scholarly journals Predictive eye movements are adjusted in a Bayes-optimal fashion in response to unexpectedly changing environmental probabilities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Harris ◽  
Tom Arthur

This paper examines the application of active inference to naturalistic visuomotor control. Active inference proposes that actions serve to minimise future prediction errors and are dynamically adjusted according to uncertainty about sensory information, predictions, or the environment. We investigated whether predictive gaze behaviours are indeed adjusted in this Bayes-optimal fashion during a virtual racquetball task. In this task, participants intercepted bouncing balls with varying levels of elasticity, under conditions of high and low environmental volatility. Participants’ gaze patterns differed between stable and volatile conditions in a manner consistent with generative models of Bayes-optimal behaviour. Partially observable Markov models also revealed an increased rate of associative learning in response to unpredictable shifts in environmental probabilities, although there was no overall effect of volatility on this parameter. Findings extend active inference frameworks into complex and unconstrained visuomotor tasks and present important implications for a neurocomputational understanding of the visual guidance of action.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Harris ◽  
Tom Arthur ◽  
David Broadbent ◽  
Mark Wilson ◽  
Samuel James Vine ◽  
...  

Optimal performance in time-constrained and dynamically changing environments depends on making reliable predictions about future outcomes. In sporting tasks, performers have been found to employ multiple information sources to maximize the accuracy of their predictions, but questions remain about how different information sources are weighted and integrated to guide anticipation. In this paper, we outline how active inference, a unifying account of perception and action, explains many of the prominent findings in the sports anticipation literature. Active inference proposes that perception and action are underpinned by the need to minimize prediction errors and optimise a predictive model of the world. To this end, decision making approximates Bayesian inference and actions are used to minimize future prediction errors. Using a series of Bayesian neurocomputational models based on a partially observable Markov process, we demonstrate that key findings from the literature can be recreated from the first principles of active inference. In doing so, we formulate a number of novel, empirically falsifiable hypotheses about human anticipation capabilities which could guide future investigations in the field.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox

Active inference is a physics of life process theory of perception, action and learning that is applicable to natural and artificial agents. In this paper, active inference theory is related to different types of practice in social organization. Here, the term social organization is used to clarify that this paper does not encompass organization in biological systems. Rather, the paper addresses active inference in social organization that utilizes industrial engineering, quality management, and artificial intelligence alongside human intelligence. Social organization referred to in this paper can be in private companies, public institutions, other for-profit or not-for-profit organizations, and any combination of them. The relevance of active inference theory is explained in terms of variational free energy, prediction errors, generative models, and Markov blankets. Active inference theory is most relevant to the social organization of work that is highly repetitive. By contrast, there are more challenges involved in applying active inference theory for social organization of less repetitive endeavors such as one-of-a-kind projects. These challenges need to be addressed in order for active inference to provide a unifying framework for different types of social organization employing human and artificial intelligence.


Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Baltieri ◽  
Christopher Buckley

In the past few decades, probabilistic interpretations of brain functions have become widespread in cognitive science and neuroscience. In particular, the free energy principle and active inference are increasingly popular theories of cognitive functions that claim to offer a unified understanding of life and cognition within a general mathematical framework derived from information and control theory, and statistical mechanics. However, we argue that if the active inference proposal is to be taken as a general process theory for biological systems, it is necessary to understand how it relates to existing control theoretical approaches routinely used to study and explain biological systems. For example, recently, PID (Proportional-Integral-Derivative) control has been shown to be implemented in simple molecular systems and is becoming a popular mechanistic explanation of behaviours such as chemotaxis in bacteria and amoebae, and robust adaptation in biochemical networks. In this work, we will show how PID controllers can fit a more general theory of life and cognition under the principle of (variational) free energy minimisation when using approximate linear generative models of the world. This more general interpretation also provides a new perspective on traditional problems of PID controllers such as parameter tuning as well as the need to balance performances and robustness conditions of a controller. Specifically, we then show how these problems can be understood in terms of the optimisation of the precisions (inverse variances) modulating different prediction errors in the free energy functional.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. e1006267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna C. Sales ◽  
Karl J. Friston ◽  
Matthew W. Jones ◽  
Anthony E. Pickering ◽  
Rosalyn J. Moran

Author(s):  
Giovanni Pezzulo ◽  
Laura Barca ◽  
Karl J. Friston

AbstractAll organisms must integrate cognition, emotion, and motivation to guide action toward valuable (goal) states, as described by active inference. Within this framework, cognition, emotion, and motivation interact through the (Bayesian) fusion of exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive signals, the precision-weighting of prediction errors, and the “affective tuning” of neuronal representations. Crucially, misregulation of these processes may have profound psychopathological consequences.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Schwartenbeck ◽  
Johannes Passecker ◽  
Tobias U Hauser ◽  
Thomas H B FitzGerald ◽  
Martin Kronbichler ◽  
...  

