


This introduction describes the strategic bombing mission of the US Army Air Forces’ Eighth Air Force against the Fock-Wulfe plant at Bremen, Germany, on April 17, 1943, assessing the use of high-altitude daylight precision bombing,. The introduction then reviews American strategic bombing theory from its origins in World War I to the thinking of three great interwar air power theorists―the Italian Giulio Douhet, the Briton Hugh Trenchard, and the American Billy Mitchell―to the founding of the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), the development of the Norden bombsight and B-17 bomber, and the genesis of HADPB theory at the Air Corps Tactical School.


1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Finch

Retribution for the shocking crimes and atrocities committed by the enemy during World War II was made imperative by the overwhelming demands emanating from the public conscience throughout the civilized world. Statesmen and jurists realized that another failure to vindicate the law such as followed World War I would prove their incapacity to make progress in strengthening the international law of the future.1


2001 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Peterson

Hone Kouka's historical plays Nga Tangata Toa and Waiora, created and produced in Aotearoa/New Zealand, one set in the immediate aftermath of World War I, and the other during the great Māori urban migrations of the 1960s, provide fresh insights into the way in which individual Māori responded to the tremendous social disruptions they experienced during the twentieth century. Much like the Māori orator who prefaces his formal interactions with a statement of his whakapapa (genealogy), Kouka reassembles the bones of both his ancestors, and those of other Māori, by demonstrating how the present is constructed by the past, offering a view of contemporary Māori identity that is traditional and modern, rural and urban, respectful of the past and open to the future.


2000 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 145-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gottfried Hagen

The past to which a society refers in search of clues for self-identification and confirmation for its hopes and aspirations is not an objective reality. It is a myth that can be defined as “a (preferably narrative) reference to the past in order to shed light from there on present and future” (Assmann 1997, p. 78). However, the function of myth is not generally to legitimize the present order or to continue it into the future. It may also work as a counter-principle of the present, contrasting it with a better past and betraying the experience of a fundamental deficiency in present society. Assmann thus distinguishes several functions of the myth collectively termed mythomotoric: It can either serve the present (präsentisch, fundierend) or criticize it (kontrapräsentisch, in its extreme forms revolutionary) (Assmann 1997, pp. 80-86).


1984 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 663
Author(s):  
Richard P. Hallion ◽  
John H. Morrow
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-230
Author(s):  
Pavel NEČAS ◽  
Martina VACKOVÁ ◽  
Peter LOŠONCZI

The aim of our work was to identify the role and the potential of the Air Power in modern warfare as a security factor. The Air Power itself is a concept, which had initially materialized almost one hundred years ago over the battlefields of the World War I. Since then we could witness a staging development in the field of technology and the Art of War, which momentum and scope has no precedence in history. In other words, it has taken less than one hundred years for human to move from fragile and underpowered biplanes to supersonic jet fighters and stealth bombers, which represent a state of art technology of mankind. Such speed in development had no precedence in any other operational domain, except maybe of cyberspace.


Author(s):  
George W. Breslauer

Communism was the offspring of wars: World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War. Are such wars likely in the coming decades? If not, new communist regimes on the Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist models are unlikely to come to power in the name of Marxism-Leninism. Whether that ideological heritage becomes again a beacon for revolution may depend on whether, in the future, the historical imagination comes to view communism as having been an achievement or a tragedy.


The World War was announced while Gandhi was on a boat crossing the English Channel. His mind was instantly made up about assisting the empire by raising an Ambulance Corps to nurse the wounded soldiers. To Gandhi, his decision was a matter of duty. The future of his country was also on his mind. He thus wrote to the Viceroy: ‘I recognize that, in the hour of its danger, we must give—as we have decided to give—ungrudging and unequivocal support to the Empire, of which we aspire, in the near future, to be partners in the same sense as the Dominions overseas.’ Tagore and Andrews were both unhappy and worried over Gandhi’s decision of recruiting Indians for the War.


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