scholarly journals First-person subjective vs. Third-person objective; the universe is a collection of self-driven mathematical entities; the first-person subjective consciousness is the use of mathematical models by a Turing machine

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

Physical interactions among any number of elementary particles (EPs) are governed by physical laws (e.g., the Schrodinger equation). In the reality, the predetermined world lines of all EPs form a predetermined state machine. What a Turing machine perceives/predicts, is not the reality itself (but a mathematical model (MM) of the reality), but it is incorrectly treated by this Turing machine as the reality, when this Turing machine deals with everyday challenges. The subjective experience is actually the use of a MM by a Turing machine within its low-level calculation. For example, when a Turing machine uses its geometric model of the reality (GMR), it feels like the subjective experience of being immersed within a geometric structure. The GMR, which is a component of the mind, is a real-time representation of all the EPs within the reality; the GMR only includes the physical objects perceived in the mind. A naïve cognitive researcher might incorrectly treat her GMR as the real world. A Turing machine can use its GMR. Using the semantics of human language, the use of GMR is described as subjectively experiencing the GMR. The subjective experience shouldn’t be able to impact the predetermined world line of any EP within this world.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

Physical interactions among any number of elementary particles (EPs) are governed by physical laws (e.g., the Schrodinger equation). Let’s call the superdeterministic state machine which is formed by the world lines of all EPs the destiny. To a human neural network, the reality is a snapshot of the destiny. What a neural network perceives/predicts, is not the destiny itself (but a mathematical model (MM) of the destiny), but it is incorrectly treated by this neural network as the destiny, when this neural network deals with everyday challenges. The subjective experience is actually the use of a MM by a neural network within its low-level calculation. For example, when a neural network uses its geometric model of the destiny (GMD), it feels like the subjective experience of being immersed within a topological structure. The GMD, which is a component of the mind, is a real-time representation of all the EPs within the universe; the GMD only includes the physical objects perceived in the mind. A naïve cognitive researcher might incorrectly treat her GMD as the real world. A neural network can use its GMD. Using the semantics of human language, the use of GMD is described as subjectively experiencing the GMD. It’s possible that a neural network can’t subjectively experience its GMD. Otherwise, its subjective experience shouldn’t be able to impact the actual world line of any EP within this universe.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

Physical interactions among any number of elementary particles (EPs) are governed by physical laws (e.g., the Schrodinger equation). Let’s call the predetermined state machine which is formed by the predetermined world lines of all EPs the destiny. To a human neural network, the reality is a snapshot of the destiny. What a neural network perceives/predicts, is not the destiny itself (but a mathematical model (MM) of the destiny), but it is incorrectly treated by this neural network as the destiny, when this neural network deals with everyday challenges. The subjective experience is actually the use of a MM by a neural network within its low-level calculation. For example, when a neural network uses its geometric model of the destiny (GMD), it feels like the subjective experience of being immersed within a topological structure. The GMD, which is a component of the mind, is a real-time representation of all the EPs within the universe; the GMD only includes the physical objects perceived in the mind. A naïve cognitive researcher might incorrectly treat her GMD as the real world. A neural network can use its GMD. Using the semantics of human language, the use of GMD is described as subjectively experiencing the GMD. It’s possible that a neural network can’t subjectively experience its GMD. Otherwise, its subjective experience shouldn’t be able to impact the predetermined world line of any EP within this universe.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

Physical interactions among any number of elementary particles (EPs) are governed by physical laws (e.g., the Schrodinger equation). Let’s call the predetermined state machine which is formed by the predetermined world lines of all EPs the destiny. To a human neural network, the reality is a snapshot of the destiny. What a neural network perceives/predicts, is not the destiny itself (but a mathematical model (MM) of the destiny), but it is incorrectly treated by this neural network as the destiny, when this neural network deals with everyday challenges. The subjective experience is actually the use of a MM by a neural network within its low-level calculation. For example, when a neural network uses its geometric model of the destiny (GMD), it feels like the subjective experience of being immersed within a geometric structure. The GMD, which is a component of the mind, is a real-time representation of all the EPs within the universe; the GMD only includes the physical objects perceived in the mind. A naïve cognitive researcher might incorrectly treat her GMD as the real world. A neural network can use its GMD. Using the semantics of human language, the use of GMD is described as subjectively experiencing the GMD. It’s possible that a neural network can’t subjectively experience its GMD. Otherwise, its subjective experience shouldn’t be able to impact the predetermined world line of any EP within this universe.


1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Gopnik

AbstractAs adults we believe that our knowledge of our own psychological states is substantially different from our knowledge of the psychological states of others: First-person knowledge comes directly from experience, but third-person knowledge involves inference. Developmental evidence suggests otherwise. Many 3-year-old children are consistently wrong in reporting some of their own immediately past psychological states and show similar difficulties reporting the psychological states of others. At about age 4 there is an important developmental shift to a representational model of the mind. This affects children's understanding of their own minds as well as the minds of others. Our sense that our perception of our own minds is direct may be analogous to many cases where expertise provides an illusion of direct perception. These empirical findings have important implications for debates about the foundations of cognitive science.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sook Whan Cho ◽  
Hyun Jin Hwangbo

