scholarly journals Regulation of professional clinical trial volunteers in New Zealand

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Malisa Mulholland

<p>This paper aims to form a starting point for a discussion of the regulation of paid clinical research volunteers (professional volunteers) in New Zealand. It will argue that professional volunteers, who are currently unregulated as a class of research participants, present unique issues which are not addressed by existing regulation. The major arguments will be that: by restricting the value of financial compensation that can be provided for volunteering in a clinical trial, existing regulation allows professional volunteers to be exploited; professional volunteers are exposed to unregulated compounded risks and it is unlikely that they are properly informed of these risks; and in failing to recognise the existence of professional volunteers, current regulation fails to address their commodification and dehumanisation. Proposals to address these issues will be evaluated through a human rights lens for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1996. Recommendations for reform will be put forward on the basis of this analysis.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Malisa Mulholland

<p>This paper aims to form a starting point for a discussion of the regulation of paid clinical research volunteers (professional volunteers) in New Zealand. It will argue that professional volunteers, who are currently unregulated as a class of research participants, present unique issues which are not addressed by existing regulation. The major arguments will be that: by restricting the value of financial compensation that can be provided for volunteering in a clinical trial, existing regulation allows professional volunteers to be exploited; professional volunteers are exposed to unregulated compounded risks and it is unlikely that they are properly informed of these risks; and in failing to recognise the existence of professional volunteers, current regulation fails to address their commodification and dehumanisation. Proposals to address these issues will be evaluated through a human rights lens for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1996. Recommendations for reform will be put forward on the basis of this analysis.</p>


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 823-830 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy M. P. King

First-in-human (FIH) research has several characteristics that require special attention with respect to ethics and human subjects protections. At least some nanomedical technologies may also have characteristics that merit special attention in clinical research, as other papers in this symposium show. This paper considers how to address these characteristics in the consent form and process for FIH nanomedicine research, focusing principally on experimental nanotherapeutic interventions but also considering nanodiagnostic interventions.It is essential, as a starting point, to recognize that the consent form and process are by no means the primary protectors of human subjects (although they are sometimes so regarded). Instead, consideration of the form and content of informed consent becomes relevant only after a clinical trial has been reviewed and deemed scientifically and ethically acceptable.Two convergent types of challenges to informed consent are posed by nanomedicine FIH research. First, some issues appear generally applicable to FIH research, but have specific nanomedicine implications.


2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Geringer

This article explores recent case law touching on the suggestion that the New Zealand courts have an implied power to formally declare that legislation is inconsistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The article concludes from this case law that the prospects for the development of a formal declaratory jurisdiction of this kind in New Zealand are, if anything, receding. Further, although the Supreme Court's decision in R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 affirms the power of the New Zealand courts to informally "indicate" the existence of such legislative inconsistencies, early indications suggest that it is unlikely that this power will be exercised on a routine basis. In the absence of legislative reform, any "dialogue" over human rights between the New Zealand courts and the political branches of government is likely to continue to be far more sporadic and sotto voce than in those countries that have legislated for an express declaration of inconsistency power.


2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Heesterman

The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in CN v The United Kingdom highlighted that slavery remains a modern problem. It may no longer resemble the traditional picture of slavery dramatically presented by Hollywood but it is no less an issue. Modern slavery is less visible; it is hidden away within homes, normal workplaces or in overseas factories. This article argues that New Zealand's current treatment of slavery is inadequate, exemplified by the absence of prosecutions. Thorough protection of slavery requires clear definitions that courts can easily apply. This article explores how the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 could be used to remedy this situation. This article argues for the application of the Drittwirkung concept to give a horizontal effect to a right against slavery. Furthermore it is argued that New Zealand is under positive obligations to actively prevent rights violations, not merely avoid them. These positive obligations are a key component of modern human rights jurisprudence and can be read into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. This article speculates that one action courts could take is to undertake the development of a tort action against slavery.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 367
Author(s):  
Claudia Geiringer

This is the text of the author's inaugural lecture as a Professor at the Faculty of Law at Victoria University of Wellington. The author discusses the nature of entrenched bills of rights as a protection mechanism for human rights, particularly focusing on New Zealand and its Bill of Rights Act and the author's personal journey as a scholar. In the first part of the lecture, the author contrasts her intellectual journeys on constitutions and bills of rights with that of the previous generation, which includes the likes of Sir Kenneth Keith and Sir Geoffrey Palmer. The author suggests that the experience of both generations have been both the same and different due to the political and constitutional climates. In the second part of the lecture, the author argues that we are now in a position to start reaching definitive conclusions about how well the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 has worked by drawing on her own research. The author concludes that it is time for reform, suggesting that judges need more power to enforce constitutional rights.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nina White

<p>Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.</p>


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Jasmin Moran

This article examines the human rights consistency of the Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 2012. The Bill proposes a new scheme to detain recidivist sex offenders beyond the expiration of their finite sentences, if they are seen as highly likely to reoffend. Despite obvious human rights concerns, the Attorney-General issued a statement contending the Bill was consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The article analyses the correctness of that statement, with a particular focus on whether the Bill establishes a form of civil committal and is, in substance, different to prison detention. 


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benedict Coxon

Abstract This article suggests that the power conferred on United Kingdom courts by section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UKHRA) is legitimate as a matter of the interpretation of that provision. It sets out a contextual approach to the interpretation of section 3(1) consistent with general principles of statutory interpretation. This differs from most analyses of this provision, whether comparative or jurisdiction-specific, which tend to use constitutional theory as the framework for analysis. The article adopts a comparative perspective, applying the same approach to section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). It concludes that the approach of New Zealand courts to section 6 is also correct as a matter of the interpretation of that provision. The different approaches of United Kingdom and New Zealand courts to these equivalent provisions is explained by a number of important differences between the UKHRA and NZBORA; including especially the context in which each statute falls to be interpreted. Some implications of this analysis for the development of the principle of legality in the United Kingdom in the event of repeal of section 3(1) of the UKHRA are briefly identified.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Simon Matthew Wilson

<p>This paper analyses the implications of section 29(1) of the Marriage Act 1955 for marriage celebrants wishing to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds. Section 29(2) of the Marriage Act (as amended in 2013) allows a limited religious exemption for some celebrants, but not all are covered by this provision. Those not included (namely independent celebrants) can only refuse to solemnise a marriage if section 29(1) allows such a refusal. This paper asserts that when solemnising marriages, celebrants perform a ‘public function’ and are therefore subject to human rights obligations arising from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). These obligations are not overridden by section 29(1), so a celebrant can only refuse to solemnise a marriage if NZBORA allows this. A refusal to solemnise a same-sex marriage on religious grounds limits the right to freedom from discrimination in a way that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, and thus permitted by NZBORA. Section 29(1) therefore provides a broader protection for celebrants than section 29(2), allowing all celebrants to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds.</p>


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Davidson

The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the Victorian Charter) was enacted 16 years after the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA). Like the NZBORA and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), the Victorian Charter is an ordinary act of Parliament which seeks to preserve parliamentary sovereignty by limiting the courts’ ability to strike down legislation. The Victorian Charter drew heavily upon the experience of New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The Victorian Charter expressly adopts some aspects of the NZBORA and the HRA (such as the interpretative rule), rejects other aspects (such as the ability to obtain damages for breach), but also includes some provisions that are quite different from either the NZBORA or the HRA. 


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