Evolution Game Analysis of Information Sharing Behavior between Supply Chain Members

With growing use of interorganizational systems, the scope of interfirm collaboration has increased considerably, particularly in the supply chain context. An important prerequisite of interfirm collaboration is information sharing. Extant research suggests clear advantages of information sharing. The research at hand addresses antecedents of interorganizational information sharing. Based on findings from interorganizational systems adoption and interfirm collaboration research, a structural model is developed and validated by a quantitative survey among Austrian retailers and manufacturers in the fast-moving consumer-goods sector. The proposed model analyzes the effect of internal factors (commitment, information policy, and technical readiness), interorganizational factors (relationship, trust, power, and trading partners’ technical readiness), and economic factors (perceived benefits and costs) on information-sharing behavior. The results show the relevance of internal factors and perceived benefits. The study reveals particularities of information-sharing behavior and can help practitioners to understand what motivates their trading partners to share information.

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Evolutionary Game Model of Information Sharing Behavior in Supply Chain Network With Agent-Based Simulation

International Journal of Intelligent Information Technologies ◽

10.4018/ijiit.2019040104 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 15 (2) ◽

pp. 54-68 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Jian Tan ◽

Guoqiang Jiang ◽

Zuogong Wang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Information Sharing ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Supply Chain Network ◽

Agent Based Simulation ◽

Control Cost ◽

Agent Based ◽

Supply Chain Networks ◽

Network Information ◽

Sharing Behavior

In the supply chain network, information sharing between enterprises can produce synergistic effect and improve the benefits. In this article, evolutionary game theory is used to analyse the evolution process of the information sharing behaviour between supply chain network enterprises with different penalties and information sharing risk costs. Analysis and agent-based simulation results show that when the amount of information between enterprises in supply chain networks is very large, it is difficult to form a sharing of cooperation; increase penalties, control cost sharing risk can increase the probability of supply chain information sharing network and shorten the time for information sharing.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Subjects’ Information-Sharing from the Perspective of Building Industrialization

Proceeding of the 24th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management 2018 ◽

10.1007/978-981-13-3402-3_56 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 531-541

Author(s):

Yue Li ◽

Yong-qing Li

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Information Sharing ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Game Analysis

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Evolutionary Game Analysis on Knowledge-Sharing Behavior in the Construction Supply Chain

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su11195319 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 11 (19) ◽

pp. 5319 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Chanchan Hao ◽

Qiang Du ◽

Youdan Huang ◽

Long Shao ◽

Yunqing Yan

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Knowledge Sharing ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

The Sustainable Development ◽

Game Analysis ◽

Knowledge Sharing Behavior ◽

Evolution Path ◽

Evolutionary Trajectories ◽

New Perspective ◽

Sharing Behavior

With the increasingly fierce global competition, supply chain members have to collaborate to respond to constant changes. Efficient knowledge sharing is the basis for the collaborative operation of the supply chain. Combined with evolutionary game theory, this paper studies the evolution path and stable strategies of knowledge-sharing behavior between construction supply chain enterprises, analyzing the factors that influence the establishment of a knowledge-sharing alliance. A numerical simulation is conducted to verify theoretical results and the effects of parameter adjustments on behavioral evolution. The results indicate that under different income relationships, knowledge-sharing behavior in construction supply chains presents different evolutionary trajectories. In addition, the probability of accepting the sharing strategy is positively correlated with the penalty coefficient, incentive coefficient, trust level, and synergy coefficient and negatively correlated with cost. This study provides a new perspective and theoretical guidance for establishing stable knowledge collaboration between enterprises and promoting the sustainable development of the construction supply chain.

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Backward supply chain information sharing: who does it benefit?

Supply Chain Management An International Journal ◽

10.1108/scm-03-2019-0098 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Zhaojun Han ◽

Baofeng Huo ◽

Xiande Zhao

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Supply Chains ◽

Information Sharing ◽

Structural Equation ◽

Equation Modeling ◽

Unequal Distribution ◽

Content Type ◽

Using Data ◽

Sharing Behavior ◽

Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of backward supply chain information sharing (SCIS) on the performance of different parties along supply chains. Design/methodology/approach Using data collected from 617 Chinese manufacturers, this study examines the effect of information sharing from manufacturers to suppliers (ISMS) on supplier and manufacturer responsiveness in both two- and three-tier supply chains and the transferrable effect of information sharing from customers to manufacturers (ISCM) on supplier responsiveness. The authors use structural equation modeling and regression analysis to estimate the proposed relationships. Findings ISMS is positively related to supplier responsiveness in both two- and three-tier SCIS, whereas its effect on manufacturer responsiveness is conditional, indicating that upstream receiving parties benefit more from backward SCIS. ISCM is positively related to supplier responsiveness, demonstrating the transferable effect of backward SCIS. Practical implications When designing SCIS strategies, managers should take into account the unequal distribution of benefits from SCIS and the transferable effect of backward SCIS. Specifically, companies should always motivate their downstream partners to engage in SCIS, while they themselves need to be cautious with information sharing. They should also be aware that their information sharing behavior may benefit a third upstream party. Originality/value This study provides deep insights into the distribution of the benefits from SCIS among supply chain partners and suggests that the direction and the role supply chain partners play (as receiving or disclosing parties) in SCIS matter.

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