Multiple constraints and the resolution of Korean null subject anaphor

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sook Whan Cho ◽  
Hyun Jin Hwangbo

This study investigates how Korean adults interpret and identify the referent of a null subject in a narrative text, given different types of topic continuity and person features. We have found that the first-person feature was most accessible in the weak topicality condition in resolving the null subjects, and that the target sentences ending with the first-person modal suffix ‘-lay’ were read and responded to faster, and interpreted more correctly than other types of stimuli involving a third-person modal (‘-tay’) and a person-neutral modal (‘-e’). Furthermore, of the two first-person-specific featured types, the null subjects in the topically weak contexts were processed significantly better than those in the topically strong conditions. It was argued that anaphoric dependency would be formed more discursively than morpho-syntactically in the strong discourse continuity contexts involving no extra processing load due to the shift among multiple eligible candidates. It was also argued that, in the absence of discourse topic assigned strongly to more than one eligible referent in advance, morpho-syntactic cues involved in verb modality are likely to become prominent in the mind of the processor. It is concluded that these main findings support a constraint-based approach, but not the Centering-inspired work.

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liliana Sánchez ◽  
José Camacho ◽  
Jose Elías Ulloa

In this article, we present a study that tests the Interface Hypothesis (Sorace and Filiaci, 2006) at the syntax—pragmatics interface and its possible extension to the syntax—morphology interface in two groups of first language (L1) speakers of Shipibo with different levels of formal instruction in Spanish as a second language (L2). Shipibo is a mixed null subject language that only allows third person null subjects and has no person morphology on the verb. Spanish is a null subject language with rich person morphology on the verb. Evidence of acquisition of a core syntactic property (the extension of null subject licensing from third to first person subjects) was found in the speech of both groups of Shipibo speakers. No significant evidence of residual non-native patterns at the syntax—morphology interface was found (subject—verb mismatches in person) in the group with higher levels of formal instruction. At the syntax—pragmatics interface, we found non-native distribution of first person null subjects in both groups of Shipibo speakers that indicates residual transfer of discourse organization properties concerning topics from Shipibo into Spanish.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-420

This paper investigates the acquisition of the syntactic and discourse-pragmatic properties of null subjects in Standard Arabic (SA) by native speakers of English. Ninety participants from intermediate and advanced levels participated in a questionnaire, which aimed to investigate their knowledge on the occurrence of null subjects in SA. The results show that native speakers of English with regard to missing subject and free inversion face no difficulty in the acquisition of the syntactic properties of the null subject parameter in SA; however, they have difficulties in the acquisition of that-trace effect. In terms of discourse-pragmatic properties, the results of the study illustrate that they can also easily acquire the discourse topic and pragmatic anaphora properties of null subjects in SA. Keywords: Null Subjects, free inversion, that-trace effect, discourse topic, pragmatic anaphora, parameter.


1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Gopnik

AbstractAs adults we believe that our knowledge of our own psychological states is substantially different from our knowledge of the psychological states of others: First-person knowledge comes directly from experience, but third-person knowledge involves inference. Developmental evidence suggests otherwise. Many 3-year-old children are consistently wrong in reporting some of their own immediately past psychological states and show similar difficulties reporting the psychological states of others. At about age 4 there is an important developmental shift to a representational model of the mind. This affects children's understanding of their own minds as well as the minds of others. Our sense that our perception of our own minds is direct may be analogous to many cases where expertise provides an illusion of direct perception. These empirical findings have important implications for debates about the foundations of cognitive science.


