Heidegger’s Endoxic Method

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 102-135
Author(s):  
John J. Preston ◽  

I argue that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle’s method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philo­sophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of Being and Time, specifically das Man and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into endoxa.

Author(s):  
Andrew Inkpin

This chapter adds a more specific level to the Heideggerian framework by considering the complex disclosive function linguistic signs have for Heidegger. This task is approached by considering his ambivalent attitude toward everyday language use (‘idle talk’), which is presented as both practically necessary and somehow deficient. To understand this ambivalence, it reviews Heidegger’s earlier conception of philosophical concepts’ function as ‘formal indication’, before showing how his earlier views reappear in Being and Time and how, together with the foundational role of purposive understanding discussed in chapter 1, they account for Heidegger’s ambivalence toward everyday language use. Given the disparate factors at work in Heidegger’s conception of linguistic signs, it then proposes a distinction between presentational sense and pragmatic sense, before explaining how the limitations of Heidegger’s discussion define the task for the following chapters.


PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Saulius Geniusas

The author argues that our ontological understanding of signs remains incomplete as long as it is limited to Heidegger's explicit analysis of signs in Being and Time. Besides focusing on §17 (the only section in this work that addresses signs explicitly), a full-scale evaluation of Heidegger's ontology of signs must also inquire into (1) the relation between signs and the question of the meaning of Being, as well as (2) the role signs perform on the methodological level of formal indication. The paper's main thesis will be that Heidegger's explicit treatment of signs is irreconcilable with how signs emerge as problematic in (1) and (2). This irreconcilability stems from Heidegger's presumption that non-linguistic signs are paradigmatic of signs in general.


Author(s):  
Thomas R. Flynn

Toward the midpoint of his career, Sartre famously announced the separation from his previous work which he described as a rationalist philosophy of consciousness. Henceforth, he implied, his focus would be on free organic praxis. It would be dialectical and historical not just analytical and psychological. It seemed that he was distancing himself from classical (constitutive) Husserlian phenomenology in favor of something more fluid, more concrete like the hermeneutic phenomenology that he discovered in the Heidegger of Being and Time and was recommending as an ingredient in his Existential psychoanalysis. But classical phenomenology was not so much passed over as it was placed in abeyance to return in Sartre’s study of Gustave Flaubert, his life and times. The author proposes to chart and critique this methodological circle of applied phenomenology.


Author(s):  
Catriona Hanley

The discussion of Heidegger's “destructive retrieve” of Aristotle has been intensified in recent years by the publication of Heidegger's courses in the years surrounding his magnum opus. Heidegger's explicit commentary on Aristotle in these courses permits one to read Being and Time with Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics. My paper analyzes a network of differences between the two thinkers, focusing on the relationship between theory and praxis. From Aristotle to Heidegger, there is: (1) a shift from the priority of actuality to the priority of possibility. This shift, I argue, is itself the metaphysical ground of: (2) a shift from the priority of theory to the priority of praxis. This shift is seen most clearly in the way in which (3) Heidegger's notion of Theorie is a modification of his poíesis. The temporal ground of the reversal is seen in (4) Heidegger's notion of transcendence towards the world, and not towards an eternal being.


2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Bergo

AbstractThis essay studies the unfolding of Levinas' concept of transcendence from 1935 to his 1984 talk entitled "Transcendence and Intelligibility." I discuss how Levinas frames transcendence in light of enjoyment, shame, and nausea in his youthful project of a counter-ontology to Heidegger's Being and Time. In Levinas' essay, transcendence is the human urge to get out of being. I show the ways in which Levinas' early ontology is conditioned by historical circumstances, but I argue that its primary aim is formal and phenomenological; it adumbrates formal structures of human existence. Levinas' 1940s ontology accentuates the dualism in being, between what amount to a light and a dark principle. This shift in emphasis ushers in a new focus for transcendence, which is now both sensuous and temporal, thanks to the promise of fecundity. Totality and Infinity (1961) pursues a similar onto-logic, while shifting the locus of transcendence to a non-sexuate other. The final great work, Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence (1974) offers a hermeneutic phenomenology of transcendence-in-immanence. It rethinks Husserl's focus on the transcendence of intentionality and its condition of possibility in the passive synthesis of complex temporality. If the 1974 strategy 'burrows beneath' the classical phenomenological syntheses, it also incorporates unsuspected influences from French psychology and phenomenology. This allows Levinas to develop a philosophical conception of transcendence that is neither Husserl's intentionality nor Heidegger's temporal ecstases, in what amounts to an original contribution to a phenomenology both hermeneutic and descriptive.


Author(s):  
David Egan

Superficially, Wittgenstein and Heidegger seem worlds apart: they worked in different philosophical traditions, were mostly ignorant of one another’s work, and Wittgenstein’s terse aphorisms in plain language could not be farther stylistically from Heidegger’s difficult prose. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Heidegger’s Being and Time share a number of striking parallels. In particular, this book argues that both authors manifest a similar concern with authenticity. The argument develops in three stages. Part One explores the emphasis both philosophers place on the everyday, and how this emphasis brings with it a methodological focus on recovering what we already know rather than advancing novel theses. Part Two argues that the dynamic of authenticity and inauthenticity in Being and Time finds homologies in Philosophical Investigations. In particular, the book articulates and defends a conception of authenticity in Wittgenstein that emphasizes the responsiveness and reciprocity of play. Part Three considers how both philosophers’ conceptions of authenticity apply reflexively to their own work: both are concerned not only with the question of what it means to exist authentically but also with the question of what it means to do philosophy authentically. For both authors, the problematic of authenticity is intimately linked to the question of philosophical method.


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