THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: INTERPRETATION, GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND ARBITRABILITY

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-84
Author(s):  
Pilar Perales Viscasillas

This article explores the possible modification of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (MAL) to include the topic of arbitrability. This is an area in which the domestic legal systems differ, particularly in relation to the arbitrability of intra-corporate disputes. The article also deals with new art 2A, introduced into the Model Law in 2006, which deals with the interpretation and gap-filling system under the Model Law. The interpretation of MAL in accordance with its international character is a very important step towards uniformity and therefore the different tools required for a uniform interpretation are analysed. These include case law and scholarly writings; the meaning and importance of achieving both a uniform and an international interpretation of MAL are also considered. The article also analyses the whole text of MAL in order to arrive at the general principles on which the Model Law is based; when problems have to be solved, these principles should guide issues of interpretation that arise under this law.

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-84
Author(s):  
Slavomír Halla

Abstract Consent, the final frontier. International commercial arbitration is a dis­pute resolution mechanism embedded in consent of the parties involved. Presentation of such a mutual understanding is done through an arbitration agreement. However, the aim of this paper is to analyse whether its contractual, indeed consensual, nature is the only element which the courts use to identify the subjects who may compel or must be compelled to arbitrate disputes, or whether they employ other considerations as well. The paper will focus on extension doctrines which might be less known even to a professional audience: piercing of the corporate veil, estoppel & group of companies. A review of selected case law leads to a conclusion that consent-finding analysis is defi­nitely a starting point of any analysis. However, at the same time courts and arbitrators do indeed use tools of contract interpretation and the ones based on equity or good faith considerations to establish, and exceptionally force, the implication of consent far beyond what is obvious.


2021 ◽  
Vol 138 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-57
Author(s):  
Dusty-Lee Donnelly ◽  
Seshni Govindasamy

The decision in Atakas Ticaret Ve Nakliyat AS v Glencore International AG 2019 (5) SA 379 (SCA) made important remarks to the effect that the discretion to effect a joinder to admiralty proceedings under s 5(1) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983, and the discretion to refuse a stay of proceedings under s 7(1)(b) of the Act, are ‘untouched’ by art 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration that is incorporated under the International Arbitration Act 15 of 2017. The court reached this decision on the basis that, in terms of art 1(5), the Model Law does not affect other laws of the Republic under which matters may not be referred to arbitration, or may only be so referred subject to conditions. This case note analyses the nature and extent of the court’s discretion under art 8(1) of the Model Law, the argument for an implied repeal of s 7(1)(b) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, the interpretation of art 1(5) of the Model Law, and the questions left unanswered by the judgment. It argues that although the Model Law does not automatically oust the jurisdiction of the high court exercising admiralty jurisdiction to hear a maritime claim, the court only retains a narrow discretion to refuse a stay of those proceedings when an international commercial arbitration agreement exists in respect of the dispute.


Author(s):  
Anayit Khoperiya ◽  

The article analyses the refusal to recognize and grant permission to enforce awards of international commercial arbitration because of improper notification about the arbitration. The study concerns the new case law of the Supreme Court in cases of recognition and granting permission to enforce the awards of international commercial arbitration in cases where the party against whom the decision is made denies that it has been notified of the arbitration or appointment of an arbitrator. Particular attention was paid to the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases No. 824/26/19 of November 28, 2019 and No. 824/69/19 of February 13, 2020 on the application of Jurginsky Mashzavod LLC on the enforcing of the decision of the Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation on debt collection from PJSC Pokrovske Mine Management. These decisions were assessed as a negative case law that does not contribute to the development of arbitration in Ukraine. It was concluded that in cases No. 824/26/19 and No. 824/69/19 the Supreme Court formulated two extremely negative opinions for the development of international commercial arbitration: 1) the need to inform the different jurisdictions parties of the arbitration proceedings, where in these jurisdictions the Hague Convention is binding, in form of provision of international legal assistance, which would harm the pace of arbitration proceedings; 2) the necessity to notify the parties by arbitration via mail with a postal description of the enclosed documents. The provisions of the Hague Convention regarding the requirement of arbitration notifications of the parties on the implementation of arbitration proceedings using the procedure of international legal assistance were analysed. It was established that the provisions of this convention cannot be interpreted as establishing an obligation for arbitration tribunals to notify the parties of the arbitration proceedings, which are situated in states-parties to this convention, through the procedure of international legal assistance only. The practice of the Supreme Court in other cases on the recognition and granting permission to enforce of international commercial arbitration decisions, where the party against which the decision was made denies that it has been notified about the arbitration or appointment of an arbitrator, was positively assessed. This practice is pro-arbitration. It was emphasized the importance of forming pro-arbitration practice of the Supreme Court, which ensures the image of Ukraine as a friendly jurisdiction for arbitration and for investment accordingly.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-108
Author(s):  
Reyadh Mohamed Seyadi

Abstract One significant feature of arbitration that distinguishes it from litigation in national courts, is the parties’ freedom to select the arbitrator or members of the arbitral tribunal familiar with the kind of dispute that might arise or already has arisen. In 2012, a new arbitration law was issued in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) inspired by the texts of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. In all its provisions it included the requirement not to violate Sharīʿah law (Islamic legal tradition). However, according to this law, the sole arbitrator or presiding arbitrator must hold a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) or Sharīʿah law degree. This provision is mandatory, and the parties cannot agree otherwise. This article seeks to provide some thoughts on this restriction through an analysis of arbitrator qualifications under Sharīʿah law in order to provide a better understanding of the position adopted by the KSA Arbitration Law.


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