The tenure of English judges

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.

Author(s):  
David Polizzi

The phenomenology of solitary and supermax confinement reflects what Giorgio Agamben has defined as the state of exception. The state of exception is defined as the blurring of the legal and political order, which constructs a zone of indifference for those forced to endure this situation. This notion of the state of exception can be applied to the zone of indifference created by the Supreme Court, which seems unwilling to outlaw this harmful practice relative to 8th Amendment protections prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and the political order which is all too inclined to continue use strategy. One of the central aspects of this “ecology of harm”, is the way in which the very structures of this type of confinement, helps to invite and legitimize abusive attitudes and behaviors in penitentiary staff.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-376
Author(s):  
Denis Kraev

The article is devoted to the problems of qualification of hijacking of an aircraft, a sea-going ship, or a railway train, provided for by Art. 211 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that Art. 211 has been present in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation since its adoption, it should be noted that there is a lack of theoretical research on its analysis, as well as the existence in court practice of the difficulties of applying this norm (in addition, Federal Law No. 130 of May 5, 2014 -FZ in Art. 211 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation a new Part 4 was introduced, providing for liability for the combination of hijacking of a ship of air or water transport or railway rolling stock with a terrorist act or other terrorist second activity that, in the absence of specific explanations of the Plenum of the Supreme Court, has created additional challenges for law-qualification). This determines the relevance of the chosen topic. Analyzing the current legislation, the provisions of the Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated December 9, 2008 No. 25 “On judicial practice in cases of crimes related to violation of the rules of the road and the operation of vehicles, as well as their unlawful seizure without the purpose of theft”, scientific positions and court decisions on these issues, the author comes to the following conclusions that seem interesting for theory and practice. Small boats of water transport relate to the subject of hijacking of a ship of air or water transport or railway rolling stock, and the commission of a crime under Part 4 of Art. 211 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and the associated terrorist act, requires qualification in the aggregate of Part 4 of Art. 211 and Art. 205 of the Criminal Code. Military aircraft and boats, submarines, etc.) are also the subject of a crime under Art. 211 of the Criminal Code. The of hijacking of an aircraft, a sea-going ship, or a railway train, as well as the seizure of such a ship or train for the purpose of hijacking, associated with the murder, assault on the life of a law enforcement officer, person conducting justice or preliminary investigation, a state or public figure are qualified in the aggregate of Art. 211 and Art. 105, Art. 277, Art. 295, Art. 317 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. When of hijacking of an aircraft, a sea-going ship, or a railway train, as well as hijacking such a ship or train for the purpose of hijacking, committed with the use of violence dangerous to the life or health of the victim, or with the threat of such violence, in addition to item “c” of Part 2 of Art. 211 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation of additional qualification in parts 1, 2 of Art. 111, Art. 112, Art. 115, Art. 117, Art. 119 of the Criminal Code is not required. The of hijacking of an aircraft, a sea-going ship, or a railway train is often fraught with violation of the traffic safety rules and operation of the relevant transport provided for in Art. 263 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: the deed is covered by Art. 211 of the Criminal Code, if the violation specified in Art. 263 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation expressed itself in theft; if not, qualification is possible in the aggregate of art. 211,263 of the Criminal Code.


2014 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Moran ◽  
Anthony Payne

The articles in this special issue survey comparatively the shape of power and finance. The introduction sketches the history of the study of the political role of financial markets and examines the reasons for the comparative neglect of the subject by the discipline of political science.


Author(s):  
Guobadia Ameze

This chapter examines the relationship between the executive and the judiciary in Nigeria. It sketches the history of assertions of judicial power by Nigerian courts, including the 1966 action by the Supreme Court to assert the continued validity of the 1963 constitution in the face of a military coup. It considers the role of the National Judicial Council in appointing and disciplining judges, an important issue in many systems. It recounts the saga surrounding President of the Court of Appeal Justice Salami, which raises the troubling prospect of the Chief Justice ‘packing’ the Council and possibly colluding with the executive to pursue political goals and discusses the issue of disputes over the appointment of state chief justices, who are appointed by governors on the Council’s recommendation. It also offers the Nigerian perspective on control over judicial budgets and administration, before concluding with a review of some significant cases.


Author(s):  
Irina E. Belova

We research the issue of the current law enforcement practice of considering cases of joint bankruptcy of spouses in the framework of insolvency procedures of individuals. We emphasize that at the legislative level, joint bankruptcy of spouses and multiple persons on the debtor’s side is not provided for. Initially, this resulted in a lack of courts’ uniform approach, which has become a subject of discussion in the scientific literature. In this context, we pay attention to the importance of adoption by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of position on the combining admissibility of spouses’ banknote cases. In turn, the permissibility of combining cases did not resolve the issue of possibility of accepting a joint bankruptcy application, which again led to discrepancies in judicial practice. Special attention is paid to the admissibility of combining cases, which is the right of the court, and not its duty. We note that the arbitration courts, when solving this issue, study such circumstances as the subject composition of the persons participating in the cases of debtors, the volume and nature of prop-erty that is part of the bankruptcy estate of each debtor’s property, the per-formance of duties of financial manager by the same person. Despite the de-veloping judicial practice of joint bankruptcy of spouses, justified by the ex-planations of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, we believe that it expedient and necessary to establish the grounds, procedure and conditions for joint bankruptcy of individuals who are spouses at the legislative level.


1972 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Abrams

The origins of the Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936 (hereinafter, CCO) have never been fully explored. The Supreme Court of Israel has indicated that specific provisions were derived from Ottoman law, or were modelled upon an English statute, or based upon a common law doctrine. No one, however, has attempted to describe comprehensively the history of the CCO, and those who have touched upon the subject have usually contented themselves with general statements:a. The local legislator drew most of the offences included in the Criminal Code Ordinance from the well of English law.b. Everybody admits that the provisions of the Palestine Criminal Code Ordinance relating to manslaughter and murder were not derived from one source, but include different ideas and pieces of ideas that were taken, a little here and a little there, from different legal systems—English, French, Ottoman, or French in Ottoman clothing, as it existed until 1936. Before us is a mosaic of different colours composed into a single picture. As to this there is no disagreement … What is not so clear and certain is the identity of the concrete source of each of the bricks of the building that comprise the ‘collective’ legislation.


Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-64
Author(s):  
Christian Holloway

It has become apparent throughout the history of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that section 33, or the Notwithstanding Clause, has been utilized very little in the parliamentary arena, yet has been the subject of an abundance of arguments, both in favour and opposed, in the academic spectrum. This is because section 33, to many theorists, is the mechanism that balances the Supreme Court of Canada and maintains constitutional supremacy in Canada. Through research and evaluation, it becomes evident that section 33 is not a viable option to maintain constitutional supremacy, and that judicial supremacy is already in effect. While there are many scholars who see the Supreme Court of Canada as the guardians of the Charter, and judicial supremacy as beneficial, it is a view that places too much faith in the hands of the unelected magistracy. Firstly, this paper will discuss the problems that face the Notwithstanding Clause. This section will demonstrate the problems that developed at its inception with the wording of the section, and how these problems have developed into the issues it faces today with regards to the ramifications that legislatures face if used. The following section will then evaluate the use of the Notwithstanding Clause in relation to the Quebec Charter of the French Language (which may also be referred to as Bill 101), as well as Saskatchewan’s Dispute Settlement Act, and the circumstances surrounding both cases.[...]


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