Growing Primacy of Human Agency in the Coevolution Process

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Albert Bandura
Keyword(s):  
Human Agency ◽  
Coevolution Process

Collective Human Agency in the Context of Organizational Participation

2017 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Georg Weber ◽  
Hans Jeppe Jeppesen
Keyword(s):  
Collective Efficacy ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Work Motivation ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Employee Participation ◽  
Ecological Approach ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Organizational Decision Making ◽  
Organizational Participation ◽  
The Social

Abstract. Connecting the social cognitive approach of human agency by Bandura (1997) and activity theory by Leontiev (1978) , this paper proposes a new theoretical framework for analyzing and understanding employee participation in organizational decision-making. Focusing on the social cognitive concepts of self-reactiveness, self-reflectiveness, intentionality, and forethought, commonalities, complementarities, and differences between both theories are explained. Efficacy in agency is conceived as a cognitive foundation of work motivation, whereas the mediation of societal requirements and resources through practical activity is conceptualized as an ecological approach to motivation. Additionally, we discuss to which degree collective objectifications can be understood as material indicators of employees’ collective efficacy. By way of example, we explore whether an integrated application of concepts from both theories promotes a clearer understanding of mechanisms connected to the practice of employee participation.

Commentary on Bandura's "human agency."

1991 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. Powers
Keyword(s):  
Human Agency

Humanising the Dehumanised: Emotion and Being in the Violence of the Islamic State (IS): An Alternative Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quraysha Bibi Ismail Sooliman
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
The State ◽  
Religious Violence ◽  
The Political ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Religious Ideology ◽  
Alternative Perspective ◽  
Western Civilisation ◽  
Ongoing Project

This paper considers the effect of violence on the emotions of IS fighters and the resultant consequences of those emotions as a factor in their choice to use violence. By interrogating the human aspect of the fighters, I am focusing not on religion but on human agency as a factor in the violence. In this regard, this paper is about reorienting the question about the violence of IS not as “religious” violence but as a response to how these fighters perceive what is happening to them and their homeland. It is about politicising the political, about the violence of the state and its coalition of killing as opposed to a consistent effort to frame the violence into an explanation of “extremist religious ideology.” This shift in analysis is significant because of the increasing harm that is caused by the rise in Islamophobia where all Muslims are considered “radical” and are dehumanised. This is by no means a new project; rather it reflects the ongoing project of distortion of and animosity toward Islam, the suspension of ethics and the naturalisation of war. It is about an advocacy for war by hegemonic powers and (puppet regimes) states against racialised groups in the name of defending liberal values. Furthermore, the myth of religious violence has served to advance the goals of power which have been used in domestic and foreign policy to marginalise and dehumanise Muslims and to portray the violence of the secular state as a justified intervention in order to protect Western civilisation and the secular subject.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.

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