Introduction

Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This introductory chapter provides an overview of competition law in developing countries. Following the proliferation of competition law across the globe in the last few decades, developing countries now comprise a majority of the jurisdictions that have in place a competition law. At least in terms of the language of the main substantive provisions on restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance, many of these new jurisdictions have chosen to follow the U.S. and the EU models. However, the proliferation of competition law regimes has given rise to a fear of balkanization of competition law enforcement and an excessive compliance burden for businesses, especially multi-national corporations. Out of this fear grew the rallying cry for convergence. The implicit assumption behind the drive for convergence is that there exists one or a handful of models of competition law enforcement that are suitable for most countries across the globe, to which new jurisdictions are expected to converge. Some commentators and officials have challenged this, questioning whether the legal principles regulating markets in the industrialized economies of the United States and the European Union can be transplanted directly to developing countries. Apart from the need to tailor to the local economic environment, competition law must contribute to the economic growth and development agenda of developing countries.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Mária T. Patakyová

Abstract Digitalisation is a challenge from the regulatory point of view. Competition law, as a special type of regulation, is no exception to this. The article explores the risks of digitalisation, especially the ones related to the enhanced use of pricing algorithms. In theory, pricing algorithms are not easily assessed from the perspective of competition law, let alone its application in practice. The prohibition of anticompetitive agreements (pursuant to Article 101 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) is applied with certain difficulty to agreements created by using pricing algorithms. This is an unfortunate situation, as horizontal agreements represent one of the worst infringements of EU competition law, including price cartels or bid rigging. Apart from presenting a theoretical background, the article dives into the practice of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) in order to assess which practical issues the AMO might face when applying the theoretical concepts. In sum, the article asks from a theoretical perspective which issues of competition law have been introduced (or deepened) by the enhanced digitalisation, looking in particular to pricing algorithms. On top of that, the article explores the issues which may be encountered in practice, taking the Slovak jurisdiction as the example. The willingness and feasibility of the AMO to enforce digital issues such as pricing algorithms is assessed based on the previous acts of the AMO as well as the new Act on Protection of Competition, adopted by the Slovak parliament on 11 May 2021.


Author(s):  
Hieu Trong Truong

The goals of competition law and policy play a notable navigator in law enforcement and lead to new rule inauguration regimes. However, Vietnam avoids signifying its goals in all two competition law versions, the Vietnamese Competition Law 2004 and the Vietnamese Competition Law 2018. The practical merger regulation has been thus confusing in the circumstances. Be continued with the lengthy controversial discussions in the academic world; the paper opens the comparative approach to other major jurisdictions. Rather than the Asian earlies system of Japanese anti-monopoly law or the European Union's primary youngest competition law, the United States antitrust law contributes to the original explanation of the law's objectives and directions. It experiences that Vietnam could maintain the diverse goals of competition law with its priority interests. Rejecting the aspect of free and fair competition, or the workable competition, the analysis traces the identification of effective competition mainly according to the European Union's perspective. Notably, the industrial policy takes a significant connection with the competition policy; however, it does not always ensure competition law enforcement. Be mainly based on Japanese historical achievement; the paper leads to an appropriate direction to resolve this complicated relationship between the two conflict but reciprocity policies. These implications will contribute to enhancing the legalization of competition law in Vietnam.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter explores the myriad difficulties and obstacles for competition law enforcement in developing countries and suggests possible solutions to some of these difficulties. Competition culture is generally lacking in developing countries. In addition, developing country authorities often face a particularly challenging enforcement environment due to past policy failures by the government, especially in the context of privatization. Another major external impediment to effective competition law enforcement is the lack of political will on the part of the government to enforce the law. The chapter also looks at the lack of authority independence, financial resources, enforcement powers, availability of data, and judicial expertise. Institutional design can have a bearing on setting of enforcement priorities. Poor institutional design may take flexibility away from the authority and make it impossible for the authority to set enforcement priorities. Apart from enforcement, however, another very important part of an authority’s work is advocacy. It is through advocacy with the general public that the authority can hope to build a competition culture. Meanwhile, it is through advocacy with the government that the authority can ensure government policies do not create intractable competition problems that are beyond the capability of the authority to solve. The chapter then considers the benefits and limitations of a regional approach to competition law enforcement. Enforcement and procedure


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter offers a coherent approach to competition law enforcement in developing countries. The promotion of economic growth and development should be the paramount objective of competition law enforcement in developing countries. However, ascribing the objective of the promotion of economic growth and development to competition law enforcement in developing countries does not require a detraction from a focus on promoting competition. In addition, competition law enforcement in developing countries must abide by the principle of causing no harm to the poor in society. If a developing country decides to pursue industrial policy, its competition authority may be asked to balance between competition and industrial policy objectives. Ultimately, competition law enforcement in developing countries must take into account the economic characteristics of developing countries as well as the enforcement capacity of developing country authorities.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This book explores the relationship between competition law and economic development, which takes on growing importance as more and more developing countries have adopted competition law in recent years. The work tackles two principal questions. The first is whether competition law enforcement promotes growth, which helps to determine how seriously developing countries should enforce their competition laws. The second is how developing countries should craft their competition law rules in light of the need to incorporate development concerns, the need to reflect the special economic characteristics of developing countries, and the need to improve the administrability of competition law rules to suit the enforcement capacity of developing country authorities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Kit Barker

Achieving a workable, hybrid model of competition law enforcement that is sensitive to both instrumental and non-instrumental ends and which commands broad, cross-jurisdictional support always struck me as a tall order. For one thing, it required a keen understanding of the nature of competition law wrongs, which sit awkwardly at the turnstile between public and private law. The enforcement processes of competition law have also evolved in very different social and historical contexts, the United States being an environment in which regulatory agencies have historically been regarded with scepticism (if not downright distrust) and Europe being a centralised bureaucracy in which they have tended to be regarded as the paradigm. Most challengingly of all, the project required a theory of ‘holism’ capable of explaining how it is possible to reconcile complex moral, economic and social objectives within a singular enforcement system, or (more accurately) within a linked network of distinct law enforcement systems.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter argues that there is no one universal approach to competition law and that the design and enforcement of competition law needs to take into account the political, economic, and social circumstances of the country. Given the overwhelming obstacles to attaining economic growth and development, economic policies in a developing country must be tailored to maximize the prospect of growth and development. This means that competition law enforcement should aim to promote growth and meet development needs, even if this may lead to conflict with other objectives of competition law such as the protection of consumer welfare and the pursuit of economic efficiency. Moreover, the various classifications of developing countries suggest that there is significant diversity among them. Indeed, there are likely to be significant differences in terms of market conditions among developing countries. Thus, it is unlikely that there is a single approach to competition law enforcement suitable for all of them.


1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-122
Author(s):  
Eugene D. Cross

On September 23,1991, an agreement was signed by the Commission of the European Communities and the United States government to promote cooperation and coordination of theircompetition law enforcement efforts. This is the fourth such bilateral agreement to which the United States is a party, and the first for the Commission. Previous US agreements are in force with Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Australia.


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