Le misure provvisorie della Corte europea dei diritti umani nell'ambito della procedura di ricorso interstatale Georgia c. Russia

2009 ◽  
pp. 129-150
Author(s):  
Andrea Saccucci

- In the case Georgia v. Russia, the European Court has adopted provisional meas- ures requesting both States parties to ensure compliance with their engagements under the ECHR, particularly in respect of the right to life (Article 2) and the prohibition of tor- ture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3). It is the first time in the Court's history that Rule 39 of its Rules of Procedure is applied in the framework of an inter- state complaint procedure. Being themselves aimed at safeguarding pendente lite the rights of individuals exposed to the imminent risk of an irreparable damages rather than to protect States' own rights, inter-state provisional measures are subject to a legal re- gime largely correspondent to that of provisional measures adopted on request of an in- dividual applicant. Notwithstanding the despicable absence of any reasoning, the in- terim protection accorded by the Court in the case Georgia v. Russia seems to fall squarely within the previous practice in individual cases as to procedural and substantial requirements, certain peculiarities being in fact a mere consequence of the rules appli- cable to inter-state litigation and of the specific object of the complaint filed by Georgia in relation to an ongoing armed conflict. The most controversial issue remains that of the binding nature of provisional measures, given that the solution embraced by the re- cent Court's case-law relies on the obligation not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual petition and cannot be extended to inter-state complaints. A proposal for a different approach is therefore offered, which links the binding nature of provi- sional measures to the substantive obligations they seek to ensure respect for against possible violations having irreparable consequences.

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-488
Author(s):  
Kresimir Kamber

This article looks into the architecture of remedies for breaches of the right of prisoners not to be subjected to inadequate conditions of detention under the revised 2020 European Prison Rules (EPR). It seeks to expound the consistency and rationality of the relevant provisions of the 2020 EPR from the perspective of relevant principles and specific prescriptions of European prison law. For the purpose of the present article, the term ‘European prison law’ encompasses rules and standards set out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, practice of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the provisions of the EPR. The article finds that, in this context, there is sufficient coherence in the relevant principles of European prison law – faithfully codified in the 2020 EPR – providing clear guidance to European States on how to put in place a system of remedies for breaches of prisoners’ rights and how to ensure its effective operation in practice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-314
Author(s):  
Lieneke Slingenberg

Abstract The European Court of Human Rights increasingly deals with migrants’ complaints about destitution in their host state under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment). This case law has been criticized for not being consistent and/or for not providing migrants with enough protection. Based on a systematic case law search, in this article, I analyse Article 3 case law on migrants’ destitution from a new perspective: the concept of freedom as non-domination, as developed in (neo) republican theory. It will argue that, seen through this lens, many tendencies in the Court’s case law can be explained and constructed as consistent, and it is submitted that in this way the Court does provide migrants with important protection against unfreedom. Nevertheless, I also argue in the article that the case law could be improved in a number of ways in order to provide more effective and robust protection against domination.


Author(s):  
Jakub Czepek

Sport has been an object of interest of international law on several occasions. It has also been a point of interest of regional human rights protection, for example within the legal system of Council of Europe. Recently, the European Court of Human Rights has developed its case-law concerning sport-related issues, such as football supporters related violence and prevention of events of hooliganism, anti-doping related issues or fairness of proceedings before The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne or the protection of professional athletes’ rights in the context of anti-doping requirements. The article focuses on the ECtHR case-law relating to sport within the meaning of the  right to life (art. 2 of the ECHR), prohibition of torture of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 3 of the ECHR), right to liberty and security (art.5 of the ECHR), right to a fair trial (art.6 of the ECHR) or right to protection of private and family life (art.8 of the ECHR).


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuliya Samovich

The manual is devoted to making individual complaints to the European Court of human rights: peculiarities of realization of the right to appeal, conditions of admissibility and the judicial procedure of the European Court of Human Rights. The author analyses some “autonomous concepts” used in the court's case law and touches upon the possibility of limiting the right to judicial protection. The article deals with the formation and development of the individual's rights to international judicial protection, as well as the protection of human rights in universal quasi-judicial international bodies and regional judicial institutions of the European Union and the Organization of American States. This publication includes a material containing an analysis of recent changes in the legal regulation of the Institute of individual complaints. The manual is recommended for students of educational organizations of higher education, studying in the areas of bachelor's and master's degree “Jurisprudence”.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (83) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana Domocos

The Romanian legislation establishes in the new penal procedure law the right to silence and the right of non-incrimination of the defendant in the criminal trial.The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.Therefore, the right to silence involves not only the right not to testify against oneself, but also the right of the suspect or defendant not to incriminate oneself. The suspect or defendant cannot be compelled to assist in the production of evidence and cannot be sanctioned for failing to provide certain documents or other evidence. Obligation to testify against personal will, under the constraint of a fine or any other form of coercion constitutes an interference with the negative aspect of the right to freedom of expression which must be necessary in a democratic Romanian society.The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. It is essential to clarify certain issues as far as this right is concerned.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


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