scholarly journals A comparative study on goals of competition law with the case of merger regulation and recommendations to Viet Nam

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. first
Author(s):  
Hieu Trong Truong
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Academic World ◽  
Fair Competition ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Workable Competition

The goals of competition law and policy play a notable navigator in law enforcement and lead to new rule inauguration regimes. However, Vietnam avoids signifying its goals in all two competition law versions, the Vietnamese Competition Law 2004 and the Vietnamese Competition Law 2018. The practical merger regulation has been thus confusing in the circumstances. Be continued with the lengthy controversial discussions in the academic world; the paper opens the comparative approach to other major jurisdictions. Rather than the Asian earlies system of Japanese anti-monopoly law or the European Union's primary youngest competition law, the United States antitrust law contributes to the original explanation of the law's objectives and directions. It experiences that Vietnam could maintain the diverse goals of competition law with its priority interests. Rejecting the aspect of free and fair competition, or the workable competition, the analysis traces the identification of effective competition mainly according to the European Union's perspective. Notably, the industrial policy takes a significant connection with the competition policy; however, it does not always ensure competition law enforcement. Be mainly based on Japanese historical achievement; the paper leads to an appropriate direction to resolve this complicated relationship between the two conflict but reciprocity policies. These implications will contribute to enhancing the legalization of competition law in Vietnam.

Modelling Public and Private Enforcement

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Kit Barker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
Moral Economic

Achieving a workable, hybrid model of competition law enforcement that is sensitive to both instrumental and non-instrumental ends and which commands broad, cross-jurisdictional support always struck me as a tall order. For one thing, it required a keen understanding of the nature of competition law wrongs, which sit awkwardly at the turnstile between public and private law. The enforcement processes of competition law have also evolved in very different social and historical contexts, the United States being an environment in which regulatory agencies have historically been regarded with scepticism (if not downright distrust) and Europe being a centralised bureaucracy in which they have tended to be regarded as the paradigm. Most challengingly of all, the project required a theory of ‘holism’ capable of explaining how it is possible to reconcile complex moral, economic and social objectives within a singular enforcement system, or (more accurately) within a linked network of distinct law enforcement systems.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Development Agenda

This introductory chapter provides an overview of competition law in developing countries. Following the proliferation of competition law across the globe in the last few decades, developing countries now comprise a majority of the jurisdictions that have in place a competition law. At least in terms of the language of the main substantive provisions on restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance, many of these new jurisdictions have chosen to follow the U.S. and the EU models. However, the proliferation of competition law regimes has given rise to a fear of balkanization of competition law enforcement and an excessive compliance burden for businesses, especially multi-national corporations. Out of this fear grew the rallying cry for convergence. The implicit assumption behind the drive for convergence is that there exists one or a handful of models of competition law enforcement that are suitable for most countries across the globe, to which new jurisdictions are expected to converge. Some commentators and officials have challenged this, questioning whether the legal principles regulating markets in the industrialized economies of the United States and the European Union can be transplanted directly to developing countries. Apart from the need to tailor to the local economic environment, competition law must contribute to the economic growth and development agenda of developing countries.

International Cooperation in Competition Law Enforcement

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-122
Author(s):  
Eugene D. Cross
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Government ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Bilateral Agreement ◽  
States Government

On September 23,1991, an agreement was signed by the Commission of the European Communities and the United States government to promote cooperation and coordination of theircompetition law enforcement efforts. This is the fourth such bilateral agreement to which the United States is a party, and the first for the Commission. Previous US agreements are in force with Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Australia.

A Solution to the Problems? Regulation 1/2003 and the modernization of competition procedure

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Andreas Rosenfeld
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Radical Reform ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Ec Competition Law

Abstract On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings.

Super platforms, big data, and competition law: the Japanese approach in contrast with the USA and EU

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiaki Takigawa
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Essential Facility ◽  
Share Data ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Data Portability ◽  
Efficiency Effects

ABSTRACT This article examines antitrust issues concerning digital platforms equipped with big data. Recent initiatives by the Japanese competition agency are highlighted, comparing them with those by the USA and EU competition authorities. First examined is whether competition among platforms would result in a select few super platforms with market power, concluding that AI with machine learning has augmented the power of super platforms with strong AI-capability, leading to increased importance of merger control over acquisitions by platforms. Next scrutinized is the argument for utility-regulation to be imposed on super platforms, concluding that wide support is limited to data portability, leaving competition law as the key tool for addressing super platforms, its core tool being the provision against exclusionary conduct, enforcement of which, initially, concerns whether to order super platforms to render their data accessible to their rivals. Passive refusal-to-share data needs to be scrutinized under the essential facility doctrine. Beyond passive refusal, platforms’ exclusionary conduct requires competition agencies to weigh the conduct’s exclusionary effects against its efficiency effects. Finally addressed is exploitative abuse, explaining its relation to consumer protection, concluding that competition law enforcement on exploitative abuse should be minimized, since it accompanies risk of over-enforcement.

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