Możliwości zablokowania ustanowienia powiązania budżetu Unii Europejskiej z praworządnością

2021 ◽  
Vol 5(166) ◽  
pp. 35-54
Author(s):  
Waldemar Gontarski

The new regime of conditionality for the protection of the rule of law, understood as the rule of law (new conditionality), appears to be contrary to the European Union Treaties, in particular because its essential provisions are incompatible with the requirement of legal certainty which underlies the rule of law. This conditionality is based on financial liability for the risk of illegality, that is, in sum, for lawful acts of a Member State which may possibly turn out to be unlawful, but after financial sanctions have already been applied. This publication deals with the identification and management of legal risks that give rise to financial risks. After characterising the basic EU budgetary instruments on the basis of the acquis of economic and legal sciences (which implies the application of the external integration method), using a dogmatic method, the author discusses the possibility of blocking by a Member State the introduction into EU law of a mechanism binding the budget with the broadly understood rule of law in connection with the signalled incompatibilities of the new conditionality mechanism with primary Union law. The aim of the paper is to answer the question of what legal possibilities an individual Member State has to counteract a Union regulation prima facie incompatible with the rule of law, apart from challenging the regulation before the Court of Justice (review of the legality of legal acts), on the assumption that the rule of law imposes an obligation to first counteract bad legislation (decent legislation as an element of the rule of law) and only as a last resort to lodge a complaint with the Court against a given act of derived Union law.

Author(s):  
Ákos Kopper ◽  
Zsolt Körtvélyesi ◽  
Balázs Majtényi ◽  
András Szalai

Abstract This article scrutinizes the ‘insecurity toolbox’ that Hungary’s illiberal regime relies on in order to create an increasingly authoritarian system that sidelines the opposition and silences discontent. While authoritarian shifts are widespread, what makes the case of Hungary unique is that it involves a member state of the European Union. We identify three important features of the regime: (1) it relies on securitization by using an anti-immigrant meta-frame to justify virtually all policies and identify enemies whose presence justifies exceptional measures; (2)it applies law instrumentally and rules by law, which effectively undermines the rule of law and its guarantees against arbitrariness; (3)it maintains a screen of compliance with democratic and constitutional norms. While the EU seems impotent, or unwilling to halt this authoritarian backsliding, the Hungarian government feels it necessary to fake compliance with democratic norms by adopting policies that formally acquiesce to European standards but contradict them in essence.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


Author(s):  
Venelin Krastev Terziev ◽  
◽  
Marin Petrov Georgiev ◽  
Stefаn Marinov Bankov ◽  
◽  
...  

The independence of the Prosecutor General of any Member State of the European Union is extremely important with a view to comply with the legal framework and the rule of law. It lays the foundations of trust in the judiciary and the fundaments of statehood, creates a sense of law and legal order. That is why it is highly important in the context of the present to outline the control of the activity of the Prosecutor General in the exercise of his powers, clearly emphasizing that the Bulgarian Prosecutor General is not out of control in his powers. The legal powers of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria are even more limited than the powers of analogous figures in the legal systems of other EU countries. The Prosecutor General exercises his powers only in exceptional cases and according to previously prescribed legal procedures.


Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlatka Bilas ◽  
Mile Bošnjak ◽  
Sanja Franc

The aim of this paper is to establish and clarify the relationship between corruption level and development among European Union countries. Out of the estimated model in this paper one can conclude that the level of corruption can explain capital abundance differences among European Union countries. Also, explanatory power of corruption is higher in explaining economic development than in explaining capital abundance, meaning stronger relationship between corruption level and economic development than between corruption level and capital abundance. There is no doubt that reducing corruption would be beneficial for all countries. Since corruption is a wrongdoing, the rule of law enforcement is of utmost importance. However, root causes of corruption, namely the institutional and social environment: recruiting civil servants on a merit basis, salaries in public sector competitive to the ones in private sector, the role of international institutions in the fight against corruption, and some other corruption characteristics are very important to analyze in order to find effective ways to fight corruption. Further research should go into this direction.


Author(s):  
Stefano Civitarese

The article revolves around the doctrine of precedent within the so-called European legal space, wondering whether and to what extent we can speak of a convergence towards a stare decisis model boosted by the harmonizing role of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The article argues that although there are still some differences between civil law and common law legal systems they regard more the style of reasoning and the deep understanding of the relationship between the present decision of a court and past judicial decisions than the very existence of the constraints of the latter upon the former. The article concludes that a sort of mechanism of stare decisis has in fact been created, even though, on the one hand, uncertainty remains as to the way in which the binding force of a precedent concretely operates in the system, and on the other hand, this mechanism relates exclusively to the relationships between past and future decisions of higher courts (horizontal effect). This change, far from being a shift towards a truly judge-made law system or a consequence of the final abandonment of the dictates of the rule of law, enhances legal certainty contributing to the fundamental requirement of stability of law as a feature of the ideal of the rule of law.


Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


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