AbstractSuccessful behaviour depends on the right balance between maximising reward and soliciting information about the world. Here, we show how different types of information-gain emerge when casting behaviour as surprise minimisation. We present two distinct mechanisms for goal-directed exploration that express separable profiles of active sampling to reduce uncertainty. ‘Hidden state’ exploration motivates agents to sample unambiguous observations to accurately infer the (hidden) state of the world. Conversely, ‘model parameter’ exploration, compels agents to sample outcomes associated with high uncertainty, if they are informative for their representation of the task structure. We illustrate the emergence of these types of information-gain, termed active inference and active learning, and show how these forms of exploration induce distinct patterns of ‘Bayes-optimal’ behaviour. Our findings provide a computational framework to understand how distinct levels of uncertainty induce different modes of information-gain in decision-making.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (9) ◽  
pp. 1155
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox

In this paper, the Adaptive Calibration Model (ACM) and Active Inference Theory (AIT) are related to future-proofing startups. ACM encompasses the allocation of energy by the stress response system to alternative options for action, depending upon individuals’ life histories and changing external contexts. More broadly, within AIT, it is posited that humans survive by taking action to align their internal generative models with sensory inputs from external states. The first contribution of the paper is to address the need for future-proofing methods for startups by providing eight stress management principles based on ACM and AIT. Future-proofing methods are needed because, typically, nine out of ten startups do not survive. A second contribution is to relate ACM and AIT to startup life cycle stages. The third contribution is to provide practical examples that show the broader relevance ACM and AIT to organizational practice. These contributions go beyond previous literature concerned with entrepreneurial stress and organizational stress. In particular, rather than focusing on particular stressors, this paper is focused on the recalibrating/updating of startups’ stress responsivity patterns in relation to changes in the internal state of the startup and/or changes in the external state. Overall, the paper makes a contribution to relating physics of life constructs concerned with energy, action and ecological fitness to human organizations.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cooper A. Smout ◽  
Marta I. Garrido ◽  
Jason B. Mattingley

AbstractRecent studies have shown that prediction and attention can interact under various circumstances, suggesting that the two processes are based on interdependent neural mechanisms. In the visual modality, attention can be deployed to the location of a task-relevant stimulus (‘spatial attention’) or to a specific feature of the stimulus, such as colour or shape, irrespective of its location (‘feature-based attention’). Here we asked whether predictive processes are influenced by feature-based attention outside the current spatial focus of attention. Across two experiments, we recorded neural activity with electroencephalography (EEG) as human observers performed a feature-based attention task at fixation and ignored a stream of peripheral stimuli with predictable or surprising features. Central targets were defined by a single feature (colour or orientation) and differed in salience across the two experiments. Task-irrelevant peripheral patterns usually comprised one particular conjunction of features (standards), but occasionally deviated in one or both features (deviants). Consistent with previous studies, we found reliable effects of feature-based attention and prediction on neural responses to task-irrelevant patterns in both experiments. Crucially, we observed an interaction between prediction and feature-based attention in both experiments: the neural effect of feature-based attention was larger for surprising patterns than it was for predicted patterns. These findings suggest that global effects of feature-based attention depend on surprise, and are consistent with the idea that attention optimises the precision of predictions by modulating the gain of prediction errors.Significance StatementTwo principal mechanisms facilitate the efficient processing of sensory information: prediction uses prior information to guide the interpretation of sensory events, whereas attention biases the processing of these events according to their behavioural relevance. A recent theory proposes to reconcile attention and prediction under a unifying framework, casting attention as a ‘precision optimisation’ mechanism that enhances the gain of prediction errors. Crucially, this theory suggests that attention and prediction interact to modulate neural responses, but this hypothesis remains to be tested with respect to feature-based attention mechanisms outside the spatial focus of attention. Here we show that global effects of feature-based attention are enhanced when stimuli possess surprising features, suggesting that feature-based attention and prediction are interdependent neural mechanisms.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cooper A. Smout ◽  
Matthew F. Tang ◽  
Marta I. Garrido ◽  
Jason B. Mattingley

