scholarly journals Apical Amplification – A Cellular Mechanism of Conscious Perception?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomas Marvan ◽  
Michal Polák ◽  
Talis Bachmann ◽  
William A. Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Sensory Input ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Cellular Mechanism ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
Theoretical View ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations fornetwork-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience.Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cellsare summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. Theseinputs come from diverse sources, and provide a context within which thetransmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal andperisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apicalamplification (AA) enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it moreflexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. AA providesa possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strongloops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspacetheories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of theindividual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms thatcontribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As AAis highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, itrelates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental statesand to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendritesprovide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selectiveamplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

scholarly journals Apical amplification—a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomáš Marvan ◽  
Michal Polák ◽  
Talis Bachmann ◽  
William A Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cellular Mechanism ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Transmission Of Information ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Apical Dendrites ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

Abstract We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

scholarly journals V1 as an Egocentric Cognitive Map

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Linton
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Cognitive Map ◽  
Eye Position ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Pictorial Cues ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
Visual Consciousness ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article we explain why V1 also functions as an egocentric cognitive map. To the extent that cognitive processing has been discussed in V1, it has focused on (a) the allocation of attention, (b) top-down influences on perception, and (c) the transition from egocentric perception to allocentric navigation. By contrast, in this article we argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (a) the estimation of distance from eye position, (b) the estimation of size from eye position and/or pictorial cues, and (c) the multisensory integration of vision with proprioception and hearing, are potentially better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. We use this insight to explore V1 as the neural correlates of the visual perception / cognition distinction, and propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory), and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). We conclude by outlining the implications of our account for the perception of depth, motion, and colour / illumination.

scholarly journals V1 as an egocentric cognitive map

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Linton
Keyword(s):  
Visual Experience ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Cognitive Map ◽  
Laminar Structure ◽  
Detection Thresholds ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
Visual Consciousness ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Rule Out

Abstract We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1’s laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.

scholarly journals The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for ‘no-report’ paradigms

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1755) ◽  
pp. 20170348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Pitts ◽  
Lydia A. Lutsyshyna ◽  
Steven A. Hillyard
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Processing ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Processing Theory ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent ‘no-report’ paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

scholarly journals Representational ‘touch’ and modulatory ‘retouch’—two necessary neurobiological processes in thalamocortical interaction for conscious experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Talis Bachmann
Keyword(s):  
Pyramidal Neurons ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
General Purpose ◽  
Cortical Layer ◽  
Integration Theory ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Dendritic Integration ◽  
States Of Consciousness ◽  
Historical Origins

Abstract Theories of consciousness using neurobiological data or being influenced by these data have been focused either on states of consciousness or contents of consciousness. These theories have occasionally used evidence from psychophysical phenomena where conscious experience is a dependent experimental variable. However, systematic catalog of many such relevant phenomena has not been offered in terms of these theories. In the perceptual retouch theory of thalamocortical interaction, recently developed to become a blend with the dendritic integration theory, consciousness states and contents of consciousness are explained by the same mechanism. This general-purpose mechanism has modulation of the cortical layer-5 pyramidal neurons that represent contents of consciousness as its core. As a surplus, many experimental psychophysical phenomena of conscious perception can be explained by the workings of this mechanism. Historical origins and current views inherent in this theory are presented and reviewed.

scholarly journals The Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape: Reconciling Neuroscientific Theories With the Phenomenology of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse J. Winters
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Neural Correlate ◽  
Resonance Theory ◽  
Thalamocortical System ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Neural Correlate Of Consciousness

