scholarly journals Republican Home-Owning

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Hockett

Ten years after failing and being rescued by our federal government, our nation’s principal secondary market makers in home mortgage loans – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – remain in federal receivership. The proximate reason for this is that neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress have been able to find consensus – interparty or intraparty consensus – on what should be done with our home mortgage GSEs post-crisis. The deeper reason is that public – that is to say, citizen – ownership of secondary market makers in home loans is in a certain sense ‘natural’ in any republic, such as our own, where both middle class standing and that standing’s primary indicator – home-owning – are deeply ingrained in the citizenry’s self-ascribed national identity. This truth is yet more compelling when home prices, as they are bound to do anywhere homes are the primary middle class asset, become what I call 'systemically significant' - that is, when they become pervasive determinants both of other prices and of broader macroeconomic wellbeing. I conclude that the only sustainable future for Fannie and Freddie, not to say for the American middle class and our other GSEs (including our student loan GSEs), is to be found in their past. Fannie and Freddie should be forthrightly made citizen-owned once again as Fannie was through our home markets’ healthiest decades.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Hockett

Ten years after the financial dramas of Autumn 2008, I take stock of what we have learned, what we have done, and what we have yet to do if we would avoid a repeat performance. The primary lessons I draw are that income and wealth distribution, the endogeneity of credit-money, and finance system structure all matter profoundly not only where justice, but also where systemic stability is concerned. The longer-term tasks still before us include a much broader and financially engineered diffusion of capital ownership over our population, citizen central banking, a permanent national investment authority, continuous public open labor market operations, debt-free or low-debt education and health insurance, and an updated form of segregating capital-raising primary from asset-trading secondary markets in the financial sector. Shorter-term tasks include debt-forgiveness, a restoration of labor rights and countercyclical progressive taxation, and restored citizen-ownership of our secondary market makers in home mortgage and higher education debt. These measures will restore the nation to its erstwhile status as a productive middle class ‘yeoman republic,’ and in so doing will restore both justice and efficiency to our social and economic arrangements.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Hockett

We design a digital home mortgage and title registry system, overseen by a new public sector entity, to provide clearing and settlement efficiencies in mortgage-related instruments comparable to those enabled by the Depository Trust Company (‘DTC’) in other investment securities. We believe such a system to be a prerequisite to the return of a safe, transparent, and liquid ‘private’ secondary market in mortgage loans.


Credit risk transfer (CRT) securities were introduced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2013. As of the end of 2017, in combination, the two government sponsored housing enterprises had issued a total of $53 billion in CRTs linked to residential mortgage loans with a total face value of $1.79 trillion. The goal is to shift mortgage risk from tax payers to the private sector. In return, investors expect to be compensated. The authors document the returns earned by investors in the various CRT tranches since their inception. The most senior tranches have provided an average representative return of 0.26% per month. The most junior tranches have provided an average representative return of 1.71% per month. These compare with average monthly returns of 0.03%, 0.15%, and 0.87% to T-bills, 15-year agency mortgage-backed securities, and 10-year high-yield corporate bonds, respectively, over the same time periods.


2008 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 0850002
Author(s):  
KARAN BHANOT ◽  
DONALD LIEN ◽  
MARGOT QUIJANO

Comments by the Federal Reserve Chairman often evoked concerns about whether the government would protect bondholders in the event of default by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F). Using a model of capital structure, we analyze the impact of this uncertainty on the value of the implicit subsidy for F&F (and similar institutions). We show that, counter to intuition, an increase in the likelihood that the government will not subsidize these entities via a guarantee may increase the expected cost of the subsidy to the federal government. A cap on the value of the investment portfolio is a more effective mechanism to reduce the risk exposure of the federal government. We also assess the design and impact of proposed receivership rules and highlight the problems in regulating GSE portfolios. Even though F&F are now in conservatorship, the framework is applicable to other government sponsored entities where there is ambiguity about the extent of government backing.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Scott Frame ◽  
Andreas Fuster ◽  
Joseph Tracy ◽  
James Vickery

The imposition of federal conservatorships on September 6, 2008, at the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation—commonly known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—was one of the most dramatic events of the financial crisis. These two government-sponsored enterprises play a central role in the US housing finance system, and at the start of their conservatorships held or guaranteed about $5.2 trillion of home mortgage debt. The two firms were often cited as shining examples of public-private partnerships—that is, the harnessing of private capital to advance the social goal of expanding homeownership. But in reality, the hybrid structures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were destined to fail at some point, owing to their singular exposure to residential real estate and moral hazard incentives emanating from the implicit guarantee of their liabilities. We describe the financial distress experienced by the two firms, the events that led the federal government to take dramatic action in an effort to stabilize housing and financial markets, and the various resolution options available to US policymakers at the time; and we evaluate the success of the choice of conservatorship in terms of its effects on financial markets and financial stability, on mortgage supply, and on the financial position of the two firms themselves. Conservatorship achieved its key short-run goals of stabilizing mortgage markets and promoting financial stability during a period of extreme stress. However, conservatorship was intended to be a temporary fix, not a long-term solution, and more than six years later, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac still remain in conservatorship.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (1609) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenhua Di ◽  
◽  
Kelly D. Edmiston ◽  

Author(s):  
W. Scott Frame ◽  
Andreas Fuster ◽  
Joseph Tracy ◽  
James Ian Vickery
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document