Abstract«Bankenmacht», «Verwaltungsherrschaft», «Aktionärsdemokratie»? On the problem of management control in German stock corporations 1870 to 1931The liberalization of stock company law in Prussia and the North German Confederation respectively as well as the abolition of state concessions as a prerequisite for the formation of a joint-stock company led to a debate about the means of control regarding joint-stock companies. The new stock company law instituted supervisory boards as a controlling body, as a mandatory «contracted general assembly», but did not elaborate on a clear definition of their duties. Yet, since the end of the so called «Gründerboom» in 1873, it became more and more apparent that the supervisory boards failed to provide adequate supervision. The law was amended in 1884 accordingly, in order to increase the supervisory boards’ means of control over the executive board. Subsequently, many joint-stock companies developed an oligarchic power structure, which cut down on shareholder protection rights. Banks were heavily involved in this process due to their voting rights as «inside shareholders», but by no means would it be suitable to label this as «Bankenherrschaft».