Innovation and the theory of fields

Innovation does not just involve the creation of new products, but also includes the need for new kinds of processes and organizations. Field theory can help us understand why some innovations are more piecemeal and others more revolutionary. It explicitly links innovation to the process of the emergence, adjustment, and transformation of markets (conceived of as fields). To illustrate this perspective, the case of the transition in the U.S. from a mortgage market dominated by savings and loan banks to the emergence of mortgage securitization dominated by the government sponsored enterprises and the largest private banks, is explicated. Field theory helps us understand the logic of this transition and the myriad players and innovations that helped produce a large part of what we consider to be modern finance. The case also shows the limits of economic theories of financial innovation and the sociology of finance. I end with a discussion of how field theory can inform subsequent research on innovation.

Why Wasn’t there a Nonbank Mortgage Servicer Liquidity Crisis?

In March 2020, in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, many were concerned about the liquidity of nonbank mortgage servicers. As it turned out, the vast majority of these servicers did not face a liquidity crisis. In this Commentary I detail the reasons why, including lower than expected take up rates of forbearance, the role played by mortgage origination income, and the actions taken by the government-sponsored enterprises, Ginnie Mae, and housing agencies.

Too Much Skin-in-the-Game? The Effect of Mortgage Market Concentration on Credit and House Prices

In 2007, as American housing markets started to decline, the government-sponsored enterprises dramatically increased their acquisitions of low FICO and high loan-to-value mortgages. By 2008, the agencies had reversed course by decreasing their high-risk acquisitions. I develop a theory in which large lenders temporarily increase high-risk activity at the end of a boom. In the model, lenders with many outstanding mortgages have incentives to extend risky credit to prop up house prices. The increase in house prices lessens the losses they make on their outstanding portfolio of mortgages. As the bust continues, lenders slowly wind down their mortgage exposure.

Potential for consolidation and coordination of government-sponsored enterprises' financial transactions by the Russian Federal Treasury

Subject. This article explores the opportunities of a single cash pool and coordination of financial assets and liabilities of the enlarged government sector, which includes State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Objectives. The article aims to justify the need to consolidate and coordinate financial assets and liabilities of the enlarged government sector to reduce net interest expenses and quasi-sovereign debt. Methods. The article analyzes and compares the powers of the HM Treasury, U.S. Treasury, and the Russian Federal Treasury within their relations with SOEs in compiling consolidated financial statements. Results. The article justifies the necessity to empower the Russian Federal Treasury additionally to consolidate and coordinate short-term financial assets and liabilities of SOEs and GSEs using the running corporate governance mechanisms. Conclusions. Significant reductions in interest costs and quasi-sovereign debt will improve the resilience of the enlarged government sector to potential shocks and free up financial resources for the development of the Russian economy.

Outside the Box: Unconventional Monetary Policy in the Great Recession and Beyond

In November 2008, the Federal Reserve faced a deteriorating economy and a financial crisis. The federal funds rate had already been reduced to virtually zero. Thus, the Federal Reserve turned to unconventional monetary policies. Through “quantitative easing,” the Fed announced plans to buy mortgage-backed securities and debt issued by government-sponsored enterprises. Subsequent purchases would eventually lead to a five-fold expansion in the Fed’s balance sheet, from $900 billion to $4.5 trillion, and leave the Fed holding over 20 percent of all mortgage-backed securities and marketable Treasury debt. In addition, Fed policy statements in December 2008 began to include explicit references to the likely path of the federal funds interest rate, a policy that came to be known as “forward guidance.” The Fed ceased its direct asset purchases in late 2014. Starting in October 2017, it has allowed the balance sheet to shrink gradually as existing assets mature. From December 2015 through June 2018, the Fed has raised the federal funds interest rate seven times. Thus, the time is ripe to step back and ask whether the Fed’s unconventional policies had the intended expansionary effects—and by extension, whether the Fed should use them in the future.

Stabilizing the System of Mortgage Finance in the United States

It has been over a decade since the peak of house prices in the US was attained, and while there has been a concerted regulatory response to the subsequent collapse, the two Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) remain in conservatorship. While this action served to forestall a deeper crisis at the time, over the past several years risks related to the system of mortgage finance can be seen building across several dimensions that need to be addressed. While reforms to the GSEs are an important part of dealing with these concerns, this paper argues that broader changes need to be made across the entire mortgage landscape to stabilize the system, even before the final state of the GSEs is fully determined.