2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Meyerhoff

A corpus of conversational Bislama (a Melanesian creole spoken in Vanuatu, related to Tok Pisin and Solomon Islands Pijin) suggests that during the 20th century the creole has developed a set of regular inflectional morphemes on the verb that agree in person and number with the subject of the finite clause. It is shown that, where the agreement paradigm is referentially richest, the language is also beginning to grammaticize a tendency towards phonetically null subjects (pro-drop). Three possible analyses of the Bislama verb phrase are evaluated; consistent support for only one is found in the spoken Bislama corpus. The resulting paradigm of subject–verb agreement (i, oli, and Ø) is analyzed in terms of the historical development of Bislama. It is argued that the synchronic agreement marking reflects properties derived from (i) the lexifier (English), (ii) the substrate languages, and (iii) universal grammar. No one component fully accounts for the patterns of agreement marking observed. Instead, a synthesis of all three is required, as previously observed by, for example, G. Sankoff (1984) and Mufwene (1996). Substrate languages provide a model for subject agreement prefixing on the verb; the person features associated with the lexifier ‘he’ continue to be reflected in the distribution of Bislama i; and phonetically null subjects are emerging as the norm where the agreement paradigm best serves to identify the subject referent. This is consonant with generative accounts of null subject systems. Parallels with other languages (e.g., Italian, Franco-Provençal, Hebrew, Finnish) are examined.


Gragoatá ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 244-267
Author(s):  
Gian Luigi De Rosa

The present research, based on a corpus of contemporary Brazilian filmic speech – Urban Carioca Sub-Corpus from the I-Fala Corpus of Luso-Brazilian Film Dialogues as a resource for L1 & L2 Learning and Linguistic Research (DE ROSA et al., 2017) –, illustrates how Brazilian Portuguese (BP) has undergone a process of change regarding the representation of referential subjects. A preference for overt pronominal subjects is on the rise, thus transitioning contemporary Brazilian Portuguese from a null subject language to a partial null subject language. The current paper revisits De Rosa (2017), this time including third person subjects and using actual film dialogue transcriptions rather than scripts. The occurrence of null and overt subjects in the corpus is discussed both quantitatively and qualitatively. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SUJEITOS NULOS NA FALA FÍLMICA BRASILEIRA CONTEMPORÂNEAO presente contributo, baseado numa amostra de fala fílmica brasileira contemporânea – Urban Carioca Sub-Corpus do I-Fala: Corpus of Luso-Brazilian Film Dialogues as a resource for L1 & L2 Learning and Linguistic Research (DE ROSA et al., 2017) –, propõe-se observar o processo de transformação que está atingindo o português brasileiro (PB) que está perdendo, à luz de toda uma série de mudanças linguísticas, as caraterísticas de uma língua de sujeito nulo. Nesse contributo, revisitamos De Rosa (2017), incluindo os sujeitos de terceira pessoa, sempre com o objetivo de registrar, em termos quantitativos e qualitativos, a presença do sujeito pleno nos diálogos fílmicos analisados e de confrontar os resultados com os dados da fala espontânea.---Original em inglês.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

Physical interactions among any number of elementary particles (EPs) are governed by physical laws (e.g., the Schrodinger equation). In the reality, the predetermined world lines of all EPs form a predetermined state machine. What a Turing machine perceives/predicts, is not the reality itself (but a mathematical model (MM) of the reality), but it is incorrectly treated by this Turing machine as the reality, when this Turing machine deals with everyday challenges. The subjective experience is actually the use of a MM by a Turing machine within its low-level calculation. For example, when a Turing machine uses its geometric model of the reality (GMR), it feels like the subjective experience of being immersed within a geometric structure. The GMR, which is a component of the mind, is a real-time representation of all the EPs within the reality; the GMR only includes the physical objects perceived in the mind. A naïve cognitive researcher might incorrectly treat her GMR as the real world. A Turing machine can use its GMR. Using the semantics of human language, the use of GMR is described as subjectively experiencing the GMR. The subjective experience shouldn’t be able to impact the predetermined world line of any EP within this world.


2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Delfitto ◽  
Gaetano Fiorin

This article aims at clarifying the role of person at the interface between syntax and the interpretive systems. We argue that first person interpretations of third person pronouns (de se readings) stem from the option of leaving the referential index underspecified on the pronoun, thus accounting for the interplay of this phenomenon with the anaphoric usage of first person indexicals (pronoun shifting) and logophoric pronouns. The results include proposals on the connection between the semantics of first person and the syntax of the left periphery, a neo-Davidsonian treatment of the semantics of first person indexicals, and a novel view of pronominal anaphora according to which Higginbotham's (1983) asymmetric relation of linking involves a mechanism of θ-role inheritance tied to the semantics of first person.


