Does depicting consequences of actions in narratives bolsters the formation of propositional beliefs? First results from an experimental approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solenne Bonneterre ◽  
Oulmann Zerhouni ◽  
James A Green
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Implicit Associations ◽  
Relational Responding ◽  
Single Process ◽  
First Results ◽  
Drinking Consequences ◽  
Tv Show ◽  
Cumulative Evidence

We explored (i) whether narratives can influence viewers’ attitudes towards alcohol through evaluative learning and (ii) compared predictions from dual-process and single-process models of evaluative learning.In study 1, participants had to read vignettes, while they were exposed to TV show excerpts in study 2. Both studies (nstudy1 = 147; nstudy2 = 150) followed a 2 (valence: positive vs negative) x 2 (drinking consequences: yes vs no) study design. Implicit associations and propositional beliefs were then measured by an Implicit Association Test (IAT) and a Relational Responding Task (RRT) respectively. A multilevel meta-regression was conducted to provide cumulative evidence for our hypotheses.Our first study did not yield robust significant results in the direction of associative or propositional processes. Conversely, the results of study 2 and meta-analytic findings showed stronger evidence for (i) an effect of exposure to narratives on alcohol-related attitudes and (ii) in favor of propositional models. Simply presenting a stimulus within a valenced content had no effect on the IAT or RRT. We conclude that these results are more in line with inferential propositional models of evaluative learning than with dual-process models.

scholarly journals Single- and Dual-Process Models of Biased Contingency Detection

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel A. Vadillo ◽  
Fernando Blanco ◽  
Ion Yarritu ◽  
Helena Matute
Keyword(s):  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Contingency Learning ◽  
Contingency Detection ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Dependent Variables ◽  
Single Process

Abstract. Decades of research in causal and contingency learning show that people’s estimations of the degree of contingency between two events are easily biased by the relative probabilities of those two events. If two events co-occur frequently, then people tend to overestimate the strength of the contingency between them. Traditionally, these biases have been explained in terms of relatively simple single-process models of learning and reasoning. However, more recently some authors have found that these biases do not appear in all dependent variables and have proposed dual-process models to explain these dissociations between variables. In the present paper we review the evidence for dissociations supporting dual-process models and we point out important shortcomings of this literature. Some dissociations seem to be difficult to replicate or poorly generalizable and others can be attributed to methodological artifacts. Overall, we conclude that support for dual-process models of biased contingency detection is scarce and inconclusive.

scholarly journals Dynamics of brain activity reveal a unitary recognition signal

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph T. Weidemann ◽  
Michael J. Kahana
Keyword(s):  
Recognition Memory ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Memory Strength ◽  
Single Process ◽  
Familiarity And Recollection ◽  
Temporal Profiles ◽  
Eeg Features

Dual-process models of recognition memory typically assume that independent familiarity and recollection signals with distinct temporal profiles can each lead to recognition (enabling two routes to recognition), whereas single-process models posit a unitary “memory strength” signal. Using multivariate classifiers trained on spectral EEG features, we quantified neural evidence for recognition decisions as a function of time. Classifiers trained on a small portion of the decision period performed similarly to those also incorporating information from previous time points indicating that neural activity reflects an integrated evidence signal. We propose a single-route account of recognition memory that is compatible with contributions from familiarity and recollection signals, but relies on a unitary evidence signal that integrates all available evidence.

scholarly journals Response time models separate single- and dual-process accounts of memory-based decisions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Maximilian Kraemer ◽  
Laura Fontanesi ◽  
Mikhail S. Spektor ◽  
Sebastian Gluth
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Memory Bias ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Single Process ◽  
The One ◽  
Single Versus

Human decisions often deviate from economic rationality and are influenced by cognitive biases. One such bias is the memory bias according to which people prefer choice options they have a better memory of - even when the options' utilities are comparatively low. Although this phenomenon is well supported empirically, its cognitive foundation remains elusive. Here we test two conceivable computational accounts of the memory bias against each other. On the one hand, a single-process account explains the memory bias by assuming a single biased evidence-accumulation process in favor of remembered options. On the contrary, a dual-process account posits that some decisions are driven by a purely memory-driven process and others by a utility-maximizing one. We show that both accounts are indistinguishable based on choices alone as they make similar predictions with respect to the memory bias. However, they make qualitatively different predictions about response times. We tested the qualitative and quantitative predictions of both accounts on behavioral data from a memory-based decision-making task. Our results show that a single-process account provides a better account of the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition to deepening our understanding of memory-based decision making, our study provides an example of how to rigorously compare single- versus dual-process models using empirical data and hierarchical Bayesian estimation methods.

scholarly journals On Dual- and Single-Process Models of Thinking

2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162096417
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys
Keyword(s):  
Process Model ◽  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Good Evidence ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Single Model ◽  
Single Process ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Human Thinking ◽  
Processing Mechanisms

Popular dual-process models of thinking have long conceived intuition and deliberation as two qualitatively different processes. Single-process-model proponents claim that the difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Psychologists have been debating the dual-process/single-process question for at least 30 years. In the present article, I argue that it is time to leave the debate behind. I present a critical evaluation of the key arguments and critiques and show that—contra both dual- and single-model proponents—there is currently no good evidence that allows one to decide the debate. Moreover, I clarify that even if the debate were to be solved, it would be irrelevant for psychologists because it does not advance the understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.

scholarly journals Response time models separate single- and dual-process accounts of memory-based decisions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Kraemer ◽  
Laura Fontanesi ◽  
Mikhail S. Spektor ◽  
Sebastian Gluth
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Memory Bias ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Single Process ◽  
The One ◽  
Parameter Estimation Methods

Abstract Human decisions often deviate from economic rationality and are influenced by cognitive biases. One such bias is the memory bias according to which people prefer choice options they have a better memory of—even when the options’ utilities are comparatively low. Although this phenomenon is well supported empirically, its cognitive foundation remains elusive. Here we test two conceivable computational accounts of the memory bias against each other. On the one hand, a single-process account explains the memory bias by assuming a single biased evidence-accumulation process in favor of remembered options. On the contrary, a dual-process account posits that some decisions are driven by a purely memory-driven process and others by a utility-maximizing one. We show that both accounts are indistinguishable based on choices alone as they make similar predictions with respect to the memory bias. However, they make qualitatively different predictions about response times. We tested the qualitative and quantitative predictions of both accounts on behavioral data from a memory-based decision-making task. Our results show that a single-process account provides a better account of the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition to deepening our understanding of memory-based decision-making, our study provides an example of how to rigorously compare single- versus dual-process models using empirical data and hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation methods.

scholarly journals Feature sampling in categorization and recognition of objects

2002 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koen Lamberts
Keyword(s):  
Recognition Memory ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Time Course ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Perceptual Categorization ◽  
The Past ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Single Process ◽  
Recognition Of Objects

This article presents an overview of some recent work on the time course of perceptual categorization and recognition memory. First, The EGCM-RT, which is a feature-sampling model of the time course of categorization, is described. It is shown that the model explains a wide range of categorization data. Second, an overview is given of a feature-sampling model of the time course of recognition that is derived from the EGCM-RT. This model explains results that have been interpreted in the past as evidence for dual-process models of recognition, and it provides a single-process alternative to dual-process accounts.

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