scholarly journals Lead Independent Director: Impact on Firm Performance and Financial Misstatements.

Author(s):  
xiaochuan zheng ◽  
Nandini Chandar
Author(s):  
Danuse Bement ◽  
Ryan Krause

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.


Author(s):  
Graeme Guthrie

Past pay generates incentives via the ownership stake that it creates; present pay generates incentives via the link between firm performance and the level of pay; future pay generates incentives via executives’ career concerns. This chapter explains how uncertainty about an executive’s ability and effort generates incentives for the executive to exert effort on behalf of shareholders. These incentives stem from the links between labor-market perceptions of an executive’s ability and the likelihood that he is promoted or fired from his current job, able to gain employment at another firm, and able to find post-retirement work as an independent director. Strong boards can use these links to design compensation schemes that benefit shareholders. This chapter describes career-based incentives using the story of Carl Yankowski, the high-profile CEO of Palm who endured a series of career disappointments.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 2305-2311

This paper fulfils the purpose by studying the effect of corporate board structure i.e., board size and independent director on firm financial performance for selected focused and diversified Indian companies. This study analyses the corporate governance structure of 76 Indian companies (60 focused and 16 diversified companies) listed on the BSE-Sensex for ten years from the year 2007-2016 using panel data analysis. The empirical findings showed a positive relationship of board size with firm performance and significant negative association of independent director with the corporate performance of focused Indian firms, while in the diversified Indian firm, board size found to be positively related to financial performance and independent director found to be negatively related to corporate performance. The result has shown that board structure has seemed to be significant in listed focused firm with firm performance while board structure of diversified firm seems to be insignificant with firm performance, it might be because of small sample size and dynamics of an emerging economy in India which is different from the developed economies of the world. This study implied that in emerging or developing economy like India, lower independent director usually boost company value, and adequate board size will significantly impact on firm performance both in case of focused and diversified firms. This research paper contribute and fill existing gap in literature on corporate governance by examining and establishing relation between firm performance and board structure with focused and diversified Indian firms.


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebeca García-Ramos ◽  
Myriam García-Olalla

AbstractThis study analyses whether or not the effect of board independence on a firm's strategic performance is moderated by family involvement in ownership and control. Moderation of the board's size and the independent director ratio are tested under quadratic specifications. The effect of CEO duality with family involvement on long-term sales growth is also measured. The empirical analysis is conducted in the Southern European context using a sample of publicly traded firms that have concentrated ownership structures. The main findings indicate that when nonlinearities are considered, family involvement moderates the relationship between the independent director ratio and firm performance. The optimal proportion of independent directors is lower in family businesses than in non-family ones. However, the results fail to support nonlinearities for board size. We find positive linear relationships between both board size and CEO duality with firm performance, which are not moderated by family involvement.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  

This study examines whether board diversity affects firm performance. We investigate this study using panel data of a sample of S&P 500 firms during a 12 year period. After controlling for industry, firm size, and other board composition variables, we find that all three board diversity variables of interest – gender, ethnicity, and age have a significant influence on firm performance. While ethnicity and age have a positive influence on firm performance, it was found that gender has a negative influence. Implications for future research are discussed.


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