2011 ◽  
Vol 279 (1729) ◽  
pp. 669-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Cook ◽  
Alan Johnston ◽  
Cecilia Heyes

When motion is isolated from form cues and viewed from third-person perspectives, individuals are able to recognize their own whole body movements better than those of friends. Because we rarely see our own bodies in motion from third-person viewpoints, this self-recognition advantage may indicate a contribution to perception from the motor system. Our first experiment provides evidence that recognition of self-produced and friends' motion dissociate, with only the latter showing sensitivity to orientation. Through the use of selectively disrupted avatar motion, our second experiment shows that self-recognition of facial motion is mediated by knowledge of the local temporal characteristics of one's own actions. Specifically, inverted self-recognition was unaffected by disruption of feature configurations and trajectories, but eliminated by temporal distortion. While actors lack third-person visual experience of their actions, they have a lifetime of proprioceptive, somatosensory, vestibular and first-person-visual experience. These sources of contingent feedback may provide actors with knowledge about the temporal properties of their actions, potentially supporting recognition of characteristic rhythmic variation when viewing self-produced motion. In contrast, the ability to recognize the motion signatures of familiar others may be dependent on configural topographic cues.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Umur Başdaş

Abstract Since in Hegel's view the end of philosophy coincides with its beginning, it is reasonable to expect that the end of the Encyclopaedia sheds some light on the Science of Logic. The Encyclopaedia concludes with three syllogisms in which logic, nature and spirit are related to each other in three different ways. This article analyses these three final syllogisms with an eye to how they can contribute to our understanding of the logical movement that starts from pure being. Trendelenburg and Schelling, like many others after them, think that Hegel's project in the Science of Logic is doomed from the start, because there can be no such thing as a non-temporal, purely logical movement. I argue that the three final syllogisms contain Hegel's response to this challenge. I call them ‘meta-encyclopaedic reflections’ in the sense that they take the whole encyclopaedic presentation of the Hegelian system as an object of critical inquiry and identify its limitations. The core of my approach is to examine how each one of these syllogisms situate us, namely the philosophizing subjects, vis-à-vis the world as disclosed by them. They demand that we shift from a third-person to a first-person perspective towards the world. The logical categories initially appear to move of their own accord only due to the limitations of the third-person perspective of the encyclopaedic presentation, which is to be sublated in a higher, first-person perspective. Hence, Hegel would happily admit that a purely logical movement is a mere appearance, but he would also claim that his philosophy can immanently explain the necessity of this appearance in the beginning of philosophy, and explain it better than his critics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henriette Löffler-Stastka ◽  
Kathrin Bednar ◽  
Ingrid Pleschberger ◽  
Tamara Prevendar ◽  
Giada Pietrabissa

Depression has been widely studied by researchers from different fields, but its causes, and mechanism of action are still not clear. A difficulty emerges from the shifting from objective diagnosis or analysis to exploration of subjective feelings and experiences that influence the individuals' expression, communication and coping in facing depression. The integration of the experiential dimension of the first-person in studies on depression–and related methodological recommendations–are needed to improve the validity and generalizability of research findings. It will allow the development of timely and effective actions of care. Starting from providing a summary of the literature on theoretical assumptions and considerations for the study of the mind, with particular attention to the experiential dimension of patients with depression (aim #1 and #2), this contribution is aimed to provide practical suggestions for the design of research able to incorporate first- and third-person accounts (aim #3). It is also aimed to review qualified phenomenological methods for the acquisition and interpretation of experiential data in patients with depression (aim #4). Recognizing the first-person perspective in the study of depression is a major step toward a better understanding and treatment of this disorder. Theoretical constructs and technique suggestions that result from this review offer a valid starting point for the inclusion of the experiential dimension to common third-person research in the study of the mind.


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