scholarly journals Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from Pakistan

2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (4II) ◽  
pp. 643-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attiya Y. Javid ◽  
Robina Iqbal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Economic Landscape ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Pyramid Structures ◽  
Dual Class

The nature of relation between the ownership structure and corporate governance structure has been the core issue in the corporate governance literature. From a firms’ perspective, ownership structure determines the firms’ profitability, enjoyed by different stake-holders. In particular, ownership structure is an incentive device for reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and management, which can be used to protect property rights of the firm [Barbosa and Louri (2002)]. With the development of corporate governance, many corporations owned by disperse shareholders and are controlled by hire manager. As a results incorporated firms whose owners are dispersed and each of them owns a small fraction of total outstanding shares, tend to under-perform as indicated by Berle and Means (1932). Latter this theoretical relationship between a firm’s ownership structure and its performance is empirically examined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shlefier and Vishny (1986). In most of developing markets including Pakistan, the closely held firms (family or state-controlled firms or firms held by corporations and by financial institutions) dominate the economic landscape. The main agency problem is not the managershareholder conflict but rather the risk of expropriation by the dominant or controlling shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders. The agency problem in these markets is that control is often obtained through complex pyramid structures,1 interlock directorship,2 cross shareholdings,3 voting pacts and/or dual class voting shares that allow the ultimate owner to maintain (voting) control while owning a small fraction of ownership (cash flow rights).

scholarly journals The impact of governance and ownership structure on disclosure patterns transcending major regulatory change in Malaysia

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-125
Author(s):  
Poh-Ling Ho ◽  
Grantley Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Voluntary Disclosures ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
The Impact

The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosures between 2006 and 2009 that transcends major regulatory and governance changes in Malaysia and to assess the association between strength of corporate governance structure, and ownership structure on the extent of voluntary disclosures of Malaysian listed firms over that period. The average level of voluntary disclosure within the annual reports of sample firms increased over the two periods. Further, the extent of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with strength of corporate governance structure in both 2006 and 2009. Firms with concentrated ownership structure are associated with more extensive voluntary disclosures. These findings highlight the importance of an effective governance regime and concentrated ownership structure in reducing information asymmetry and agency costs and thereby enhancing the level of voluntary disclosures. These findings also have practical implications for policy-makers, analysts, auditors and regulators in Malaysia as well as East Asian countries

scholarly journals The effect of pyramidal structures on earnings management: Evidence from Italian listed companies

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 64-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Farina Briamonte ◽  
Felice Addeo ◽  
Fabio Fiano ◽  
Marco Sorrentino
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Group Structure ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
Financial Scandals ◽  
Statistical Relationships ◽  
The Relationship

In recent years, business administration researchers and economic operators have become increasingly interested in ways to protect minority shareholders from opportunistic behaviour by the majority shareholders in control of company management. Scholars have further extended their attention to the systems of Corporate Governance after the failures and financial scandals involving some important international groups such as Enron (United States), Parmalat, and Giacomelli (Italy). These events have focused attention on the opportunistic use of technical discretion when drawing up financial information in the presence of incentives or subsidies linked to the expropriation of potential wealth generated through the Corporate Governance structure adopted by companies. Against this background of applying emphasis to the information included in financial statements as an important tool for the management of Corporate Governance conflicts, this paper intends to analyses the relationship between the practices of earnings management and the adoption of a pyramidal group structure within the Italian financial market. In particular, the contribution aims to prove whether earnings manipulation practices have been adopted with a higher frequency and a greater intensity within the listed pyramidal groups as well as whether any statistical relationships exist between the pyramidal structure and the earnings management phenomenon.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 19TH CENTURY: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary John Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Review Committee ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Theoretical Structure ◽  
The 19Th Century ◽  
The U.S

Presenting evidence from a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), the paper shows that issues of corporate governance have existed since the first corporations were established in the U.S. The C&O used a stockholder review committee to review the annual report of the president and directors. The paper shows how the C&O stockholders used this committee to supplement the corporate governance structure. The corporate governance structure of the C&O is also viewed from a theoretical structure as espoused by Hart [1995].

THE STOCKHOLDER REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY, 1828–1857: EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

2006 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary J. Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
The Political ◽  
Review Committee ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Form ◽  
The 19Th Century

Canal companies were among the first enterprises to be organized in the corporate form and to require large amounts of capital. This paper examines the stockholder review committee of a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), and discusses how the C&O used this corporate governance structure to monitor and improve financial management and operations. A major strength was the concern and dedication of the stockholders to the company, while a major weakness was the political control exerted by the State of Maryland. The paper provides an historical perspective on corporate governance in the 19th century. This research contributes to the literature by providing detailed workings and practices of a stockholder review committee. The paper documents corporate governance efforts in archival sources that provide an early example of accountability required in a corporate charter and the manner in which the stockholders carried out this responsibility.

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