This study investigates how Korean adults interpret and identify the referent of a null subject in a narrative text, given different types of topic continuity and person features. We have found that the first-person feature was most accessible in the weak topicality condition in resolving the null subjects, and that the target sentences ending with the first-person modal suffix ‘-lay’ were read and responded to faster, and interpreted more correctly than other types of stimuli involving a third-person modal (‘-tay’) and a person-neutral modal (‘-e’). Furthermore, of the two first-person-specific featured types, the null subjects in the topically weak contexts were processed significantly better than those in the topically strong conditions. It was argued that anaphoric dependency would be formed more discursively than morpho-syntactically in the strong discourse continuity contexts involving no extra processing load due to the shift among multiple eligible candidates. It was also argued that, in the absence of discourse topic assigned strongly to more than one eligible referent in advance, morpho-syntactic cues involved in verb modality are likely to become prominent in the mind of the processor. It is concluded that these main findings support a constraint-based approach, but not the Centering-inspired work.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

The physical interactions among any number of elementary particles are governed by Schrodinger equation. The universe is a superdeterministic state machine which is formed by elementary particles. Mind’s “center stage”, which is a component of the mind, is imagined to exist as a real-time representation of all the elementary particles within the universe; the “center stage” only includes the physical objects perceived in the mind. A naïve cognitive researcher might incorrectly treat her mind’s “center stage” as the real world. It’s possible that the “center stage” doesn’t exist like “the ghost in the machine”. Otherwise, this “center stage” shouldn’t be able to impact the world line of any elementary particle. So, the human body is merely a fuzzy set of elementary particles, no matter the “center stage” really exist or not. The precondition of the “hard problem” of consciousness makes a mistake. Proving the precondition of the “hard problem”, is a “harder problem” of consciousness. The “harder problem” can’t be proved empirically. The conscious experience is actually the use of a mathematical model by a neural network within its low-level calculation. For example, when a neural network uses its 3D model of the reality, it feels like the subjective experience of being immersed within a topological structure.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henriette Löffler-Stastka ◽  
Kathrin Bednar ◽  
Ingrid Pleschberger ◽  
Tamara Prevendar ◽  
Giada Pietrabissa

Depression has been widely studied by researchers from different fields, but its causes, and mechanism of action are still not clear. A difficulty emerges from the shifting from objective diagnosis or analysis to exploration of subjective feelings and experiences that influence the individuals' expression, communication and coping in facing depression. The integration of the experiential dimension of the first-person in studies on depression–and related methodological recommendations–are needed to improve the validity and generalizability of research findings. It will allow the development of timely and effective actions of care. Starting from providing a summary of the literature on theoretical assumptions and considerations for the study of the mind, with particular attention to the experiential dimension of patients with depression (aim #1 and #2), this contribution is aimed to provide practical suggestions for the design of research able to incorporate first- and third-person accounts (aim #3). It is also aimed to review qualified phenomenological methods for the acquisition and interpretation of experiential data in patients with depression (aim #4). Recognizing the first-person perspective in the study of depression is a major step toward a better understanding and treatment of this disorder. Theoretical constructs and technique suggestions that result from this review offer a valid starting point for the inclusion of the experiential dimension to common third-person research in the study of the mind.


2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 677-677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Velmans

Wegner's analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and complementary to a third-person account of voluntary processing in the mind/brain.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-27
Author(s):  
Karnarajsinh Vaghela

Consciousness exists, or so it seems to us most of the time. However, consciousness is unlike your car-keys or your cell-phone in that it is not located at a specific point in space and time. The applicability of physical laws like gravity seem moot at best when it comes to consciousness. What is desirable is an explanation of consciousness that allows it to exist and be part of the very same reality as the car-key or the cell-phone, a ‘philosophy of immanence’ as Gilles Deleuze would put it.  I prefer a view that construes consciousness as causally-efficacious (having material effects upon one’s body in real time) and metaphysically separate from the brain. In essence, to say that the mind is metaphysically separate from the brain is to deny the proposition that there is nothing more to our subjective experience of mind than the mere activity of the physical brain. This paper looks at a view proposed by John Searle and tries to show that there are empirical problems with a consciousness that is causally inefficacious (unable to cause material changes) and metaphysically identical (not separate from the brain).


Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers

The book offers solutions to two related puzzles. One is about the place of phenomenal—or felt—consciousness in the natural order. Consciousness is shown to comprise fine-grained nonconceptual contents that are “globally broadcast” to a wide range of cognitive systems for reasoning, decision making, and verbal report. Moreover, the so-called “hard” problem of consciousness results merely from the distinctive first-person concepts we can use when thinking about such contents. No special non-physical properties—no qualia—need to be introduced. The second puzzle concerns the distribution of phenomenal consciousness across the animal kingdom. Here the book shows that there is, in fact, no fact of the matter. This is because thinking about phenomenal consciousness in other creatures requires us to project our first-person concepts into the mind of another; but such projections fail to result in determinate truth-conditions when the mind of the other is significantly unlike our own. This upshot, however, doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter for science, because no additional property enters the world as one transitions from creatures that are definitely incapable of phenomenal consciousness to those that definitely are (namely, ourselves). And on many views it doesn’t matter for ethics, either, since concern for animals can be grounded in sympathy, which requires only third-person understanding of the desires and emotions of the animal in question, rather than in first-person empathy


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