scholarly journals Dlaczego śmierć nie jest taka zła?

2020 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 47-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcin Ferdynus
Keyword(s):  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Jeff Mcmahan ◽  
Leon Kass

Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie o to, dlaczego śmierć nie jest taka zła. Autor twierdzi, że śmierć niekoniecznie musi być aż tak zła, jak to opisują Thomas Nagel czy Jeff  McMahan. Według autora śmierć nie jest absolutnym złem, nie ma też śmierci lepszych i gorszych. Nie ma też powodu, by sądzić, że śmierć jest dobra (wartościowa) jedynie w tym sensie, jak to opisują Bernard Williams, czy Leon Kass. Śmierć jest dobra, ponieważ dzięki niej osoba ludzka aktualizuje swoje potencjalności (poznanie, pragnienia, miłość), osiągając pełnię życia.

Happiness and Luckiness

1998 ◽  
pp. 207-214
Author(s):  
Paul Schollmeier
Keyword(s):  
Moral Luck ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Moral philosophers, beginning with Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, have recently broached the topic of moral luck in the philosophical literature. They limit their discussion however to considerations of how luck affects our ability to carry out actions or how it affects the consequences of our actions. I wish to suggest that luck is also an important factor in determining our actions as ends in themselves. What actions we may choose to perform for their own sake in a given situation depends much more than we might care to think on causes beyond our control. Our happiness rests ultimately on our luckiness.

Moral luck

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Statman
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Educational Background ◽  
Modern Concept ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Moral Accountability ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Stark Contrast

The term ‘moral luck’ was introduced by Bernard Williams in 1976 to convey the idea that moral status is, to a large extent, a matter of luck. For example, that Bob grows up to be vicious and Tom to be virtuous depends very much on their different family conditions and educational background. Following Williams, Thomas Nagel widened the scope of moral luck. The position taken by both stands in stark contrast to the widely-held view, influenced by Kant, that one is morally accountable only for what is under one’s control, so that moral accountability is not a matter of luck. This idea is so deeply entrenched in our modern concept of morality that rejecting it would call for a rethinking and reformulation of the most basic notions of morality. Some have argued that the paradox of moral luck provides a strong reason to abandon traditional moral theories, and lends support to virtue ethics.

Democracy and Value Pluralism

2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 255-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Galston
Keyword(s):  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
John Gray ◽  
Stuart Hampshire ◽  
The Relationship

My intention in this essay is to open up a question I cannot fully resolve: the relationship between democracy and value pluralism. By “value pluralism” I mean the view propounded so memorably by the late Isaiah Berlin and developed in various ways by thinkers including Stuart Hampshire, Steven Lukes, Thomas Nagel, Martha Nussbaum, Michael Stocker, Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, John Kekes, and John Gray, among others. I shall define and discuss this view in some detail in Section III. For now, suffice it to say that value pluralism is the view that what we (rightly) value in our lives turns out to be multiple, heterogeneous, not reducible to a common measure, and not hierarchically ordered with a single dominant value or set of values binding on all persons in all circumstances. I use the phrase “value pluralism” rather than “moral pluralism” to indicate that this view encompasses nonmoral as well as moral goods.

Bernard Williams

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark P. Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Bernard Williams

Is the Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self Conceptually Coherent?

2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernier
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Buddhist Doctrine

Virtually all schools of Buddhism do not accept a permanent, substantial self, and see everything as non-self (anatta). In the first part of this article I recall some arguments traditionally given in support of this perspective. Descartes’ cogito argument contradicts this, by suggesting that we know infallibly that the self, understood as a substantial enduring entity, does exist. The German aphorist Lichtenberg has suggested that all Descartes could claim to have established was the impersonal ‘There is thinking’ (Es denkt), which would support the perspective of non-self. Bernard Williams has argued that Lichtenberg’s impersonal version of the cogito is conceptually incoherent, which would entail that the Buddhist perspective of non-self is also incoherent. I propose to defend the coherence of the Buddhist perspective of non-self against Williams’s argument.

Excursus

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Schlieter
Keyword(s):  
Life Review ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Niklas Luhmann ◽  
Search For Meaning ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation

This chapter, an excursus, embarks on a more philosophical interpretation of consciousness and experience. Building on Thomas Nagel and Niklas Luhmann, it is argued that human consciousness, defined as a process of self-reproduction of never-ending new possibilities, is perplexed by the task of imagining its own nonexistence. Given that consciousness is not equipped for this task, that is to imagine death (its own nonexistence), it will react with a search for meaning, a context for the existential threat. The excursus argues that this leads to the highly accelerated activity of consciousness. It may result in a phenomenon reported by a certain number of near-death experiencers, namely, the life review. In short, then, the life review is a highly accelerated search for meaning. These deliberations are further substantiated by a comparison with “wake-up dreams,” in which a similar structure becomes visible.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Kirchin
Keyword(s):  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
General Methodology ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
History Of ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
The Difference

This chapter introduces the distinction between thin and thick concepts and then performs a number of functions. First, two major accounts of thick concepts—separationism and nonseparationism—are introduced and, in doing so, a novel account of evaluation is indicated. Second, each chapter is outlined as is the general methodology, followed, third, by a brief history of the discussion of thick concepts, referencing Philippa Foot, Hilary Putnam, Gilbert Ryle, and Bernard Williams among others. Fourth, a number of relevant contrasts are introduced, such as the fact–value distinction and the difference between concepts, properties, and terms. Lastly, some interesting and relevant questions are raised that, unfortunately, have to be left aside.

How Nowhere Can You Get (and do Ethics)?The View from Nowhere. Thomas Nagel

Ethics ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen L. Darwall
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Nagel
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