The Effect of Board and Ownership Structure on the Possibility of Financial Distress

Research aims: This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance, specifically relating to the ownership structure and board structure, on the possibility of financial distress.Design/Methodology/Approach: The sample used in this study are companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2015 to 2019, excluding the financial industry. Conditional logistic regression is used as the study uses paired data based on the total assets of the company.Research findings: The results of this study indicate that board ownership, independent commissioners, and the board of directors can increase the likelihood of financial distress. On the other hand, institutional ownership and concentrated ownership are proven to have no effect on the likelihood of financial distress. The results of sensitivity testing using logistic regression showed different results on the variable institutional ownership, which is that institutional ownership can increase the likelihood of financial distress. Meanwhile, the other variables showed the same outcome as the main regression used in this study.Theoretical contribution/Originality: This study contributes to the knowledge on the relationship of board ownership, institutional ownership, concentrated ownership, independent commissioners and board size and the possibility of financial distress. Also, this research found that the provision of incentives in the form of shares to the board may not be an effective way to overcome financial distress in Indonesian firms.

CEO age, shareholder monitoring, and the organic growth of European firms

The question of why some firms grow faster than others is of high theoretical and practical importance. Beyond a wealth of studies based on stochastic models, firm growth has mostly been explained by looking at the structural characteristics of firms, sectors, and countries. The role of managers’ characteristics in fostering firms’ growth has been explored much less. In this study, we adopt one key characteristic of managers, the age of the chief executive officer (CEO) and examine its relationship with the firm’s organic growth. Using data from a large sample of European manufacturing firms, we find that firms managed by young CEOs grow faster in terms of sales and assets, but not in terms of profitability. These results hold with the inclusion of a large vector of firm and CEO characteristics, and a battery of robustness checks, including issues related to the time horizon and appointment of CEOs, the educational attainment of younger cohorts of managers, and endogeneity. We hypothesize that young CEOs are incentivized to boost firm growth to signal their talent in the managerial market and to secure a longer stream of future compensation benefits. To the extent that firm growth does not translate into higher profitability, this may create an agency problem, due to the divergence of this corporate strategy from shareholders’ targets. In line with this hypothesis, we find that a more concentrated ownership that allows for more effective monitoring moderates the relationship between CEO age and firm growth.

The heterogeneous effect of governance mechanisms on zero-leverage phenomenon across financial systems

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the effect of country and corporate governance mechanisms on zero leverage is heterogeneous across market- and bank-based financial systems. Design/methodology/approach Using logit regression methods and a sample of listed firms from 14 Western European countries for the 2002–2016 period, this study examines the propensity of firms having zero leverage in different financial systems. Findings Country governance mechanisms have a heterogeneous effect on zero leverage, with higher quality mechanisms increasing zero-leverage propensity in bank-based countries and decreasing it in market-based countries. Board dimension and independency have no impact on zero leverage. A higher ownership concentration decreases the propensity for zero-leverage policies in bank-based countries. Research limitations/implications This study’s findings show the importance of considering both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms when studying the zero-leverage phenomenon and that the effect of those mechanisms vary across financial and legal systems. Practical implications For managers, this study suggests that stronger national governance makes difficult (favours) zero-leverage policies in market (bank)-based countries. In bank-based countries, it also suggests that the presence of shareholders that own a large stake makes the adoption of zero-leverage policies difficult. This last implication is also important for small shareholders by suggesting that investing in firms with a concentrated ownership reduces the risk that zero-leverage policies are adopted by entrenched reasons. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to consider simultaneously the effects of both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms on zero leverage and to allow such effects to vary across financial systems.

The Influence of Ownership Structure on Firms’ R&D Investments: An Empirical Investigation

By using listed companies of Shanghai Stock Exchange in the coal-mining industry as samples, this paper empirically tests the influence of ownership structure on firms’ R&D investments. Firstly, the influence mechanism of ownership structure on R&D investments is analyzed based on the principal-agent theory, and hypotheses are developed accordingly. Then, the empirical analyses are conducted based on data from China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database. The empirical results show that the degree of ownership concentration has a negative impact on firms’ R&D investments, and the improvement of equity counterbalance has a positive effect on firms’ R&D investments. The state-owned enterprises' firms’ R&D investments is higher than that of privately-owned enterprises. The highly concentrated ownership mode of state-owned shares may hinder their investment in firms’ R&D investments to some extent.

The moderating role of board gender diversity between power-based corporate governance and tax aggressiveness

The purpose of this study is to explore the moderating effect of board gender diversity on the relationship between power-based corporate governance (CEO power and concentrated ownership) and tax aggressiveness. The sample of this study is based on 2,071 firm-year observations over the period 2010 to 2018. We employed two-step GMM estimations to account for endogeneity and other statistical biases. The results show that CEO power increases the likelihood of tax aggressiveness while the link between the large controlling shareholders and tax-avoidance activities is not statistically significant. Lastly, the findings suggest that powerful CEOs manipulate female directors to promote tax aggressiveness behavior.

Do firm characteristics of concentrated ownership firms affect dividend payout beyond traditional motivations?

Purpose This study aims to analyze the influence of firm characteristics in dividend payout in a concentrated ownership setting. Design/methodology/approach This study is probably the first to use the lasso technique for model selection and error prediction in the study of dividend payout in India. The lasso method comprises subsampling the available data set and performing reiterative regressions on those samples to generate the model with the best fit. This study incorporates four different ways of performing lasso treatment to get the best fit among them. Findings This study analyzes the influence of firm characteristics on dividend payout in the Indian context and asserts that firms with growth potential and earnings volatility do not hesitate to cut dividends. This study does not find evidence for signaling, agency cost and life cycle theories in a concentrated ownership setting. Earnings is the single most important factor to have a positive influence on dividend, while excessively leveraged firms are restrictive of dividend payout. Taxation has a prominent role in altering the way firms pay dividend. Research limitations/implications The recent changes in buyback taxation offer another opportunity to test the reactive behavior of firms. Also, given the disregard for traditional motivations, further research needs to be done to determine if dividend adjustments (on the lower side) help enhance firm value or not. Practical implications This study may help investors view dividends in a proper perspective. Firms give importance to investments over dividends and thus investors need not dwell on dividend changes if firms fulfill their growth potential. Social implications It lends perspective to investors about dividend changes and its importance. Originality/value The methodology used for analysis is absolutely original in the literature pertaining to dividend policy in the Indian context. The literature is abundant with theories advocating or opposing the eminence of dividend payout; however, this study takes a holistic view of all influential dividend determinants in literature to understand dividend payout.

Does Ethnicity Matters in Capital Structure Decision in Family Firms? Overview of Agency Theory

Drawing on the evidence indicating that prominent features of Asian companies are notably the concentrated ownership with extensive family ownership and dominance of controlling shareholders controlled by two main ethnic groups in Malaysia, namely the Chinese and the Malays, this study attempts to investigate the effect of ownership and ethnicity on the financing decisions of Malaysian family firms.