scholarly journals Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights in International Treaties

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sital Kalantry

Citizens of foreign countries are increasingly using international treaties to assert claims against Federal and state governments. As a result, U.S. courts are being asked to determine whether treaties provide litigants with individually enforceable rights. Although courts have no consistent approach to determining whether a treaty gives rise to individually enforceable rights, they often apply the textualist methodology derived from statutory interpretation. However, instead of using textual theories of statutory interpretation, I argue that courts should use intentionalist theories developed from contract interpretation in determining individually enforceable rights under treaties. Two positive arguments and one negative argument support my approach. First, the question of whether a non-party can enforce a treaty is structurally similar to the question of whether a non-party can enforce a contract, but structurally different from the issue of whether there is a private cause of action under a statute. Second, Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the view that treaties are contracts even though they have the effect of statutes. As such, it is appropriate to apply theories of contract interpretation to understanding treaties. Third, arguments used to justify using textualism for purposes of interpreting statutes are not relevant to interpreting treaties.I suggest that courts use a modified version of the "intent-to-benefit" test derived from contract law in determining whether a treaty is enforceable by a non-party. Under the modified "intent-to-benefit" test, a non-party will have individually enforceable rights and remedies under the treaty if the treaty identifies a class of individuals who are intended beneficiaries of the treaty and if such non-party is within that class of individuals. Applying this test suggests that courts should privilege the drafting history over the ratification history of a treaty in interpreting it.I apply the modified "intent-to-benefit " test to a case study-the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Supreme Court recently decided in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not provide individuals with any remedies, but refused to decide whether the treaty provides individuals with rights. Since that decision, two Federal Courts of Appeals have come to differing conclusions on the question of whether that treaty creates individually enforceable rights. Under the modified "intent-to-benefit," the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations would be found to give rise to individually enforceable rights.Published: Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights in International Treaties, 44 Stanford Journal of International Law 63 (2008).

2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison L. LaCroix

Historians and legal scholars generally agree that during John Marshall's tenure as chief justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835, the federal judiciary expanded its power to interpret the Constitution and asserted with increasing force its authority to speak on behalf of the Union. This single story of judicial nationalism, however, contains two distinct and largely non-overlapping strands. Historians have tended to focus on the Supreme Court alone, to the exclusion of the lower federal courts, and have largely treated early national controversies over the lower federal courts as outgrowths of the political turmoil that accompanied the emergence of the first party system. Legal scholars in the fields of federal courts and constitutional law, meanwhile, have devoted significant attention to the lower federal courts but have largely neglected the history of how those courts developed beyond the key early moments of the Constitutional Convention and the First Congress.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 22-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aegis Frumento ◽  
Stephanie Korenman

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc v. Somers and its significance for whistleblower retaliation remedies and securities law interpretation generally. Design methodology approach The authors review the statutory, regulatory and decisional history of the anti-whistleblower retaliation remedies of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Dodd–Frank Act; how they were seen by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and most courts to be in conflict, and how they were ultimately harmonized by the Supreme Court in Digital Realty. Findings In Digital Realty, the Supreme Court ruled against the SEC and the leading Courts of Appeal and established that only one who reports securities law violations to the SEC can sue in federal court under the Dodd–Frank Act; all others are limited to the lesser remedies provided by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. This simple conclusion raises a number of unresolved questions, which the authors identify and discuss. Also, the Supreme Court unanimously continued the pattern of federal securities laws decisions marked by a close reading of the text and a desire to limit private litigants’ access to the federal courts. Originality value This paper provides valuable information and insights about the legal protections for SEC whistleblowers from experienced securities lawyers and more generally on the principles that appear to guide securities law decisions in the Supreme Court.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-122
Author(s):  
Kristen E. Eichensehr

When a foreign country's law is relevant to a case in U.S. federal court and the foreign country files an official statement about the meaning of its law, how should U.S. courts treat the foreign government's representations? In Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuticals Co., the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[a] federal court should accord respectful consideration to a foreign government's submission, but is not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign government's statements.” In so doing, the Supreme Court settled a disagreement between the courts of appeals and reversed an opinion of the Second Circuit that had given conclusive effect to the Chinese government's representations about its domestic law. Animal Science Products provides important guidance to federal courts faced with increasingly frequent filings by foreign governments, but it leaves unresolved significant questions about deference to foreign sovereign amici and preserves existing debates about the nature of “respectful consideration.”


Author(s):  
William P. Hustwit

Recovering the history of an often-ignored landmark Supreme Court case, William P. Hustwit assesses the significant role that Alexander v. Holmes (1969) played in integrating the South’s public schools. Although Brown v. Board of Education has rightly received the lion’s share of historical analysis, its ambiguous language for implementation led to more than a decade of delays and resistance by local and state governments. Alexander v. Holmes required “integration now,” and less than a year later, thousands of children were attending integrated schools. Hustwit traces the progression of the Alexander case to show how grassroots activists in Mississippi operated hand in glove with lawyers and judges involved in the litigation. By combining a narrative of the larger legal battle surrounding the case and the story of the local activists who pressed for change, Hustwit offers an innovative, well-researched account of a definitive legal decision that reaches from the cotton fields of Holmes County to the chambers of the Supreme Court in Washington.


Author(s):  
Bennett Capers

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”


1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.


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