scholarly journals Response time models separate single- and dual-process accounts of memory-based decisions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Maximilian Kraemer ◽  
Laura Fontanesi ◽  
Mikhail S. Spektor ◽  
Sebastian Gluth
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Memory Bias ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Single Process ◽  
The One ◽  
Single Versus

Human decisions often deviate from economic rationality and are influenced by cognitive biases. One such bias is the memory bias according to which people prefer choice options they have a better memory of - even when the options' utilities are comparatively low. Although this phenomenon is well supported empirically, its cognitive foundation remains elusive. Here we test two conceivable computational accounts of the memory bias against each other. On the one hand, a single-process account explains the memory bias by assuming a single biased evidence-accumulation process in favor of remembered options. On the contrary, a dual-process account posits that some decisions are driven by a purely memory-driven process and others by a utility-maximizing one. We show that both accounts are indistinguishable based on choices alone as they make similar predictions with respect to the memory bias. However, they make qualitatively different predictions about response times. We tested the qualitative and quantitative predictions of both accounts on behavioral data from a memory-based decision-making task. Our results show that a single-process account provides a better account of the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition to deepening our understanding of memory-based decision making, our study provides an example of how to rigorously compare single- versus dual-process models using empirical data and hierarchical Bayesian estimation methods.

scholarly journals Response time models separate single- and dual-process accounts of memory-based decisions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Kraemer ◽  
Laura Fontanesi ◽  
Mikhail S. Spektor ◽  
Sebastian Gluth
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Memory Bias ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Single Process ◽  
The One ◽  
Parameter Estimation Methods

Abstract Human decisions often deviate from economic rationality and are influenced by cognitive biases. One such bias is the memory bias according to which people prefer choice options they have a better memory of—even when the options’ utilities are comparatively low. Although this phenomenon is well supported empirically, its cognitive foundation remains elusive. Here we test two conceivable computational accounts of the memory bias against each other. On the one hand, a single-process account explains the memory bias by assuming a single biased evidence-accumulation process in favor of remembered options. On the contrary, a dual-process account posits that some decisions are driven by a purely memory-driven process and others by a utility-maximizing one. We show that both accounts are indistinguishable based on choices alone as they make similar predictions with respect to the memory bias. However, they make qualitatively different predictions about response times. We tested the qualitative and quantitative predictions of both accounts on behavioral data from a memory-based decision-making task. Our results show that a single-process account provides a better account of the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition to deepening our understanding of memory-based decision-making, our study provides an example of how to rigorously compare single- versus dual-process models using empirical data and hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation methods.

scholarly journals Single- and Dual-Process Models of Biased Contingency Detection

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel A. Vadillo ◽  
Fernando Blanco ◽  
Ion Yarritu ◽  
Helena Matute
Keyword(s):  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Contingency Learning ◽  
Contingency Detection ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Dependent Variables ◽  
Single Process

Abstract. Decades of research in causal and contingency learning show that people’s estimations of the degree of contingency between two events are easily biased by the relative probabilities of those two events. If two events co-occur frequently, then people tend to overestimate the strength of the contingency between them. Traditionally, these biases have been explained in terms of relatively simple single-process models of learning and reasoning. However, more recently some authors have found that these biases do not appear in all dependent variables and have proposed dual-process models to explain these dissociations between variables. In the present paper we review the evidence for dissociations supporting dual-process models and we point out important shortcomings of this literature. Some dissociations seem to be difficult to replicate or poorly generalizable and others can be attributed to methodological artifacts. Overall, we conclude that support for dual-process models of biased contingency detection is scarce and inconclusive.

scholarly journals Should I stay or should I go? Evidence accumulation drives decision making in human drivers

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkady Zgonnikov ◽  
David Abbink ◽  
Gustav Markkula
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Naturalistic Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Constraints ◽  
Evidence Accumulation ◽  
Out Of Sample

Laboratory studies of abstract, highly controlled tasks point towards noisy evidence accumulation as a key mechanism governing decision making. Yet it is unclear whether the cognitive processes implicated in simple, isolated decisions in the lab are as paramount to decisions that are ingrained in more complex behaviors, such as driving. Here we aim to address the gap between modern cognitive models of decision making and studies of naturalistic decision making in drivers, which so far have provided only limited insight into the underlying cognitive processes. We investigate drivers' decision making during unprotected left turns, and model the cognitive process driving these decisions. Our model builds on the classical drift-diffusion model, and emphasizes, first, the drift rate linked to the relevant perceptual quantities dynamically sampled from the environment, and, second, collapsing decision boundaries reflecting the dynamic constraints imposed on the decision maker’s response by the environment. We show that the model explains the observed decision outcomes and response times, as well as substantial individual differences in those. Through cross-validation, we demonstrate that the model not only explains the data, but also generalizes to out-of-sample conditions, effectively providing a way to predict human drivers’ behavior in real time. Our results reveal the cognitive mechanisms of gap acceptance decisions in human drivers, and exemplify how simple cognitive process models can help us to understand human behavior in complex real-world tasks.

