The Problem of Signs in Heidegger's Being and Time

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Saulius Geniusas

The author argues that our ontological understanding of signs remains incomplete as long as it is limited to Heidegger's explicit analysis of signs in Being and Time. Besides focusing on §17 (the only section in this work that addresses signs explicitly), a full-scale evaluation of Heidegger's ontology of signs must also inquire into (1) the relation between signs and the question of the meaning of Being, as well as (2) the role signs perform on the methodological level of formal indication. The paper's main thesis will be that Heidegger's explicit treatment of signs is irreconcilable with how signs emerge as problematic in (1) and (2). This irreconcilability stems from Heidegger's presumption that non-linguistic signs are paradigmatic of signs in general.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 102-135
Author(s):  
John J. Preston ◽  

I argue that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle’s method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philo­sophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of Being and Time, specifically das Man and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into endoxa.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (10) ◽  
pp. 2825-2830 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qihang Wu ◽  
Haiyan Li ◽  
Xiaodong Hu ◽  
Yongfeng Shi ◽  
Deguan Kong ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 175 ◽  
pp. 369-389
Author(s):  
SeongYong Han ◽  
Sungpyo Kim ◽  
Kyung-Hoon Moon ◽  
Seong-han Kim ◽  
Jei-cheol Jeon ◽  
...  

1997 ◽  
Vol 69 (7) ◽  
pp. 1272-1281 ◽  
Author(s):  
William L. Marten ◽  
Glen T. Daigger

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Troy Walker ◽  
Nathan Boyle ◽  
Benjamin D Stanford ◽  
Christine Owen ◽  
Paul G. Biscardi

1977 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuel S. Alder ◽  
Stephen B. Denny

Author(s):  
Andrew Inkpin

This chapter adds a more specific level to the Heideggerian framework by considering the complex disclosive function linguistic signs have for Heidegger. This task is approached by considering his ambivalent attitude toward everyday language use (‘idle talk’), which is presented as both practically necessary and somehow deficient. To understand this ambivalence, it reviews Heidegger’s earlier conception of philosophical concepts’ function as ‘formal indication’, before showing how his earlier views reappear in Being and Time and how, together with the foundational role of purposive understanding discussed in chapter 1, they account for Heidegger’s ambivalence toward everyday language use. Given the disparate factors at work in Heidegger’s conception of linguistic signs, it then proposes a distinction between presentational sense and pragmatic sense, before explaining how the limitations of Heidegger’s discussion define the task for the following chapters.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document