scholarly journals V1 as an Egocentric Cognitive Map

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Linton
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Cognitive Map ◽  
Eye Position ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Pictorial Cues ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
Visual Consciousness ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article we explain why V1 also functions as an egocentric cognitive map. To the extent that cognitive processing has been discussed in V1, it has focused on (a) the allocation of attention, (b) top-down influences on perception, and (c) the transition from egocentric perception to allocentric navigation. By contrast, in this article we argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (a) the estimation of distance from eye position, (b) the estimation of size from eye position and/or pictorial cues, and (c) the multisensory integration of vision with proprioception and hearing, are potentially better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. We use this insight to explore V1 as the neural correlates of the visual perception / cognition distinction, and propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory), and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). We conclude by outlining the implications of our account for the perception of depth, motion, and colour / illumination.

scholarly journals V1 as an egocentric cognitive map

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Linton
Keyword(s):  
Visual Experience ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Cognitive Map ◽  
Laminar Structure ◽  
Detection Thresholds ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
Visual Consciousness ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Rule Out

Abstract We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1’s laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.

scholarly journals Apical Amplification – A Cellular Mechanism of Conscious Perception?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomas Marvan ◽  
Michal Polák ◽  
Talis Bachmann ◽  
William A. Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Sensory Input ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Cellular Mechanism ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
Theoretical View ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations fornetwork-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience.Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cellsare summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. Theseinputs come from diverse sources, and provide a context within which thetransmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal andperisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apicalamplification (AA) enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it moreflexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. AA providesa possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strongloops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspacetheories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of theindividual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms thatcontribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As AAis highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, itrelates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental statesand to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendritesprovide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selectiveamplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

scholarly journals The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for ‘no-report’ paradigms

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Pitts ◽  
Lydia A. Lutsyshyna ◽  
Steven A. Hillyard
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Processing ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent ‘no-report’ paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Listening strategy for auditory rhythms modulates neural correlates of expectancy and cognitive processing

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel S. Snyder ◽  
Amanda C. Pasinski ◽  
J. Devin McAuley
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Neural Correlates

scholarly journals The Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape: Reconciling Neuroscientific Theories With the Phenomenology of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse J. Winters
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Neural Correlate ◽  
Resonance Theory ◽  
Thalamocortical System ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Neural Correlate Of Consciousness

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of neuroscientific theories of consciousness. These include theories which explicitly point to EM fields, notably Operational Architectonics and, more recently, the General Resonance Theory. In phenomenological terms, human consciousness is a unified composition of contents. These contents are specific and meaningful, and they exist from a subjective point of view. Human conscious experience is temporally continuous, limited in content, and coherent. Based upon those phenomenal observations, pre-existing theories of consciousness, and a large body of experimental evidence, I derived the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). In brief, the TICL proposes that the neural correlate of consciousness is a structure of temporally integrated causality occurring over a large portion of the thalamocortical system. This structure is composed of a large, integrated set of neuronal elements (the System), which contains some subsystems, defined as having a higher level of temporally-integrated causality than the System as a whole. Each Subsystem exists from the point of view of the System, in the form of meaningful content. In this article, I review the TICL and consider the importance of EM forces as a mechanism of neural causality. I compare the fundamentals of TICL to those of several other neuroscientific theories. Using five major characteristics of phenomenal consciousness as a standard, I compare the basic tenets of Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace, General Resonance Theory, Operational Architectonics, and the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness with the framework of the TICL. While the literature concerned with these theories tends to focus on different lines of evidence, there are fundamental areas of agreement. This means that, in time, it may be possible for many of them to converge upon the truth. In this analysis, I conclude that a primary distinction which divides these theories is the feature of spatial and temporal nesting. Interestingly, this distinction does not separate along the fault line between theories explicitly concerned with EM fields and those which are not. I believe that reconciliation is possible, at least in principle, among those theories that recognize the following: just as the contents of consciousness are distinctions within consciousness, the neural correlates of conscious content should be distinguishable from but fall within the spatial and temporal boundaries of the full neural correlates of consciousness.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of top-down guidance of attention to food: An fMRI study

2020 ◽  
Vol 225 ◽  
pp. 113085
Author(s):  
Maartje S. Spetter ◽  
Suzanne Higgs ◽  
Dirk Dolmans ◽  
Jason M. Thomas ◽  
Renate L.E.P. Reniers ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Fmri Study

Do Not Pay Any Attention to the Umpires: Thought Suppression and Task-Relevant Focusing Strategies

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy R. Dugdale ◽  
Robert C. Eklund
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Load ◽  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Thought Suppression ◽  
Football Players ◽  
Mental Control ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Negative Thoughts ◽  
Australian Rules Football ◽  
Ironic Effects ◽  
And Task

Two studies grounded in ironic-cognitive-processing theory were conducted to determine (a) whether ironic errors may be associated with efforts to exert mental control that typically occur in sport settings and (b) whether these potential ironic effects could be negated through the use of a task-relevant cue word to refocus one’s thoughts during suppression. Participants were asked to watch a videotape of a series of clips of Australian Rules Football players, coaches, and umpires. Study 1 revealed that participants were more aware of umpires when instructed not to pay attention to them. Contrary to expectations, however, ironic effects were not significantly magnified by the combination of high cognitive load and the instruction not to pay attention to the umpires. Results from Study 2 indicated that potential ironic effects could be negated when individuals were given a task-relevant cue word to focus on when suppressing unwanted or negative thoughts. Overall, support for ironic processing theory was found in Studies 1 and 2 in this investigation.

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