Dlaczego śmierć nie jest taka zła?

Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie o to, dlaczego śmierć nie jest taka zła. Autor twierdzi, że śmierć niekoniecznie musi być aż tak zła, jak to opisują Thomas Nagel czy Jeff McMahan. Według autora śmierć nie jest absolutnym złem, nie ma też śmierci lepszych i gorszych. Nie ma też powodu, by sądzić, że śmierć jest dobra (wartościowa) jedynie w tym sensie, jak to opisują Bernard Williams, czy Leon Kass. Śmierć jest dobra, ponieważ dzięki niej osoba ludzka aktualizuje swoje potencjalności (poznanie, pragnienia, miłość), osiągając pełnię życia.

Emotional Reactions to Human Reproductive Cloning

Background: Extant surveys of people’s attitudes toward human reproductive cloning focus on moral judgments alone, not emotional reactions or sentiments. This is especially important given that some (esp. Leon Kass) have argued against such cloning on the grounds that it engenders widespread negative emotions, like disgust, that provide a moral guide. Objective: To provide some data on emotional reactions to human cloning, with a focus on repugnance, given its prominence in the literature. Methods: This brief mixed-method study measures the self-reported attitudes and emotions (positive or negative) toward cloning from a sample of participants in the United States. Results: Most participants condemned cloning as immoral and said it should be illegal. The most commonly reported positive sentiment was by far interest/curiosity. Negative emotions were much more varied, but anxiety was the most common. Only about a third of participants selected disgust or repugnance as something they felt and an even smaller portion had this emotion come to mind prior to seeing a list of options. Conclusions: Participants felt primarily interested and anxious about human reproductive cloning. They did not primarily feel disgust or repugnance. This provides initial empirical evidence that such a reaction is not appropriately widespread.

DESAFIOS ÉTICOS DAS TECNOLOGIAS DE MELHORAMENTO HUMANO

O avanço do conhecimento científico e a criação de novas tecnologias têm possibilitado o tratamento bem sucedido de enfermidades, elevando a qualidade de vida da população. Entretanto, para além da cura de doenças, o domínio conquistado sobre os processos vitais pode ser usado com o objetivo de aperfeiçoar as capacidades naturais da espécie humana, como a cognição, a performance física e a longevidade. Este trabalho busca analisar os desafios éticos colocados pelas tecnologias de melhoramento humano. Trata-se de compreender argumentos de autores contrários ao procedimento, tais como Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama e Michael Sandel, contrastando-os com argumentos daqueles que se mostram favoráveis ao melhoramento, como Nick Bostrom, Julian Savulescu e Allen Buchanan. A intervenção sobre os traços fundamentais da espécie altera o modo como concebemos tradicionalmente a noção de humanidade. Cumpre, portanto, evidenciar as implicações éticas desta alteração, identificando seus riscos e benefícios.

Entre la sacralisation de la vie et l’essentialisation de la nature humaine : un examen critique du bioconservatisme1

Souvent qualifiés par leurs détracteurs d’« anti-mélioristes » ou de « bioluddites », les penseurs associés au « bioconservatisme » ont développé au début du vingt et unième siècle une critique vigoureuse des avancées technoscientifiques et biomédicales visant l’amélioration de l’être humain et de ses performances. À travers l’examen de la pensée de deux de ses représentants majeurs, le philosophe Leon Kass et le politologue Francis Fukuyama, cet article propose une lecture critique de la bioéthique conservatrice. Si les bioconservateurs ont le mérite de rappeler la nécessité de tenir compte de l’ancrage vivant irréductible de l’être humain à l’ère de la bioéconomie et de l’exploitation croissante du monde vivant, nous verrons que la conception, sinon religieuse, pour le moins dogmatique de la « nature humaine » qui soutient leur argumentation permet difficilement de répondre aux défis éthiques et politiques soulevés par l’aspiration actuelle à un humain augmenté.

The Ethics of Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis: An Opinion Piece Examining the Moral Distinction Between Positive and Negative Selection of Traits Using PGD

Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) follows in vitro fertilization (IVF) of several ova. Negative selection (NS), or the discarding of embryos containing undesirable alleles, is currently being performed in IVF clinics. Conversely, positive selection (PS) is the discarding of embryos that do not contain a desirable allele. In other words, PS keeps an embryo because it contains a desirable genetic profile. There are many groups that support NS but there are far fewer who support PS. The bioconservative philosophy, led by philosophers such as Leon Kass, opposes PS and bioliberalism in general. Conversely, NS (and PS) of embryos resonates best of all with the bioliberalism philosophy. More specifically, a subset of bioliberalism, called transhumanism. In order to find NS morally permissible and PS morally unacceptable, one must support one’s position by making a moral distinction between the two types of selection. The major claims against PS include that it is not medically serious, that it propagates eugenics, that it propagates sex selection and that it elicits a moral repugnance which proves its immorality. In analyzing these arguments, I hope to show that none of them are consistent in their application, and that their inability to be applied universally significantly weakens their case.