Pastoralists and the State ... and 'islamic State' On Eastern Niger's Frontier: Between Evasion And Engagement

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-79
Author(s):  
Florian Köhler
Keyword(s):  
Current Situation ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Mobile Pastoralists ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
State And Society ◽  
Peripheral Areas

In the current situation of militant Islamist groups encroaching on peripheral areas of different Sahelian states, mobile pastoralists are often accused of sympathising or collaborating with jihadists. Examining this phenomenon with a focus on eastern Niger and in the context of the Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad basin, this article relates it to the debates about incorporation and evasion of pastoralists with regard to state and society, and frontiers and borderlands as spaces not only of difficult governance but also of economic and political opportunities.

scholarly journals The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-230
Author(s):  
T. S. Denisova ◽  
S. V. Kostelyanets
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Military Tactics ◽  
Basin Region

The Islamist group Boko Haram (BH) was founded in the early 2000s and in less than two decades has transformed from a “Nigerian” movement into a regional one. Tactical, strategic and ideological differences between the leaders of BH have repeatedly led to its splits into separate factions; the most serious occurred in 2016, when the group split into the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Jamaatu Ahl-is-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad, the latter being still referred to as “Boko Haram” for convenience.The present paper examines the reasons for the splits in BH, the goals and military tactics of the two factions, and the prospects for the development of the security situation in the region of the Lake Chad basin (LCB), where armed conflict is fueled by large-scale poverty, socio-economic and political marginalization, and ineffectiveness of local authorities against the background of intertribal tensions and massive migration.The LCB has now become a huge human reservoir for jihadist recruitment. The situation in the region is further complicated by the fact that a significant portion of the population supports the Islamists, while the majority of locals are targeted by them and seek to leave their homes.The authors note that the division of BH into separate factions has made it more difficult for the LCB armed forces to conduct anti-terrorist operations, and for the LCB governments to negotiate cease fires or retrieve hostages, although, simultaneously, the split has led to a certain decline in the level of violence and to the weakening of the influence of the Islamists on the socio-economic development in the region.

Nigeria defector reintegration will meet challenges

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
West Africa ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
New Development

Significance This follows the death of longtime Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in May at the hands of his rivals in the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Cameroonian authorities are also reporting a surge in defections. Though the numbers may be exaggerated, this represents a significant new development in the ongoing struggle against jihadist insurgency. Impacts Shekau’s death will allow ISWAP to consolidate its control in the Lake Chad basin by removing a major rival. ISWAP’s overall fighting strength may not substantially increase as many former Boko Haram fighters may defect rather than join ISWAP. The Nigerian military’s use of indiscriminate airstrikes may deter future defections and fuel recruitment into ISWAP.

scholarly journals Decapitation strategies and the significance of Abubakar Shekau's death in Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Olawale Albert
Keyword(s):  
Local Communities ◽  
West African ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
War On Terrorism ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
New Recruits ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Decapitation strategies have often been linked to counterterrorism. The existing literature suggests the results of these strategies are mixed. Previous studies suggest that the death of a prominent leader may not necessarily end the crisis; it all depends on the group's infrastructure, ideology, leadership traditions, and extent of its penetration in society. This article takes a critical look at the impact of a recent leadership decapitation in Nigeria. Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the Boko Haram movement in the Lake Chad Basin countries, was killed on 19 May 2021 by a faction of the movement known as the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP). This article argues that Shekau's case has paradoxically helped to strengthen ISWAP's position, giving it new recruits and other resources and perhaps most importantly reinforced its position with local communities. This has implications for the Nigerian state, its neighbours and, because of Boko Haram's links to ISIS, the wider war on terrorism.

Jihadist Insurgencies in the Sahel

2021 ◽  
pp. 568-586
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Communal Violence ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Sahel Region ◽  
Local Levels

Over the last decade, jihadist violence has expanded and intensified throughout the Sahel region. Jihadi groups, including Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Katiba Macina, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have established strongholds in many places in the central Sahel, as well as in and around the Lake Chad Basin. As they strengthen their presence, Sahelian jihadists have introduced new changes in local social relations and practices, experimented with new forms of governance, and attempted to insert themselves into the local political economy. Yet, as they gain ground and conquer new spaces, their governance model has also shown its limits: their presence has increasingly fueled deadly communal violence, and infighting among jihadi groups has become recurrent and deadly. This chapter analyses the factors and dynamics behind this surge of jihadi violence in the Sahel. It attempts to situate the global jihadi discourse within the spectrum of Islamic ideologies and discourses and elaborates on the dynamics, both at the state and local levels, that have favored the emergence of jihadi groups.

scholarly journals Desiccation of Lake Chad as a cause of security instability in the Sahel region

GeoScape ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kateřina Rudincová
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Changes ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Environmental Threats ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Ecological Changes ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Sahel Region

AbstractThe Lake Chad basin is one of the most unstable regions in Africa. The lake itself has shrunk and nowadays it covers less than 10 % of its area in 1960. These environmental changes have wider geopolitical consequences in the whole region, which encompasses countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Therefore, it seems that environmental threats may act as the detonators for larger political conflict as well as for a struggle for land and may cause growing instability in affected countries. The region is fragile, owing to the fact that several terrorist and Islamist groups are operating there. The most serious threat in the Lake Chad basin is militant Islamist group Boko Haram, which is based in north eastern Nigeria, but it is also active in neighbouring countries. As a result of both ecological changes and security threats, people are losing their traditional sources of income from herding and it is likely that there will be large waves of migration from the area. The paper focuses on the environmental challenges in the Lake Chad basin and their effect on the security in the region. The main attention will be paid to the strategies and actions of militant terrorist groups such as Boko Haram that will be analysed in the wider regional geopolitical context.

scholarly journals National Interests and Regional Security in the Lake Chad: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force

2020 ◽  
pp. 40-49
Author(s):  
Ifeanyichukwu Micheal Abada ◽  
Charles Akale ◽  
Kingsley Chigozie Udegbunam ◽  
Olihe A. Ononogbu
Keyword(s):  
Task Force ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Security Architecture ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Joint Task ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Joint Task Force

This article assessed security architecture for counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The paper diagnosed the impact of conflicting national interests of contributing nations on the performance of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional security architecture in the LCB. Some scholars and analysts cite corruption, historical contradictions among LCB members, poor funding, and complex nature of the insurgency, as factors responsible for failure of counter-insurgency operations in the LCB. Others contend that resource geopolitics, linguistic differences, and hegemonic politics have impacted negatively on the capacity of the MNJTF to decimate terrorists in the region. This is a qualitative study that draws from the Fund for Peace, International Crisis Group (ICG), Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), and research literature dealing with national interest and military alliances, while using content analysis to argue that conflicts in national interests, more than any other factor, have hampered the collaborative efforts of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and weakened the capacity of the MNJTF to engage in robust counterinsurgency against Boko Haram in the LCB.

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