Development of Judgment, Decision Making, and Rationality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maggie Toplak ◽  
Jala Rizeq
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Systematic Errors ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Research Traditions ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Gradual Onset

There is a long tradition of studying children’s reasoning and thinking in cognitive development and education. The initial studies in the cognitive development of reasoning were motivated by Piagetian models, and developmental age was thought to bring the gradual onset of logical thinking. The introduction of heuristics and biases tasks in adults and dual process models have provided new perspectives for understanding the development of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making skills. These heuristics and biases tasks provided a way to operationalize the systematic errors that people make in their judgments. Dual process models have advanced our understanding of the basic processes implicated in both optimal and non-optimal responders on several types of paradigms, including heuristics and biases tasks and classic reasoning paradigms. Importantly, these skills and competencies are generally separable from the types of higher cognition assessed on measures of intelligence and executive function task performance. Given the history of the study of reasoning in cognitive development, there is a need to integrate our understanding across these somewhat separate literatures. This is especially true given the opposite predictions that seem to be suggested in these different research traditions. Specifically, there is a focus on increasing logical development in the classic cognitive developmental literature and alternatively, there has been a focus on systematic errors in judgment and decision-making in the study of reasoning in adults. This article provides an integration of the two aforementioned perspectives that are rooted in different empirical and historical traditions. These considerations are addressed by drawing upon their research traditions and by summarizing more recent developmental work that has investigated these paradigms.

scholarly journals An Extended Dual-Process Model of Entertainment Effects on Political Information Processing and Engagement

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank M. Schneider ◽  
Anne Bartsch ◽  
Larissa Leonhard
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Political Communication ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Political Information ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Entertainment Media ◽  
Dual Process Model ◽  
The One

This chapter reviews the controversial relationship of entertainment and political communication and presents a theoretical framework to integrate seemingly contradicting concepts and research findings. On the one hand, concerns have been raised about the decay of news quality and political culture due to the growing influence of entertainment media. On the other, researchers have highlighted the potential of entertainment in terms of audience interest, cognitive accessibility, and public outreach. A literature overview shows theoretical and empirical support for both sides of the controversy about the (dys-)functionality of entertainment in political communication. Therefore, in an attempt to reconcile the divergent findings, the chapter presents an extended dual-process model of entertainment effects on political information processing and engagement. This framework offers substantial extensions to existing dual-process models of entertainment by conceptualizing the effects of entertainment on different forms of political engagement that have not been incorporated so far.

Cognition in the Courts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eileen Braman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Disciplinary Boundaries ◽  
Fact Finding

This chapter critically evaluates how experiments are used to study cognitive processes involved in legal reasoning. Looking at research on legal presumptions, heuristic processing, and various types of bias in judicial decision-making, the analysis considers how experiments with judges, lay participants, and other legally trained populations have contributed to our understanding of the psychological processes involved in fact-finding and legal decision-making. It explores how behavioral economics, dual process models, cultural cognition, and motivated reasoning frameworks have been used to inform experimental research. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what findings add to our normative understanding of issues like accuracy and neutrality in decision-making and a call to better integrate knowledge gained through experimental methods across disciplinary boundaries.

Dual-Process Models of Criminal Decision Making

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Louis van Gelder
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
Dual System ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
System Models ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Point Of Departure

This chapter discusses the application of dual-process and dual-system models to offender decision making. It is argued that these models offer a more accurate account of the decision process than the traditional choice models in criminology, such as rational choice and deterrence models, and can overcome their various limitations. Specific attention is devoted to the hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making, which takes the dual-process hypothesis as a point of departure. This model is rooted in the idea that both “cool” cognition and “hot” affect, or thinking and feeling, guide behavior and that understanding their interaction is fundamental for understanding how people make criminal choices.

scholarly journals Dynamics of brain activity reveal a unitary recognition signal

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph T. Weidemann ◽  
Michael J. Kahana
Keyword(s):  
Recognition Memory ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Memory Strength ◽  
Single Process ◽  
Familiarity And Recollection ◽  
Temporal Profiles ◽  
Eeg Features

Dual-process models of recognition memory typically assume that independent familiarity and recollection signals with distinct temporal profiles can each lead to recognition (enabling two routes to recognition), whereas single-process models posit a unitary “memory strength” signal. Using multivariate classifiers trained on spectral EEG features, we quantified neural evidence for recognition decisions as a function of time. Classifiers trained on a small portion of the decision period performed similarly to those also incorporating information from previous time points indicating that neural activity reflects an integrated evidence signal. We propose a single-route account of recognition memory that is compatible with contributions from familiarity and recollection signals, but relies on a unitary evidence signal that integrates all available evidence.

Does depicting consequences of actions in narratives bolsters the formation of propositional beliefs? First results from an experimental approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solenne Bonneterre ◽  
Oulmann Zerhouni ◽  
James A Green
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Implicit Associations ◽  
Relational Responding ◽  
Single Process ◽  
First Results ◽  
Drinking Consequences ◽  
Tv Show ◽  
Cumulative Evidence

We explored (i) whether narratives can influence viewers’ attitudes towards alcohol through evaluative learning and (ii) compared predictions from dual-process and single-process models of evaluative learning.In study 1, participants had to read vignettes, while they were exposed to TV show excerpts in study 2. Both studies (nstudy1 = 147; nstudy2 = 150) followed a 2 (valence: positive vs negative) x 2 (drinking consequences: yes vs no) study design. Implicit associations and propositional beliefs were then measured by an Implicit Association Test (IAT) and a Relational Responding Task (RRT) respectively. A multilevel meta-regression was conducted to provide cumulative evidence for our hypotheses.Our first study did not yield robust significant results in the direction of associative or propositional processes. Conversely, the results of study 2 and meta-analytic findings showed stronger evidence for (i) an effect of exposure to narratives on alcohol-related attitudes and (ii) in favor of propositional models. Simply presenting a stimulus within a valenced content had no effect on the IAT or RRT. We conclude that these results are more in line with inferential propositional models of evaluative learning than with dual-process models.

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