AbstractThe human brain is thought to optimise the encoding of incoming sensory information through two principal mechanisms: prediction uses stored information to guide the interpretation of forthcoming sensory events, and attention prioritizes these events according to their behavioural relevance. Despite the ubiquitous contributions of attention and prediction to various aspects of perception and cognition, it remains unknown how they interact to modulate information processing in the brain. A recent extension of predictive coding theory suggests that attention optimises the expected precision of predictions by modulating the synaptic gain of prediction error units. Since prediction errors code for the difference between predictions and sensory signals, this model would suggest that attention increases the selectivity for mismatch information in the neural response to a surprising stimulus. Alternative predictive coding models proposes that attention increases the activity of prediction (or ‘representation’) neurons, and would therefore suggest that attention and prediction synergistically modulate selectivity for feature information in the brain. Here we applied multivariate forward encoding techniques to neural activity recorded via electroencephalography (EEG) as human observers performed a simple visual task, to test for the effect of attention on both mismatch and feature information in the neural response to surprising stimuli. Participants attended or ignored a periodic stream of gratings, the orientations of which could be either predictable, surprising, or unpredictable. We found that surprising stimuli evoked neural responses that were encoded according to the difference between predicted and observed stimulus features, and that attention facilitated the encoding of this type of information in the brain. These findings advance our understanding of how attention and prediction modulate information processing in the brain, and support the theory that attention optimises precision expectations during hierarchical inference by increasing the gain of prediction errors.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna C Sales ◽  
Karl J. Friston ◽  
Matthew W. Jones ◽  
Anthony E. Pickering ◽  
Rosalyn J. Moran

AbstractThe locus coeruleus (LC) in the pons is the major source of noradrenaline (NA) in the brain. Two modes of LC firing have been associated with distinct cognitive states: changes in tonic rates of firing are correlated with global levels of arousal and behavioural flexibility, whilst phasic LC responses are evoked by salient stimuli. Here, we unify these two modes of firing by modelling the response of the LC as a correlate of a prediction error when inferring states for action planning under Active Inference (AI).We simulate a classic Go/No-go reward learning task and a three-arm foraging task and show that, if LC activity is considered to reflect the magnitude of high level ‘state-action’ prediction errors, then both tonic and phasic modes of firing are emergent features of belief updating. We also demonstrate that when contingencies change, AI agents can update their internal models more quickly by feeding back this state-action prediction error – reflected in LC firing and noradrenaline release – to optimise learning rate, enabling large adjustments over short timescales. We propose that such prediction errors are mediated by cortico-LC connections, whilst ascending input from LC to cortex modulates belief updating in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).In short, we characterise the LC/ NA system within a general theory of brain function. In doing so, we show that contrasting, behaviour-dependent firing patterns are an emergent property of the LC’s crucial role in translating prediction errors into an optimal mediation between plasticity and stability.Author SummaryThe brain uses sensory information to build internal models and make predictions about the world. When errors of prediction occur, models must be updated to ensure desired outcomes are still achieved. Neuromodulator chemicals provide a possible pathway for triggering such changes in brain state. One such neuromodulator, noradrenaline, originates predominantly from a cluster of neurons in the brainstem – the locus coeruleus (LC) – and plays a key role in behaviour, for instance, in determining the balance between exploiting or exploring the environment.Here we use Active Inference (AI), a mathematical model of perception and action, to formally describe LC function. We propose that LC activity is triggered by errors in prediction and that the subsequent release of noradrenaline alters the rate of learning about the environment. Biologically, this describes an LC-cortex feedback loop promoting behavioural flexibility in times of uncertainty. We model LC output as a simulated animal performs two tasks known to elicit archetypal responses. We find that experimentally observed ‘phasic’ and ‘tonic’ patterns of LC activity emerge naturally, and that modulation of learning rates improves task performance. This provides a simple, unified computational account of noradrenergic computational function within a general model of behaviour.


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