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of neuroscientific theories of consciousness. These include theories which explicitly point to EM fields, notably Operational Architectonics and, more recently, the General Resonance Theory. In phenomenological terms, human consciousness is a unified composition of contents. These contents are specific and meaningful, and they exist from a subjective point of view. Human conscious experience is temporally continuous, limited in content, and coherent. Based upon those phenomenal observations, pre-existing theories of consciousness, and a large body of experimental evidence, I derived the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). In brief, the TICL proposes that the neural correlate of consciousness is a structure of temporally integrated causality occurring over a large portion of the thalamocortical system. This structure is composed of a large, integrated set of neuronal elements (the System), which contains some subsystems, defined as having a higher level of temporally-integrated causality than the System as a whole. Each Subsystem exists from the point of view of the System, in the form of meaningful content. In this article, I review the TICL and consider the importance of EM forces as a mechanism of neural causality. I compare the fundamentals of TICL to those of several other neuroscientific theories. Using five major characteristics of phenomenal consciousness as a standard, I compare the basic tenets of Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace, General Resonance Theory, Operational Architectonics, and the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness with the framework of the TICL. While the literature concerned with these theories tends to focus on different lines of evidence, there are fundamental areas of agreement. This means that, in time, it may be possible for many of them to converge upon the truth. In this analysis, I conclude that a primary distinction which divides these theories is the feature of spatial and temporal nesting. Interestingly, this distinction does not separate along the fault line between theories explicitly concerned with EM fields and those which are not. I believe that reconciliation is possible, at least in principle, among those theories that recognize the following: just as the contents of consciousness are distinctions within consciousness, the neural correlates of conscious content should be distinguishable from but fall within the spatial and temporal boundaries of the full neural correlates of consciousness.

Difficult Turned Easy: Suggestion Renders a Challenging Visual Task Simple

2020 ◽  
pp. 095679762095485
Author(s):  
Mathieu Landry ◽  
Jason Da Silva Castanheira ◽  
Jérôme Sackur ◽  
Amir Raz
Keyword(s):  
Mental Imagery ◽  
Visual Information ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Sensory Input ◽  
Moving Objects ◽  
Visual Stimuli ◽  
Perceptual Information ◽  
Hypnotic Suggestion ◽  
Adult Participants ◽  
The Brain

Suggestions can cause some individuals to miss or disregard existing visual stimuli, but can they infuse sensory input with nonexistent information? Although several prominent theories of hypnotic suggestion propose that mental imagery can change our perceptual experience, data to support this stance remain sparse. The present study addressed this lacuna, showing how suggesting the presence of physically absent, yet critical, visual information transforms an otherwise difficult task into an easy one. Here, we show how adult participants who are highly susceptible to hypnotic suggestion successfully hallucinated visual occluders on top of moving objects. Our findings support the idea that, at least in some people, suggestions can add perceptual information to sensory input. This observation adds meaningful weight to theoretical, clinical, and applied aspects of the brain and psychological sciences.

Prior conscious experience enhances conscious perception but does not affect response priming☆

Cognition ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 160 ◽  
pp. 62-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominique Lamy ◽  
Tomer Carmel ◽  
Ziv Peremen
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Response Priming

scholarly journals Does the present moment depend on the moments not lived?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Romain Brette
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Present Moment ◽  
External Observer ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

Integrated Information Theory postulates that a conscious experience depends on a repertoire of hypothetical experiences (the axiom of information). This makes consciousness depend on the context that constrains the set of possibilities and on the scenarios imagined by the external observer, and not only on the system itself.

scholarly journals Causal manipulation of feed-forward and recurrent processing differentially affects measures of consciousness

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Allen ◽  
Tommaso Viola ◽  
Elizabeth Irvine ◽  
Jemma Sedgmond ◽  
Heidi Castle ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Magnetic Stimulation ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Feed Forward ◽  
Cortical Dynamics ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
Early Effects ◽  
Initial Processing

Abstract It has been theorized that cortical feed-forward and recurrent neural activity support unconscious and conscious cognitive processes, respectively. Here we causally tested this proposition by applying event-related transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) at early and late times relative to visual stimuli, together with a pulse designed to suppress conscious detection. Consistent with pre-registered hypotheses, early TMS affected residual, reportedly ‘unseen’ capacity. However, conscious perception also appeared critically dependent upon feed-forward processing to a greater extent than the later recurrent phase. Additional exploratory analyses suggested that these early effects dissociated from top-down criterion measures, which were most affected by later TMS. These findings are inconsistent with a simple dichotomy where feed-forward and recurrent processes correspond to unconscious and conscious mechanisms. Instead, different components of awareness may correspond to different phases of cortical dynamics in which initial processing is broadly perceptual whereas later recurrent processing might relate to decision to report.

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