scholarly journals A Response to Clunn's Axioms of Morality

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-39
Author(s):  
J R Miller
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Internal Conflicts

This is a brief critique of Clunn's foundationalism which grounds moral decision making in what he calls the three fundamental axioms of existence, consciousness, and identity. It shows how his precommitments create at least three incoherencies wherein a priori is a posteriori, individuality is an illusion, and objective morality is subjective. For Clunn's moral philosophy to offer practical value, these internal conflicts must be resolved.

Framing Morality: How Antecedent-Focused Strategies Can Shape Moral Judgments

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Process Dissociation ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
First Response ◽  
High Conflict

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.

Acting According to Conscience

1987 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 135-149
Author(s):  
Desmond M. Clarke
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Alternative Formulation ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
History Of

We have inherited from the history of moral philosophy two very different proposals about how we ought to behave. According to one view, we are required to do what is morally right; on the alternative formulation, we are required to do what we believe to be morally right. Unless these twin demands on our moral decision-making can be made to coincide by definition, it is inevitable that in some cases our beliefs about what is morally right may be mistaken. In such cases, it is not clear what we are morally required to do. Are we obliged to follow our conscience in every situation, i.e. to act according to our moral beliefs, or is it sometimes permissible not to act according to our own moral beliefs?

Moral particularism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral particularism is a broad set of views which play down the role of general moral principles in moral philosophy and practice. Particularists stress the role of examples in moral education and of moral sensitivity or judgment in moral decision-making, as well as criticizing moral theories which advocate or rest upon general principles. It has not yet been demonstrated that particularism constitutes an importantly controversial position in moral philosophy.

scholarly journals Murdoch andMargaret: Learning a Moral Life

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-280
Author(s):  
Lucy Bolton
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Agents

Reading the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch alongside film enables us to see Murdoch's notions of practical moral good in action. For Murdoch, moral philosophy can be seen as “a more systematic and reflective extension of what ordinary moral agents are continually doing”. Murdoch can help us further by her consideration of the value of a moral fable: does a morally important fable always imply universal rules? And how do we decide whether a fable is morally important? By bringing Murdoch and Margaret (Kenneth Lonergan, 2011) together in an exploration of the moral decision making of the film's protagonist and our assessment of her choices, we can learn more about the idea of film as a morally important fable rather than a fable that is purely decorative.

Acting According to Conscience

1987 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 135-149
Author(s):  
Desmond M. Clarke
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Alternative Formulation ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
History Of

We have inherited from the history of moral philosophy two very different proposals about how we ought to behave. According to one view, we are required to do what is morally right; on the alternative formulation, we are required to do what we believe to be morally right. Unless these twin demands on our moral decision-making can be made to coincide by definition, it is inevitable that in some cases our beliefs about what is morally right may be mistaken. In such cases, it is not clear what we are morally required to do. Are we obliged to follow our conscience in every situation, i.e. to act according to our moral beliefs, or is it sometimes permissible not to act according to our own moral beliefs?

Moral Philosophy

2019 ◽  
pp. 80-120
Author(s):  
Craig Smith
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Science ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter looks at Ferguson’s attempts to build a normative moral philosophy on the basis of his moral science. The relationship between universal attributes of human nature and their manifestation in the circumstances of particular societies leads Ferguson to attempt the creation of a clear moral vocabulary that will allow for ‘censorial inspection’ and moral decision making. Ferguson is not suggesting that we are bound by the content of current moral beliefs, but rather that these beliefs are the material that can help us clarify our thinking about moral issues. The chapter examines the key elements of Ferguson’s theory including his account of virtue, sociability, benevolence, happiness, action, and ambition. It argues that we should see Ferguson as a modern casuist, preparing a language for clear moral thinking.

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